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ABSTRACT 
The idea that the United States is bequeathed the special mission of leading mankind 
toward liberty has dominated U.S. foreign relations since the American Revolution. It 
remains the most pervasive theme in Americans’ thought about the world to the extent 
that over time, it has become firmly embedded in the nation’s historical and cultural 
consciousness. A study of diplomatic, intellectual, and cultural history, America in the 
World: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1944-1950 examines the impact of this 
exceptionalist vision on the policies and public debates that influenced Americans’ 
thinking about their role in the world from the beginning of their efforts to design the 
global post-World War II order to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Believers in 
Lockean progress and advocates of modernization, the administrations of Franklin 
Roosevelt and Harry Truman sought to establish a one-world order based on American 
liberal political and economic ideals. At the heart of this American-designed postwar 
world stood the United Nations, created to ensure collective security and foster a spirit of 
international collaboration, and transnational institutions like the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, envisioned to protect the global economy and promote free 
trade. These institutions served as concrete articulations of U.S. national interests yet at 
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the same time they were intended to inaugurate a “New Deal” and a “Fair Deal” for the 
world. Interpreting American post-war and Cold War policymaking through the lens of 
exceptionalism provides a complementary methodological framework to the national 
security or economic theses more commonly employed to describe this period. When the 
Soviet Union refused to accept the American-designed one-world order, the American 
response – inside and outside of government – was overwhelmingly shaped by ideology. 
While economic considerations and national security influenced U.S. Cold War policy, 
this dissertation demonstrates that it was the challenge posed by Moscow’s universalist 
aspirations and Communism’s inherent teleological ideology that caused Americans to 
turn the Cold War into a battle for a way of life.  
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Introduction 
“[I]t’s wonderful, this Senate,” Harry Truman quipped as he chatted casually with 
reporters. A day earlier he had cast his first vote as Vice President, breaking a tie on a 
foreign aid bill. It is “the greatest place on earth…The grandest bunch of fellows you 
could ever find anywhere…there isn’t one of them who would be anywhere else if he 
could.” The Missourian knew what he was talking about. He had served in the upper 
house of the United States’ Congress for ten years by the time he, with some reluctance, 
had joined Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s presidential ticket in 1944. Truman enjoyed 
being back on Capitol Hill. He had been the Vice President for less than three months, 
but as he told his mother and daughter in a letter later that same afternoon, he already 
found the job rather numbing and “quite a chore.” It was April 11, 1945.1  
The next day, Truman arrived at House Speaker Sam Rayburn’s (D-TX) office 
around five o’clock for an afternoon drink and possibly a game of cards with his former 
congressional colleagues. A call came in from Stephen Early, President Roosevelt’s 
Secretary, asking the Vice President to come to the White House “as quickly and 
quietly,” as possible. Only stopping by his office to pick up his hat, Truman in his hurry 
lost his Secret Service detail and arrived at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue just before five 
thirty. At the White House, he was ushered to the First Family’s private quarters. Outside 
the door he braced himself, took off his hat, and knocked. He was met inside by Eleanor 
Roosevelt. The First Lady placed her hand upon his shoulder and said, “Harry. The 
                                                 
1 Diary Entry, April 11, 1945 in Allen Drury, A Senate Journal, 1943-1945 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
1963), pp. 409-411. Harry Truman to Margaret and Jane Truman, April 11, 1945 in Off the Record: The 
Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (University of Missouri Press, 1997), pp. 13-14.  
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President is dead.” Truman instinctively responded, “Is there anything I can do for you?” 
“Is there anything I can do for you?” Mrs. Roosevelt replied. “For you are the one in 
trouble now.”2  
Albeit for a variety of reasons, many historians concur with Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
assessment. The task ahead of Harry Truman seemed daunting. Compared with his 
cosmopolitan, east-coast elite predecessor, the former Senator from Missouri seemed ill-
prepared for the Oval Office. He lacked Roosevelt’s charisma and sophistication and was, 
according to one historian, too “self-deprecating,” “parochial, ill-informed,” and 
“impatient.”3 Truman had even become Vice President practically by accident. He owed 
his presence on the ticket almost exclusively to the fact that between the potential 
contenders, he was “the man who would hurt FDR the least.”4 Even after the election, he 
was never part of the President’s inner circle. The two men had met only a half dozen 
times before Roosevelt had passed away. More than anything, as the historian William 
Leucthenburg explains, Harry Truman was just not Franklin Roosevelt. Few could 
imagine the Presidency separate from the Squire from Hyde Park. Even Truman 
                                                 
2 For Truman’s personal account of the events of April 12, 1945, see Ferrell, Off the Record, pp. 14-16 . 
3  Thomas G. Paterson quoted in Mark J. White, “Harry S. Truman, the Polish Question, and the 
Significance of FDR’s Death for American Diplomacy,” Maryland Historian, 23 (Fall/Winter 1992), p. 29. 
For a similarly unconvinced view of Truman’s qualifications and character, see Arnold A. Offner, Another 
Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford University Press, 2002), pp. 21-
25. For two excellent discussions that challenge these interpretations as overly simplified, see Alonzo L. 
Hamby, “An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of Harry S. Truman,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
106, no. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 33-55.; Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, 
and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
4 On Roosevelt’s selection of Truman’s as Vice President, see David Pietrusza, 1948: Harry Truman’s 
Improbable Victory and the Year that Changed America (Union Square Press, 2011), p. 10. Also see, Sean 
J. Savage, Truman and the Democratic Party (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1997), pp. 
17-21. 
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struggled to do so. In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt five months after taking office, he 
wrote, “I never think of anyone as the President, but Mr. Roosevelt.”5  
Truman inherited unfinished wars in Europe and the Far East along with a 
leadership role in his predecessor’s newly designed global postwar order. The United 
States had been instrumental in establishing the United Nations and designing it to keep 
international peace and craft a community of nations. Washington had also backed and 
prepared to bankroll the formation of a new international economic order under the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which were intended to help alleviate 
short and long term financial problems around the world and to prevent a global 
economic relapse. Formidable as these tasks appeared, Truman was not in trouble. Not 
really. Though he had limited international experience and appeared incapable of 
fulfilling Roosevelt’s legacy, Truman shared Roosevelt’s basic interpretation of 
American responsibilities in the world, and he saw himself as the “executor of” FDR’s 
“estate.”6  
Like so many Americans born at the close of the nineteenth century, Truman’s 
worldly political education began in April 1917 when Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric 
inspired the formation of his global views. The Wilsonian quest to make the world safe 
for democracy had left Truman enthusiastically feeling, “like Galahad after the Grail.” 
                                                 
5 Harry Truman to Eleanor Roosevelt, September 1, 1945 in Steve Neal, ed., Eleanor and Harry: The 
Correspondence of Eleanor Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (New York: Scribner, 2002), p. 38. 
6 William E. Leuchtenburg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to George W. Bush (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001), pp. 7-8. There is a substantial debate among historians as to whether 
Truman followed the same international policies that Roosevelt would have. We will never know, but the 
documentary evidence clearly implies that Truman believed he was following Roosevelt’s wishes. For 
more on this, see in particular Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 87-123. 
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Though nearsighted and too old to be drafted, he volunteered for the battle fields of 
Europe during the most devastating war on record.7 The combined experience of the First 
World War and the even more devastating Second World War that soon followed, 
confirmed to Harry Truman that the United States was the exceptional nation with an 
obligation to better the conditions of mankind. Twice in three decades, democracy had 
been fought for; for over a century and a half, Americans had preached it to the world. 
Like his predecessor, Truman came to believe that liberty would not prosper in a world of 
desolation. Active American involvement in global affairs was needed to prevent another 
war. This unique responsibility of leadership hung over Truman’s presidency and the 
United States as the Second World War ended.   
***** 
The idea that, as a unique nation, the United States has been bequeathed the special 
responsibility of leading the world toward liberty remains the most pervasive in 
American thought about their nation’s role in the world. As one State Department speaker 
explained it to an incoming class of Foreign Service Officers in the 1920s, even if the 
world did not always appreciate the significance of the American role and contribution, 
this was 
only to be expected in a world where gratitude is rarely accorded to the teacher, the 
doctor, or the policeman, and we have been all three. But it may be that in time they 
will come to see the United States with different eyes, and to have for her something 
of the respect and affection with which a man regards the instructor of his youth and 
a child looks upon the parent who has molded his character.8 
                                                 
7  Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Autobiography of Harry S. Truman (Boulder, CO: Associated Press of 
Colorado, 1980), p. 41. Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman, pp. 5-7. 
8 Stokely W. Morgan, “American Policy and Problems in Central America,” Lecture to the Foreign Service 
School, Department of State, January  29, 1926, cited in  Lars Schoultz, Beneath the United States: A 
History of U.S. Policy Towards the United States (Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 326. 
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The root of this American missionary impulse reaches back to the nation’s founding, and 
is with us still today. For well over a half century, diplomatic historians – often with little 
consensus – have debated how or if this impulse aligns with any particular American 
foreign policy tradition. Thomas Bailey, Bradford Perkins, Walter LaFeber, Robert 
Ferrell, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Walter McDougall, H.W. Brands, Walter Russell Mead, 
Andrew J. Bacevich, Robert Kagan, and many others have attempted to map and 
penetrate the ideals, habits, attitudes, and visions that over the course of time have 
defined the United States’ role in the world.9 Attempting to navigate the ideals that 
inspire Americans, Mead for example, holds that Americans appear to be either 
Jeffersonians mainly concerned with being an exemplary democracy for the world, 
Hamiltonians seeking to connect the national government with American business to 
integrate and influence the world economy, Jacksonians seeking to maintain national 
security and military supremacy, or Wilsonians obsessed with international law and the 
spread of democratic values in the world. Similarly, the scholar and later diplomat 
Eugene V. Rostow wrote that as Americans, “we embrace contradictory principles with 
equal fervor and cling to them with equal tenacity. Should our foreign policy be based on 
                                                 
9 Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People  4th edition (New York: Appleton-
Century-Crofts, 1950); Robert H. Ferrell, Foundations of American Diplomacy, 1775-1872 (Columbia: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1968); Bradford Perkins, The Cambridge History of American Foreign 
Relations, vol. I, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993); Walter LaFeber, The Cambridge History of Foreign Relations, vol. II, The American Search 
for Opportunity, 1865-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Arthur M Schlesinger, Jr., 
The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986); Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, 
Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997; 
H.W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and 
Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002); Robert Kagan, A 
Most Dangerous Nation: America’s Foreign Policy From Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the Twentieth 
Century (Vintage, 2007). 
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power or morality? Realism or idealism? Pragmatism or principles? Should its goal be 
the protection of interests or the promotion of values? Should we be nationalists or 
internationalists? Liberals or conservatives? We blithely answer. All of the above”10   
On one level, the very effort to seek particular and definable principles that guide 
– or ought to guide – American foreign policy is telling. It demonstrates the peculiar need 
for purpose that is at the heart of much of American thinking about global affairs. 
Americans have never been comfortable with the notion that theirs’ is a “normal” nation 
with traditional nationalistic goals. America has always been an idea rather than a mere 
patria. On a purely academic level, the vacillation between such seemingly contrasting 
principles also implies that despite diplomatic historians’ tendency to polarizingly label 
dominant American policies as “realist” or “idealist,” or to see the United States as driven 
by either national security or economic interests, no single foreign policy tradition has 
dominated over time. Perhaps historians’ attempts to categorize the United States’ foreign 
policy in this fashion simply reflects, as Bernard Bailyn writes, that there always “is a 
need to extract from the past some kind of bearing on contemporary problems, some 
message, commentary, or instructions to the writer’s age, and to see reflected in the past 
familiar aspects of the present.”11 This explains why scholars of the post-World War-II 
consensus era rallied to defend the American experiment and U.S. foreign policy, while 
many scholars of the Vietnam era turned against it. It also explains why so many scholars 
following the more recent wars in the Middle East have increasingly begun examining 
                                                 
10 Eugene V. Rostow, A Breakfast for Bonaparte: U.S. National Security Interest from the Heights of 
Abraham to the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1993), p. 22. 
11 Bailyn quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States 
(The Penguin Press, 2011), p. 21. 
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America’s past in order to establish an imperial thesis explaining American foreign 
policy.  
 Rather than seeking to capture one satisfactory American foreign policy tradition 
from many shifting ones, I wager in this study that when interpreted on the long axis, it is 
possible to detect an ideological belief rooted in American exceptionalism that has been 
flexible enough to help influence all of the traditions – and many more – that Rostow 
outlined. Like historians Michael Hunt and Odd Arne Westad, I use the term ideology – 
and not, as most diplomatic historians do “worldview” or “mindset” – to define the root 
and drive of United States’ foreign policy. Unlike these other terms, which better capture 
a specific moment in time or an era, looking at American foreign policy through the lens 
of ideology makes it possible, I believe, to detect a fairly comprehensive set of beliefs 
that over time have influenced the attitudes, beliefs, and actions of large segments of 
Americans.12 Moreover, Americans have often thought of their role in the world in much 
the same manner that political ideologues on the left and the right have. As in the case of 
other major ideologies and indeed religious faiths, the adherents of American 
exceptionalism subscribe to a shared set of principles and ideals that have proven 
remarkably consistent over time. Americans latch on to an ideological mission to guide 
the world in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideas as they relate, for 
example, to individual and often corporate liberties. The underpinning of this conviction 
cannot be located in any one foreign policy philosophy. There are no stone tablets. There 
                                                 
12 Odd Arne Westad, “Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold 
War History”, Diplomatic History, vol. 21, no. 2 (Spring 1997), pp. 259-271; Westad, “The New 
International History: Three (Possible) Paradigms, Diplomatic History, vol. 24, no. 4 (Fall, 2000), pp. 551-
565. Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). 
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is no manifesto. American exceptionalist ideology is organic. It reflects perceptions, 
whether real or imagined, of destiny and progress. It transcends time and, like other 
ideologies, its visions also transcend borders. 
The ambitious nature of the American experiment explains why scholars of 
colonial America now think of the American Revolution as a fundamentally ideological 
event. It institutionalized the rhetoric of exceptionalism and created a fundamental shift 
in the ideas and values that shaped the national culture.13 And yet, these ideals have been 
evident far beyond the revolutionary era; the missionary rhetoric that bolstered them 
would have sounded recognizable to every American generation since. It, therefore, 
makes sense to speak of an American exceptionalist ideology that goes back well over 
two centuries. It is an “evolving ideology into which generational experiences are 
interpreted and perceptual conflicts resolved.”14 Acknowledging the ideological nature of 
these ideals allows us to better explain why Americans remain so determined that theirs’ 
is the exceptional and the indispensable nation.  
 This emphasis on the significance of ideology should not be taken to mean that I 
believe that reason rather than passion directs American foreign policy. Nor should it be 
taken to mean that American self-interests have not been critical to U.S. relations with the 
world. Political, economic, and military matters are significant forces that powerfully 
influence action. Lewis Namier’s argument that “what matters most is the underlying 
emotions, the music, to which ideas are a mere libretto,” has real merit. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
13 Wood, The Idea of America, p. 321. 
14 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 9. 
 9 
ideas are products of the national consciousness; they are reflections of culture and 
society, two entities – as Gordon Wood reminds us – that are not really separate. As such, 
ideas do no “exist apart from…some more real world of economic behavior.”15 They 
provide meaning to action. Exceptionalist ideas, therefore, more often than not, reinforce 
perceptions of economic interests and national security rather than exist in opposition to 
these concepts. Displaying little sensitivity toward other cultures and often disregarding 
the practical applicability of their ideas, Americans have steadily held that the best way to 
secure their way of life and the nation’s own interest is to export its values. Teleology is 
central to the American mission: “what is America today will be the world tomorrow.”16 
In truth, the world Americans have inspired to create has often looked more like the 
folklorishly perfect America they imagined than the imperfect world they have actually 
inhabited. Yet, in a manner consistent with other ideologues, Americans have, over the 
course of more than two centuries, brushed off their nation’s own flaws while at the same 
time insisting that others would be improved if they embraced American values. Slavery, 
poverty, racism, political inequality, economic depression, Civil War, and violence have 
not caused them to question that other nations and regions would be better off if they 
looked more and acted more like the U.S.  
 Critics point to Americans’ record in the world as proof that such rhetoric is at 
best hypocrisy and at worst down-right dishonesty. They insist that eloquent oratory of 
democracy and freedom is nothing more than a Wilsonian façade for economic and 
imperial motives. Certainly American foreign policy has often been imprudent, 
                                                 
15 Sir Lewis Namier quoted in Wood, The Idea of America, p. 14; Ibid., pp. 15-16.  
16 Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 9 
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incompetent, and brutal. Efforts directed against Native Americans and blacks on the 
North American continent and against the Philippines, Vietnamese, and plenty of others 
have come with tremendous destruction and violence. Yet, at the same time, I do not 
believe that we cannot hope to understand American foreign policy culture apart from 
how Americans thought and spoke about their actions. Following Walter McDougall, I 
would venture that rather than dividing policies between the pragmatic and the moral, the 
realistic and idealistic, Americans instead have shown a propensity for bringing these 
dichotomies into alignment with one another. Rationalization of U.S. foreign policy 
almost always comes in the form of moralization. In a manner quite unique among the 
liberal democracies, Americans convert their preferences into values and explain foreign 
policy as part of a grand universal design. This, Americans, inside and outside of 
government, tend to do in a manner that is reminiscent of a people driven by ideology 
and faith; it has allowed Americans to disregard “the other” and to label enemies as 
threats to the American way of life.  
This tendency in to view the world as black and white is possible not because the 
public is somehow manipulated into accepting this national discourse, but because the 
image of the exceptional nation is so deeply embedded in the national consciousness that 
it can be summoned almost mechanically from its citizens. Any account that trivializes 
Americans’ faith in the superiority of their ideals or that obfuscates their conviction that 
they are engaged in a universal struggle for mankind misses an imperative part of 
Americans’ natural belief system and, as a result,  of how and why their nation acts as it 
does in the world.  
 11 
***** 
This study is not a tribute to U.S. foreign policy over time. It is an attempt to chart the 
ideas that influence the American role in the world. A synthesis of diplomatic, 
intellectual, and cultural history, it applies the influence and perception of exceptionalist 
ideology to the policies and public debates that influenced Americans’ thinking about 
their role in the world from their early efforts to plan the global post-World War II order 
in 1943 and 1944 to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. This chosen periodization is 
not meant to imply that American exceptionalist ideology was limited to this particular 
era, but rather that it was particularly important during these years, in which the United 
States, perhaps more so than ever before or since, shaped the development of the 
international arena.  
 Based on records from the Truman Administration, the State Department, and 
other official agencies and departments, as well as an extensive reading of journals and 
newspapers, the core emphasis of this study is on how Americans thought, wrote, 
expressed, and executed their policies; it does not aim to examine the successes and 
failures of such policies, but rather the motivations behind them. From the earliest 
postwar design of a new Americanized liberal economic and political order, through the 
drive to end imperialism and institutionalize human rights, to their attempts to 
internationalize atomic weapons and energy – which is to say from the Atlantic Charter 
through the first eighteen months of the United Nations’ existence, Americans sought to 
design a new one-world order in which their values dominated. When this effort failed as 
the Soviet Union undermined the American-designed U.N., erected the iron curtain to 
 12 
divide Europe, independently sought to build atomic weapons, and contributed to 
Communism’s march on in Asia – which is to say from the Truman Doctrine to the 
outbreak of the Korean War, Americans’ powerful ideological persuasion manifested 
itself in a number of policy initiatives and in the public’s views of the Cold War, to the 
extent that exceptionalism was the most important factor influencing key U.S. foreign 
policy decisions.  
 The first chapter of this study provides the methodological basis for the remainder 
of the work. It defines the meaning and usefulness of ideology as a vehicle for the 
analysis of United States’ foreign policy. While presenting an overview of the 
historiographical debate over U.S. Cold War policies, this chapter provides the 
intellectual context necessary to interpret American foreign policy through the lens of 
ideology. Attempting to avoid a narrow emphasis on ideology that is limited to total or 
extremist ideals confined to manifestos or dogmatic thinking, I approach American 
ideology as a force akin to a faith that people subscribe to, one that provides guidance 
and belief in progress. I locate American exceptionalist ideology as anchored in the  
historical and cultural consciousness of the nation. Inspired by ideas of America’s past 
and visions for its future, I present it as a defining component of American national self-
perception that helps explain the beliefs, morals and attitudes that influence Americans’ 
behavior and have helped to create socially established structures of meaning to 
Americans’ role in the world.  
 To make evident that American exceptionalism was not merely a rhetorical 
invention by Cold War politicians seeking a means to an end, the second chapter outlines 
 13 
the historical roots and evolution of this intellectual framework. Surveying America’s 
role in the world from the Revolution to the Second World War, it explores the 
ideological and political origins and developments of American exceptionalism among 
intellectuals and politicians. During this period, Americans became increasingly 
convinced that their nation was more egalitarian than, and qualitatively unlike, the old 
European world. Even as they perceived the unique nature of their own society, 
Americans debated the opportunities their ideology presented them with and the 
responsibilities it bestowed upon them. While few questioned that Americans possessed a 
special global mission to lead others towards liberty, there was decided disagreement 
over the nature of this responsibility. Was it enough to be an exemplar of democracy 
from which others could draw inspiration, or did the unique qualities inherent in 
American thought and society demand a more activist approach to bringing democracy to 
the world? Though the more conservative method favored by men like John Quincy 
Adams won out in the early years, the missionary impulse and the increasing conviction 
that universalistic foreign ideologies threatened the American role in the world ensured 
that the U.S. would, by the twentieth century, become an actively interventionist power.  
 Chapter three goes on to explain how this interventionism rooted in 
exceptionalism inspired the United States’ role during the Second World War. The war 
provided an opportunity for atonement to many Americans. After Woodrow Wilson’s 
failure to institute an effective League of Nations in the aftermath of the Great War, 
Americans embraced a mission to design a world order inspired by their political ideas 
and values. President Franklin Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull set out to 
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create a one-world order dominated by a strong United Nations and effective economic 
organizations intended to promote free trade and democracy. They also pursued the 
dismantlement of the European empires, the formal institutionalization of human rights in 
the world, and hoped to establish a world in which ideologues on the left and the right 
would turn toward a liberal American model. These plans met resistance from Winston 
Churchill, who clung to the remaining influence of the British Empire, and from Josef 
Stalin, whose own political and ideological ambitions directly contradicted 
Washington’s. These disagreements between the United States, Great Britain, and the 
Soviet Union resulted in compromises that created deep institutional and bureaucratic 
flaws in the new international economic organizations established at Bretton Woods in 
1944 and the United Nations inaugurated in the summer of 1945. As time would tell, 
these flaws would come to endanger the American one-world vision. 
 Despite these difficulties among the great powers, Americans entered the postwar 
with a tremendous sense of optimism that their era had finally arrived. As chapter four 
illustrates, Americans embraced the idea that their new postwar order represented the 
beginning of a new and peaceful world. Although some intellectuals, columnists, and 
diplomats warned that collaboration with the Soviet Union in this new world order would 
prove impossible and contended that nationalistic goals were likely to always trump any 
international unity, the Truman Administration did not expect or plan for a Cold War. 
During the first eighteen months of the postwar era, Americans remained committed to 
the United Nations to an extent that is often overlooked by current scholars. The United 
Nations’ later shortcomings have caused many diplomatic historians to dismiss it as 
 15 
bureaucratic behemoth, but in its early years Americans held tremendous faith that it 
would serve as the arbiter of international disputes and protect small nations from 
imperial and totalitarian ambitions. This design, however, always relied on the other great 
powers’ will to fall in line with American ideals. During 1946, these hopes slowly eroded 
as the Soviet Union refused American-designed plans for international oversight of 
atomic energy and weaponry, refused to participate in the international economic order, 
and increasingly attempted to secure influence in Europe and the Near East. 
 In a world dominated by a traditional balance of power structure, the Soviet 
Union’s appetite for influence and Stalin’s need for security might have been met with 
customary acknowledgement and acceptance in Washington. As chapter five 
demonstrates, however, American ideological perceptions of the world made such a 
scenario unacceptable. By early 1947, Washington recognized that the goal of a united 
one-world was all but impossible. The Soviets’ position on the developing civil war in 
Greece and the increasingly aggressive Communist actions across Europe and elsewhere 
led Americans to conclude that despite the hopes Roosevelt and Truman had entrusted in 
Moscow, the Soviet Union was, after all, just another totalitarian and ideological power 
bent on extending its influence and control over other nations. As a result, throughout 
1947 and 1948, Washington came to view the Soviet Union as a threat determined on 
destroying the very world order Washington had previously hoped they would help 
champion. The global ideals inherent in U.S. ideology caused Americans to interpret the 
Soviet threat in much the same manner as they had the Confederacy and Nazi Germany. 
Once Americans reached that conclusion, American exceptionalism turned the Cold War 
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into an ideological conflict. Convinced that Communism’s universalistic mission 
constituted a world-wide threat, the Truman Administration, strongly backed by the 
American people, turned the Cold War into a battle for ways of life.  
 The final chapter examines the first eighteen months of the second Truman 
Administration. This period between January 1949 and the early fall of 1950 captures the 
stranglehold that ideology had on Americans’ thinking about their own role in the world 
better than any other period in the pre-Vietnam era. The enthusiasm shown by the 
Administration and the public for the melioristic Point Four program that President 
Truman’s presented in January 1949 demonstrates that the American mission in the world 
was about more than just fighting Communism. American foreign policy also contained a 
positive agent that sought to bring progress and modernization. Such progress was 
expected to bring access to markets and increased trade, while simultaneously ensuring 
that underdeveloped nations did not fall within the Communist sphere. At the same time, 
Americans could not escape the fact that, like Communism, their own exceptionalism 
was, at heart, an international ideology with a universal mission. This became 
increasingly clear with their response to the Soviet Union’s acquisition of an atomic 
weapon, Mao Tse-Tung’s rise to power in China, and the attack by Communist North 
Korea on the U.N.-created and sponsored Republic of Korea. Collectively, these events 
inspired a response from the American public and from the American government that 
reflected the long held view that liberty’s salvation depended on the United States.  
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1. Ideology and American Foreign Policy: A Method 
 
 
Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages, 
are not yet sufficiently fashionable to procure them general 
favor; a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a 
superficial appearance of being right, and raises at first a 
formidable outcry of custom.  
 
Thomas Paine, Common Sense, January, 1776 
 
 
“This is a little book about a big and very slippery subject.” So began Michael Hunt’s 
Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy first published in 1987. It remains the seminal work on 
the relationship between ideology and the evolution of American foreign policy. 
Although originally hailed by fellow historians as innovative and path-breaking, little 
serious scholarship followed Hunt on this topic.  Just as he feared, diplomatic historians 
have continued to treat the idea of American ideology “only infrequently and even then 
perfunctorily.”1  
 In Cold War studies, scholars have increasingly become comfortable with making 
ideology an important part of Moscow’s and Beijing’s foreign policies but “many people 
in the field find it much more difficult to deal with U.S. elite ideology as a meaningful 
                                                 
1 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2nd edition, 2009), p. xi. The 
lack of attention to American ideology is evident even in the most important works on American Cold War 
foreign policy. See, for example, Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the 
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Lewis Gaddis, 
We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York, 1997); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed 
Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton University Press, 1999); Melvyn P. 
Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War; 
(Stanford University Press, 1991). In a later work, Leffler came closer to detecting a correlation between 
ideas and political action. However, he still refrained from integrating ideology as a meaningful tool for 
understanding the U.S. broadly, see his, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and 
the Cold War (Hill and Want, 2006).   
 18 
concept.” 2  Diplomatic historians in particular continue to balk at the idea. The 
complexity of American society and the nature of its democratic institutions lead many to 
believe that the United States is too politically divided and too ethnically and socially 
diverse to be labeled “ideological.” As has been the case since the end of the Second 
World War, modern interpretations of American foreign policy instead put emphasis on 
causality rather than ideas.  American actions around the world are generally explained 
by national interests, strategic interests, national security, economic interests, or 
occasionally by the constraints of domestic social realities.3  
 In part, the reason for this is methodological. Diplomatic historians remain 
committed to official sources such as government archives, diplomatic cables, and 
national security directives. They believe – quite rightly – that political power and 
sovereignty matter in the study of foreign affairs.4 One unfortunate consequence of this, 
however, is that while there today is a greater emphasis on the relationship between 
                                                 
2 Westad, “The New International History” p. 554. For recent scholarship that emphasizes the importance 
of ideology to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, see, Vladislav 
Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Harvard 
University Press, 1997); Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 
(Free Press, 1994); Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: the Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to 
Gorbachev (The University of North Carolina Press, 2007);  Lorenz M. Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold 
War in the Communist World (Princeton University Press, 2008); Westad, The Global Cold War. 
3 For a recent, although somewhat exaggerated, example of domestic affairs’ influence on foreign policy, 
see Campbell Craig and Fredrick Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Harvard 
University Press, 2009). A more convincing analysis can be found in Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: 
Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998). 
4 Cold War studies have, of course, evolved tremendously over the past three decades. We now study the 
Cold War from a multitude of angles: as a history of the Soviet Union, as a history of Eastern Europe, as a 
history of Third World Revolutions, as a history of the Non-aligned Movement, as a history of race, as a 
history of gender, as a history of economic globalization, as a history of imperialism, as a history of non-
governmental organizations, and as international history. Terms like nationalism, corporatism, dependency, 
modernization, post-colonialism, transnationalism, and empire are now household names in the Cold War 
historiography. But while all of this has improved the field tremendously, diplomatic historians continue 
largely to disregard ideas. Ideology remains largely absent as a serious vehicle for examining American 
foreign policy. 
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culture and foreign policymaking, most scholars are fundamentally uncomfortable with 
the history of international relations as intellectual history. They dismiss the premise that 
ideas drive political change and put aside the suggestion that ideas cause human behavior. 
In this they may be correct; however, even so, it does not follow that ideas are an 
unimportant or even marginal factor behind American foreign policymaking. Ideas 
accompany actions, and American ideology – in this work referred to as “American 
exceptionalist ideology” – is in fact a far more influential, far more pervasive, and far less 
theoretical idea within American history and culture than is generally acknowledged. At 
its core, American exceptionalism is about faith and what Americans believe their role in 
the world to be.  By faith I do not mean to imply that American exceptionalism is a 
religion per se, but rather that in men’s minds, ideology operates in a manner that is 
comparable to faith. Dismissing these beliefs – this faith – as extraneous to U.S. foreign 
policy, or, as most scholars do, cavalierly invoking ideology while leaving it unexplained, 
creates a methodological imbalance that skews our understanding of what drives and 
inspires the United States as a country. History, after all, is not made up entirely of 
material sources, but also of what men and women think and believe. Ideas provide 
meaning to actions, and there is hardly anything that men do to which they do not 
attribute meaning.5   
The preoccupation with American ideology in this work stems from the belief that 
ideas matter in American foreign policy; that they are in fact fundamental, not incidental, 
                                                 
5  Douglas J. MacDonald, “Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward A Framework for Empirical 
Analysis,” in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory, ed. Odd Arne Westad 
(New York, 2000), pp. 180-204. 
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to the manner in which the United States acts in the world. This preoccupation rests on a 
conviction that ideas and rhetoric are essential to behavior; that there is little political 
behavior without ideas. On the  issue of American Cold War policy, my emphasis on the 
importance of ideas also stems from a dissatisfaction with much current scholarship’s 
apparent belief that the only interesting or debatable aspect regarding Washington’s Cold 
War is the accuracy and appropriateness of its response to the threat, whether real or 
imagined, posed by international Communism. Failing to recognize that American 
exceptionalism shares an inherently optimistic and progressive interpretation of history 
with other major ideologies, many scholars continue to largely portray others as 
ideological and Americans as fully rational. Greater attention to what policy makers 
believed in the past and how these thoughts entered – and continue to enter – into the 
making of political events implies a far more complex American reality. This reality goes 
beyond matters of national interest and security; it is a reality closely tied to the 
American language, culture, beliefs, traditions, and history. The basic premise that ideas 
are significant raises key questions about the importance of the relationship between the 
nation’s values and its actions that forces us to emphasize more closely the links between 
national self-perception and foreign policy.  
 Defining what ideology is and how it operates culturally, socially, and politically 
is, however, a complex endeavor.  As one scholar observes, “the growing popularity of 
the term has been matched, if anything, by its growing obscurity.” Another insists that a 
plunge into “the cold and murky waters of the literature on ‘ideology’ is a shocking and 
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disillusioning experience.”6 Across the fields of history, political science, philosophy, 
and literary theory, well over twenty varying definitions of ideology circulate freely, none 
ostensibly more or less accepted than the rest.  Opaque rather than transparent, theoretical 
rather than practical, and philosophical rather than empirical, the study of ideology is not 
for the faint at heart.  Despite this forewarning, historians interested in a deeper and more 
satisfying explanation of the conduct and evolution of American foreign policy would do 
well to look to ideology as a methodological or explanatory vehicle.   
 In order for ideology to be useful as a central component in the study of American 
Cold War policy, we need to widen its definition beyond the perception of total or 
extremist ideals rooted in narrow manifestos. At the same time we must avoid extending 
its meaning to such a degree that it becomes analytically impractical. It is necessary to 
establish a definition that encompasses not simply “a written tradition of authoritative 
texts and their exegesis but also credenda formed by personal and historical experience.”7 
Here I broadly follow the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz’ view of ideology as a 
coherent system of symbols, values, and beliefs that carries social meaning. In Geertz’ 
framework, ideology both shapes and communicates social reality.  It is located in 
symbols and rituals throughout society, not simply within individuals. In his works, 
                                                 
6 Giovanni Sartori, “Politics, Ideology, and Belief Systems”, American Political Science Review, vol. 63 
(June, 1969),  pp.  398-411 (quotation on p. 398); Robert D. Putnam, “Studying Elite Political Culture: The 
Case of Ideology,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 65, No. 3 (Sep., 1971), pp. 651-681 
(quotation on p. 651).   
7 Westad, “Secrets of the Second World: The Russian Archives and the Reinterpretation of Cold War 
History”, p. 264.   
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ideology operates as a method through which societies define their collective culture 
based on ideas, beliefs, and historical consciousness.8 
 I define ideology as a set of ideas and beliefs, sometimes only poorly or partially 
articulated, that both establish and justify general outlines – rather than specific 
blueprints – of the world’s future political, social, and cultural order. This same set of 
ideas and dogmas also outline the methods, if not a finite path, necessary to achieve this 
order.  This definition, combined with a greater emphasis on how culture helps to provide 
meaning to policy, holds great promise for shaping our perceptions of how ideology 
functions politically and societally, and thus, our perception of how ideology influences 
foreign policy as well. Where this study diverges from Geertz, is in its effort to lift 
ideology from the theoretical to the practical realm.  A social theory, after all, is only as 
useful as its applicability.9  
This work emphasizes ideologies as grand ideas.  Only ideas that are global in 
scope and contain a universalist purpose will be viewed as ideologies. In the case of the 
United States, such universalist perceptions can be traced to the colonists’ earliest 
convictions of providentialism. The poet Philip Freneau’s captured this in his view of 
                                                 
8  Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter 
(London, 1964), pp. 49-76. Also see Geertz, “Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of 
Culture” in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York, 1973), pp. 3-30.  
9 Here I lean on a number of different scholarly definitions. I am particularly indebted to the following 
sources: Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. Herbert McClosky, “Consensus and Ideology in 
American Politics” American Political Science Review, 58 (June, 1964), pp. 362; Willard A. Mullins, “On 
the Concept of Ideology in Political Science” The American Political Science Review, vol. 66, no. 2 (June 
1972), pp. 498-510; Malcolm B. Hamilton, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology” Political Studies, 
35 (March 1987), pp. 18-38; Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split, pp. 8-12; Sasson Sofer, “International Relations 
and the Invisibility of Ideology” Millennium: Journal of International Studies vol. 16, no. 3 (1987), pp. 
489-521; Joseph LaPalombara, “Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation”, American Political 
Science Review, LX (1966), pp. 5-16.  For a discussion of how ideas have influenced thinkers of American 
foreign policy, particularly in the twentieth century, see, H.W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The 
Struggle for the Soul of American Foreign Policy  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
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America as “a New Jerusalem sent down from heaven” with a special mission.10 It is this 
mission that forms the heart of American exceptionalism:  the conviction that there is a 
distinguishable and superior American quality that endows the United States with the 
duty and the moral imperative to spread its ideals around the world; that the unique 
nature of U.S. democratic ideas, humane ideals, and the superiority of its freedoms 
ordains Americans with the ability, the authority, and the responsibility to remake the 
world in their own image. This mission is distinguished by normative values that serve as 
guides for action, as an analysis of reality, and as a basis for political vindication.  
 Born out of revolution against the perceived English tyranny, Americans 
discovered this vindication in the noble values and the high aspirations that from the early 
republic infused their national self-perception. But theirs was not a nationalism 
comparable to that of any other people. The colonists who declared independence in 1776 
gave birth not just to a nation, but to an idea. To be an American meant to believe in 
something.11 The colonists ignited a belief in freedom and equality among men; they 
gave birth to the conviction that Americans are a unique people endowed with a special 
mission to lead the world down the path to liberty. These values have been nourished and 
sustained by the nation’s historical and cultural consciousness, and they have stood the 
test of time. For almost two and a half centuries they have shaped a language that is 
distinctively American and overwhelmingly ideological. Most notably, these values have 
shaped the United States into a nation that sees itself as the principal enforcer – or at least 
                                                 
10 Philip Freneau, “The Rising Glory of America,” The Poems of Philip Freneau: Poet of the American 
Revolution vol. I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Historical Association, 1902), pp. 49-84. 
11 Wood, The Idea of America, p. 322. 
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the primary example – of moral good in a sinful world.  Over time this established the 
conviction that global peace, the spread of freedom, and world-wide social and economic 
progress would only be possible with America in the vanguard.  While most Europeans 
lost much of their Enlightenment-era inspired confidence in progress somewhere between 
Verdun and Auschwitz, Americans have retained their faith. Rather than allow the 
carnage of their own Civil War to rob them of their faith in progress, Americans 
concluded that good can triumph over man’s flaws. If anything, the Civil War appeared 
to provide the United States with a certain moral capital. Although that war had not 
begun as one for democracy and freedom, by mid-war it was being fought for those exact 
ideals. The Gettysburg address confirmed this. As a result, the Union victory only served 
to foster beliefs in an idealized version of the American dream for the world that deeply 
shaped the makeup of the nation’s foreign policy culture, and deeply influenced how 
Americans view their global role. 
 As in all ideologies, the central tenet of American exceptionalism is this belief in 
human progress. Like all men and women of faith, ideologues create and carry a 
framework for understanding their particular place and function in the world.  To them, 
“the shape of the future, the nature of historical change, and the limits and possibilities of 
human control over these changes, become questions of overwhelming importance.”12 
This natural interest in progress ensures an instinctive concern with the future of human 
society that is also greatly influenced by how the past and the present are perceived. 
Ideologues look inward to their belief system for self-identification and definitions of 
                                                 
12 Mullins, “On the Concept of Ideology,” p. 504. 
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virtues, and they look outward on to a world they see as in need of their values. They 
look back into the past and see mankind’s deficiencies and lost ideals.  They look towards 
the future, convinced that history is on their side, and assume that the purity of their 
values is destined to steer and improve the course of human development. 13   
It follows, naturally, from these definitions that not every political direction, 
movement or idealistic perception properly qualifies as an ideology. Liberalism, 
conservatism, modern day socialism, libertarianism, humanitarianism, environmentalism, 
feminism, and pacifism are not considered ideologies under this definition. Political 
direction or opportunism does not equal ideology. Although they all rest on or proclaim 
political or societal ideas, they are all conceptually narrow, and not one of them contains 
a comprehensively clear or global message. While they may have social or political 
goals, they lack the natural perception of comprehensive advancement essential to an 
ideology. American exceptionalist ideology, on the other hand, is profoundly different. It 
has purpose, direction, and definable qualities. Its structure is integral to the self-defined 
identity of the American people. Americans rarely question the preeminence of their 
ideas, values, or political system; they have faith in their destiny. This exceptionalist 
ideology provides a theology that is overwhelming, deep, and powerful for the individual 
and the collective alike. In this sense, American ideology shares traits not only with the 
French revolutionary ideals to liberate all men but also with fascism, Nazism, 
international Communism, and, in some respects, the Japanese idealism and racial 
ideology of the nineteen twenties, thirties, and forties. Each of these ideologies 
                                                 
13 Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the. Soviet Union, 1918-1933 
(Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1974), see in particular, pp. 133-154. 
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envisioned some form of a new world order that would come about by their doing. This 
does not mean that these ideas are morally equivalent, rather that they are similarly 
principled. They view other forms of government systems at best as wrong, and at worst 
as fundamentally illegitimate.  
This characteristic of American exceptionalist ideology, along with the others 
previously discussed, made it inevitable that the United States would perceive the 
ideological nature of the Soviet Union as a threat once the Second World War came to a 
close.  The communists imagined themselves as guides to enlightenment in an ominous 
and misguided world. Americans viewed themselves in the same light. Both maintained a 
universalistic ideology. Both advanced a vision for the future of mankind. This 
guaranteed, as the diplomat George Kennan wrote in the Long Telegram, that “no 
permanent modus-vivendi” was possible.14 It made normal diplomacy impossible. As 
president at the onset of the Cold War, Harry Truman asserted that only in a world 
dominated by American ideals of freedom, prosperity, economic liberalism, global peace, 
and democracy could Americans feel secure. Only in such a world could America’s 
ideals prosper. This belief signaled a return to the policy of unconditional surrender, and 
made the Cold War the battle of the century for the century. It ensured, as one former 
president succinctly put it, that the conflict with the Soviet Union would not be one for 
territory or glory, but “for the very soul of mankind.”15   
 
                                                 
14 Kennan to Secretary of State, February 22, 1946. Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter 
FRUS), vol. VI, 1946, pp. 696-709.   
15 George H. W. Bush “Introduction” in Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold 
War (Presidio Press, 2004), p. 1. 
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***** 
In this context, open-mindedness towards ideology and the influence of cultural and 
historical consciousness becomes particularly important if scholars hope to understand 
U.S. foreign policy on the long axis. Yet, such a broad approach has never been much in 
vogue among diplomatic historians. Three decades ago, the Harvard historian Charles S. 
Maier, lamented how Leopold Von Ranke’s old field was languishing.  He claimed that 
diplomatic history, once among the discipline’s flagships, had simply become “the step-
child” of American history. Historians of U.S. foreign relations lacked a coherent and 
competent methodology; they cast their inquiries too narrowly, and their perspectives too 
parochially. A majority of them ignored the new techniques and perspectives of social 
history, cultural history, and the social sciences. If diplomatic historians continued such 
resistance to new ideas, Maier warned, the field risked losing its vitality and usefulness. 
The Stanford professor Gordon A. Craig echoed these concerns in his 1982 presidential 
address to the American Historical Association. Calling for a greater inter-disciplinary 
approach and theoretical emphasis, he insisted that diplomatic historians should not be 
afraid “on the basis of similarity, [to] treat unique cases as members of a class or type of 
phenomenon and, by appropriate methods of analysis, discover correlations among 
different variables that may have causal significance or, at the very least, serve as 
indicators of predictive value.”16 
                                                 
16 Charles S. Maier “Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations” in The Past Before Us: 
Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, NY, 1980), pp. 355-
387.  Maier’s essay is the most lucid on the topic of the need for new techniques and perspectives when 
analyzing history. His was also the one that drew the most attention from diplomatic historians.  He was not 
the first, however, to point out the challenge facing diplomatic history. See,  Thomas J. McCormick, “The 
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Neither Maier nor Craig wanted the study of ideas to replace narratives in 
international relations history. They were not calling for an end to the study of wars, 
elections, peace conferences, international organizations, national security concerns, or 
great power politics in general. They were asking for more breadth and depth. Maier, in 
particular, charged that diplomatic historians’ traditional attachment to official 
government sources and their emphasis on political elites lent itself poorly to the 
increasingly popular idea of history written from the bottom up. He argued that a greater 
open-mindedness to culture, race, gender, and methods stemming from other disciplines 
would lead to more nuanced studies of history.  Both men’s message was that a greater 
emphasis on social settings broadly understood would help diplomatic historians make 
sense of policymaking and the forces that drive it.17  
The call here for a greater emphasis on ideology as a vehicle for understanding 
American foreign policy challenges large parts of the last six decades of U.S. foreign 
policy historiography.  Historians and political commentators have consistently attributed 
ideological convictions to America’s enemies, but have not viewed the United States in 
the same light. Rather, the United States has largely been considered rational (although 
not always right) when compared with Nazism and international communism. A similar 
                                                                                                                                                 
State of American Diplomatic History”, in. The State of American History, ed. Herbert J. Bass (Chicago, 
1970), pp. 119-141;  Ernest May, “The Decline of Diplomatic History”, in American History: Retrospect 
and Prospect, eds. George A Billias and Gerald N. Grob (New York, 1971), pp. 399-430. See also, Gordon 
A. Craig, “The Historian and the Study of International Relations,” The American Historical Review, vol. 
88, no. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 1-11. 
17 Although most diplomatic historians thought Maier’s jeremiad exaggerated the field’s state of affairs, 
many agreed that new approaches and the use of new and broader sources would help inject life into 
diplomatic history. In 1981, Warren I. Cohen, then the editor of Diplomatic History, invited a number of 
diplomatic historians to respond to Maier’s charges.  For a record of these excellent commentaries written 
by Michael H. Hunt, Akira Iriye, Walter LaFeber, Robert D. Schulzinger, Melvyn P. Leffler, and Joan 
Hoff-Wilson, see Diplomatic History vol. 5, no. 4 (Fall, 1981), pp. 354-382. 
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logic prevails in the current struggle against radical Islam. This argument for American 
“reason” became particularly prevalent by the middle of the twentieth century.  The 
military havoc wreaked by the Europeans between 1914 and 1945 caused Americans 
more clearly to distinguish themselves from the rest of the world as rational and averse to 
ideological fervor.  Among the most influential voices advocating this position was 
University of Chicago sociologist Edward Shils. He defined ideology narrowly and 
rigidly as a clear and consistent belief system obsessed with totality. Doctrinaire at its 
core, guided by explicit, consciously held convictions, and entirely resistant to new 
information, ideologies, Shils insisted, asserted total possession over social and political 
truth. Although he and other scholars conceded that at times American leaders had 
lamentably fallen under the sway of moralism, Shils rejected the notion that U.S. 
statesmen were ideologues.   
This logic aligned Shils with some of the most powerful intellectual voices of the 
post-war era. Among them were fellow sociologists Daniel Bell and Seymour Martin 
Lipset, the French political theorist Raymond Aron, George F. Kennan, and historians 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and E. H. Carr. Writing during an era of relative American 
national unity and cultural and political consensus, Bell’s influential “end of ideology” 
thesis claimed that the political liberalism and the social and cultural freedoms available 
to Americans made ideology untenable in the United States. The country was too organic 
in its thinking, too open-minded, and too intellectually flexible to inspire mass 
mobilization, and, therefore, was unreceptive to ideology. Ideological demagoguery was 
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reserved for America’s enemies.18  It was reserved for the extreme right and the extreme 
left. 
The most powerful statement in this regard, one from which Shils drew much 
inspiration, came from the German émigré Hans Joachim Morgenthau. A staunch anti-
totalitarian, Morgenthau went even further by challenging ideology in principle. A 
prolific writer, international relations theorist, and the doyen of post-war realist theory, 
Morgenthau labeled ideology irrelevant and an intellectual invention that concealed the 
true substance of policy decisions. He denied that ideology determined foreign policy.  
National interest and national security did. Ideologies, he believed, were little more than 
rhetorical illusions that wrongly subordinated human rationality to external social and 
idealistic influences and had little or no use for determining how states act in the world.  
To Morgenthau and his realist disciples, ideology – regardless of its name – was not a 
belief but a tactic employed to manipulate those under its control. Realists contrasted 
ideology, which they regarded as extreme in its recklessness, propaganda driven, a 
distortion of human thought manufactured to marshal mass support on the basis of 
irrational arguments, with truth and valid knowledge in general.19 Although not all realist 
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scholars shared this unmitigated rejection, their view that only political beliefs obsessed 
with totality could be considered ideological demonstrated their basic refutation of the 
concept. Since behavior and belief never correspond empirically to describe social 
conditions or political developments, realists deliberately strangled ideology as a 
meaningful theory by reducing it to a dead-end concept with no added intellectual 
significance.  
Although largely academic at heart – and generally in denial about the power and 
influence of communist ideology – the realist school of thought inevitably became 
wrapped up in the Cold War that broke out just as Morgenthau’s most important works 
were coming off the press.  Seeking to explain the origins of the brewing East-West 
conflict, the realists’ vocabulary emphasized national security, geo-politics, and vital 
interests, while dismissing the importance of ideas. In the process, they came to play a 
prominent role in defining what became known as the orthodox interpretation of the Cold 
War.  The orthodox thesis claimed that America was drawn into the conflict as a 
measured response to Josef Stalin’s aggression in Europe and the Middle East, by his 
unilateral unwillingness to pursue amicable relations with the West, and by his rejection 
of normal diplomacy after 1945.20  Realists did not deny that the United States pursued 
                                                                                                                                                 
For a similar argument, see J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (University of Chicago Press, 
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were correct. For some of the most important works, see William Henry Chamberlain, America’s Second 
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economic interests around the world, but this was secondary to, if not always detached 
from, security concerns.  In their view the international communist movement’s 
commitment to the overthrow of capitalism and liberal democracy constituted a clear and 
present danger to the United States.  Washington’s Cold War was one of self-defense not 
desire or design. 21   
This argument dominated intellectual foreign policy thought until the so-called 
Wisconsin School Cold War revisionists – most often associated with the New Left – 
shattered the post-war consensus in the early sixties.  Fathered by historian William 
Applemann Williams and guided by his 1959 The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, Cold 
War revisionists charged that economic interests and the collaboration between business 
interests and power politics drove American foreign policy.  They traced this theory to 
Secretary of State John Hay’s turn of the century Open Door Notes, intended to ensure 
American access to the traditionally European dominated areas in China.  In pursuit of 
profit, the upper echelons of the political system and the business elite in the United 
States – those whose privileges depended on economic growth – advocated overseas 
economic expansion and involvements around the world. The Open Door thesis’ 
emphasis on access to foreign markets, which, in part, drew from Robinson and 
Gallagher’s argument about imperialism, became the dominating theme of Williams’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
they Sought (Princeton University Press, 1967); Joseph M. Jones,  The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Harcourt, 
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21 The Realist school still continues to flourish. For two more recent examples, see: Craig and Logevall, 
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interpretation of Washington’s foreign policy.22  Although not Marxists – at least not 
committed ones – Williams and his followers insisted that inherent economic needs 
combined with historical and geographical confinement led the United States to seek 
outlets for surplus production. The opportunities provided by the open door helped 
prevent social unrest at home and eradicate concerns about America’s domestic 
imperfections. Williams challenged Americans who, until this point, believed foreign 
policy to be largely responsive and inherently good – a force of freedom standing up 
against authoritarians like Kaiser Wilhelm, Adolf Hitler, and Josef Stalin – to 
acknowledge that the quest for economic expansion was the predominant catalyst for 
actions abroad. American Cold War foreign policy was neither intended to prevent a 
power vacuum in Europe nor was it a missionary effort.  America, Williams insisted, did 
not have evil intentions, but such were the unintended – tragic in Williams’ words – 
consequences of American diplomacy. Its quest for economic expansion laid the 
foundation for an American empire overseas.  Responsibility for the Cold War, Williams 
insisted, rested not with Stalin, who sought only security, but with the United States for 
its refusal to cooperate and its constant search for profit.23   
                                                 
22 William Applemann Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (W.W. Norton & Company, 2nd 
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Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (Cornell University Press.  35th Anniversary Edition, 
1998); LaFeber, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: The American Search for 
Opportunity, 1865-1913; LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006 (McGraw-Hill. 10th 
Edition, 2007); Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose 
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 At stake between realists and revisionists was not only the historical interpretation 
of the Cold War, but also politics. Polemics rather than history characterized many of the 
works on both sides. Out of this hyperbolic fracas arose what came to be known as Cold 
War post-revisionism in the 1970s.  Tempered by the Vietnam War and Watergate, 
inspired by détente, and frustrated by the increasingly counter-productive realist-
revisionist debate, post-revisionists sought a return to a more fact-based and less 
emotional analysis of history. Championed by John Lewis Gaddis and a number of 
younger diplomatic historians, a general consensus emerged that while Stalin and the 
Soviet Union remained principally responsible for the Cold War, the Truman 
Administration’s aggressive rhetoric and exaggerations of the communist threat had 
helped spark the conflict’s outbreak.  This search for a neutral synthesis resulted in some 
outstanding pieces of scholarship. Unfortunately, the post-revisionist emphasis on 
policymaking and state conflicts caused these historians to tone down the importance of 
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ideology, culture, and ideas, rationalizing that these concepts – in both Moscow and 
Washington – were largely secondary to pragmatic decision-making and traditional 
concerns of national interest.24  
Scholars of all three schools of thought penned their works while the Cold War 
still raged, which was, in and of itself, an unusual situation for historians. Instead of 
acting as critical commentators with some degree of distance, they became part of the 
conflict they analyzed. Lacking access to sources, many of their histories of American 
foreign policy became impassioned and at times speculative, causing them to pay 
attention to distinctive events while ignoring ideas of culture and historical 
consciousness.25 This lack of attention paid to the impact of ideas in diplomatic history 
had serious consequences for Cold War studies.  In essence, scholars were especially 
interested in, and became more adept at, answering testable questions like, “Why the 
Marshall Plan?”, “Why did the Korean War break out?”, “Why did the world come so 
close to nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis?, and “Why did both sides pursue 
détente?” They were far less convincing, however, when attempting to answer general 
questions such as “Why did the Cold War begin?,” “Why did America act in the manner 
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it did throughout the conflict?,” or as Anders Stephanson teasingly asks, “if the Cold War 
was a “specifically American project?”26   
 Because all three schools of thought came to view ideology as peripheral, these 
scholars tended to view ideas as inconsequential elements in the minds of policymakers, 
rather than as articles of actual belief. Scholars of all three schools of thought tended to 
treat ideas casually, as mere artifacts that period actors removed from the shelf, dusted 
off, and applied to any intellectual argument only to be un-problematically returned once 
they had served their purpose. In effect, rhetoric was largely treated as empty or 
insignificant. This instrumental view of ideas as mere means “to strategic ends”, an 
argument that continues to dominate much scholarship on U.S. foreign relations, misses 
the important question of why American policymakers “deployed the particular language 
they did and how they came to ‘inhabit’ it.” Removing ideas from the determination of 
foreign policymaking caused scholars to arrive at what Joan Hoff-Wilson – in a different 
context – pithily referred to as “the tempting, yet highly questionable assumption, that 
foreign-policy formulation is a completely rational, calculated process.”27  
 It is the belief that this rationally calculated process is the underpinning of U.S. 
foreign policy that causes so many scholars to employ weaker substitute concepts like 
“mindset,” “ethos,” “Weltanschauung,” “global outlook,” “credo,” “political 
philosophy,” or simply “liberalism” when describing what guides America’s global role. 
None of these terms, however, resolves the dilemma of the relationship between ideas 
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and policy initiatives. Instead, they sterilize the debate by disregarding the influences that 
culture, beliefs, values, language, national habits, and symbols have on foreign policy. 
Their assumption that interests exist either in virtual isolation from ideas or – even more 
dubiously – that interests are neutral concepts that exist unchanging over time and can be 
easily isolated and defined is fundamentally unconvincing. Absent an examination of 
who decides what our national interests are and the factors – historical and cultural 
consciousness included– that influence policymakers’ definitions of these interests, any 
explanation of the larger shifts in U.S. foreign policy over time becomes largely 
untenable.28     
***** 
Greater attention paid to the theology and teleology that have undergirded American 
thought on foreign policy on the long axis will help to clarify more clearly Americans’ 
self-perceived place in the world and the idea that theirs’ is the indispensable nation. In 
this context, the period of the early Republic can very much be seen as an era of 
ideological self-definition. It gave birth to the earlier mentioned nationalistic 
consciousness that caused – and continues to cause – Americans to define themselves vis-
à-vis the rest of the world.   
 No book, pamphlet, article, or speech announced this birth of American 
exceptionalist ideology with greater power and conviction than Thomas Paine’s widely 
read Common Sense.  Today Paine’s work is largely remembered as fuel on the 
revolutionary bonfire that inspired the Declaration of Independence.  In clear prose and 
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with acute clarity he denounced King George as a tyrant, demanded social justice, and 
declared the birth of a new world at hand.  But Common Sense was far more than a cry 
for the colonists to cast off the shackles of the British crown. In decisively universalist 
terms it also called for the promotion of world peace, the overthrow of tyrants, the 
abolition of secret alliances, and an end to the state dominated European balance-of-
power system and its ties to monarchial rule. 29  Here and in later works and 
correspondence Paine elaborated on these internationalist ideas. While highlighting the 
new American ideals of freedom, he added a call for the creation of an intercontinental 
federation and freer commerce to bring prosperity to mankind everywhere. Paine desired 
to reform not only the New World, but the Old one as well. It was no surprise that the 
French revolutionaries a decade or so later, so enthusiastically embraced Paine’s ideas of 
liberty, freedom, and his outcry against tyrannical monarchism. Like Thomas Jefferson, 
Paine believed “that all men were born equal and that only the environment working on 
their senses made them different.” Two hundred years later, this vision would go on to 
foster the core of twentieth century American modernization theory. While Paine was not 
the only founding father to speak in such decisively internationalist and moralistic terms, 
his style of incendiary crudeness, sincerity, and judgmental definitions of right and wrong 
and good and evil delivered a comprehensively populist message that over time has 
deeply penetrated and influenced the American psyche and its missionary spirit.  
Philosophically and ideologically, the new nation he helped found defined itself not by its 
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borders, but by its values, not by its geographical location or isolation, but by the global 
applicability of its ideas.30  
 This perception of national greatness that gripped the revolutionary generation 
and the sense of global responsibility that Paine characterized became deeply engrained 
in American thought throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century.  During this 
period, the perception of America as the new Israel, the vanguard of global 
harmonization, and the promoter of political and human progress matured and began to 
shape a vision of the United States’ role in the world. This vision first found its voice and 
its path in support for democratic ideals overseas and in manifest destiny’s spread across 
the North American continent. Once strong enough, it was inevitable that a country 
considering itself the bearer of such righteous ideals would seek to actively export them 
as well.  “If Americans didn’t bring the world up to their own standard, the world would 
bring Americans down to its.”31 Beliefs of this nature continue to heavily influence and 
justify foreign policies undertaken in the promotion of American ideas and core values. 
 Like faith, the core values of American ideology fuel agency. They convince 
Americans that their nation is unlike any other. Understanding how this historical and 
cultural consciousness shapes America’s values is fundamental to our understanding of 
how policies, domestic and foreign, develop over time.  Policy, after all, is never 
executed in a vacuum. It is not autonomous or separable from social, cultural, and 
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historical settings.  Exceptionalism in U.S. foreign policy is an elastic concept that deeply 
penetrates American society, and, as such, it acts more like a religion than a political 
idea. It is a reflection of national cultural systems and of national beliefs. Geertz 
accurately defined culture and cultural consciousness as active perceptions of collective 
beliefs, morals and attitudes that influence behavior and help create “socially established 
structures of meaning.”32 The conviction that the United States is unique in thought, 
action, and virtue lies at the heart of these structures of meaning.  Understanding culture’s 
impact on foreign policy requires attention to these definable beliefs and values, to 
collective and social experiences, to national psychological patterns, and to the evolution 
of national legacies. In this context, ideology is not about Shils’ rigid perception of ideas 
as irrational or intellectually dishonest, but, rather, is about lived historical experiences. It 
is about how these experiences are embodied in ideas, memories, traditions, value-
systems and institutional forms; it is about how these experiences influence action and 
thought for the individual and for the collective. For Americans these structures of 
meaning buttress a determined belief that their ideals are transferable to others. 
 Nowhere is the power of these societal structures more prominently exhibited 
than in the special relationship Americans have with their founding fathers. No other 
liberal democracy honors its past generations or pays homage to its nation’s inception the 
way that the United States does. Americans need to know that they follow the path 
envisioned by Washington, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison, and the pantheon of demi-gods 
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that drew the nation’s roadmap.33 The righteous qualities of the first generation help pit 
Americans against other nations and forms of government; it makes their nation the flag 
bearer of a freedom that the world cannot hope to achieve on its own.  For most 
Americans, the question has only been about how the role of flag bearer should be 
executed. Not if it should be. As historian H.W. Brands succinctly argues, the only 
question has been whether Americans should remain the “example” of freedom or the 
“vindicator” of it. This perception of America as the depository of freedom is vital to 
American exceptionalism. Within the framework of American ideology this reality also 
inspires a unique view of threats and enemies. It ensures that “any threat is viewed as one 
of enslavement and is against the basic principles of humankind. Any conflict, 
consequently, tends to become a question of antagonistic ‘ways of life’.”34 Only men and 
women of faith, religious or ideological, think in this way. This is also what separates the 
American missionary role from the French mission civilisatrice or the British equivalent 
of their empire as a civilizing entity. Although both England and France envisioned a 
particular responsibility in their colonies, theirs’ was far less global and did not by 
definition view contrary ideas as inherently threatening to their role in the world the way 
Americans do.   
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Originally expressed in Americans’ fear of the papacy and then later in the 
eighteenth century in its fear of London, these perceptions brought to fruition the – in 
itself very ideological – fear of things anti-American and un-American. It is this fear that 
puts the United States on a collision course with opposing powers that possess similar 
idea-based ambitions. This fear only intensified during the Cold War; but its roots went 
far deeper. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, it was captured in Patrick Henry’s 
cry of “give me liberty or give me death,” in John Quincy Adams’ insistence that 
America has “uniformly spoken among [the nations], though often to heedless and often 
to disdainful ears, the language of equal liberty, of equal justice, and of equal rights,” and 
in Abraham Lincoln’s proclamation of America “as the world’s last best hope.” In the 
twentieth century, it was embraced by Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic Fourteen Points, by 
Henry Luce’s call for the American century, and by Harry Truman’s doctrinarian 
argument that the United States must commit itself to defend free nations everywhere. 
Essentially, world peace, Americans came to believe, rested U.S. shoulders. This theme 
was revisited in NSC-68’s assertion that the world was divided not only between good 
and evil, but between the godless and the God-fearing, and it was pronounced in Ronald 
Reagan’s  edict that the “years ahead will be great ones for our country, for the cause of 
freedom and the spread of civilization.” President George W. Bush revealed the 
immortality of these convictions in the present century when he declared that across 
“generations we have proclaimed the imperative of self-government, because no one is fit 
to be a master, and no one deserves to be a slave. Advancing these ideals is the mission 
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that created our Nation. It is the honorable achievement of our fathers. Now it is the time 
urgent requirement of our nation’s security and the calling of our time.”35  
As evidenced from the quotations above, wars have often fertilized potent beliefs 
of American global responsibility.  The impact of the American Civil War, the Great 
War, and the Second World War in particular, caused Americans to conceptualize, and 
desire to influence, the shape of the world order. The present war on international 
terrorism has done the same. However, it would be too simplistic to imply that the misery 
of war serves as the exclusive catalyst for American exceptionalism. There is a 
comprehensive and powerfully symbolic legacy (the origins and heritage to which I 
return to with greater detail in chapter two) that goes far deeper than the agony caused by 
military conflict.  It is a legacy of the one honorable nation that believes itself capable of, 
and destined to ensure, the approximation of a good society in the world.  
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***** 
In this context, ideas expressed through language become crucial. In matters of ideology 
– as in matters of faith – attention to the meaning of rhetoric and the pervasiveness of 
particular kinds of rhetoric sharpens our interpretation of ideas and how they function 
politically and socially. Emphasis on the role of symbols, metaphors, and logic in shaping 
the ideological nature of speeches, correspondence, national security memoranda, 
journals, diaries, interviews, press conferences, and media articles adds an additional 
methodological layer to the interpretation of American foreign policy. 36   Such an 
emphasis forces us to ask questions of what this American exceptionalist ideology is and 
what it does. It helps us counter the “commonplace but misguided view frequently 
entertained by American commentators that others have ideology while pragmatic 
Americans follow self-evident truths.”37 
This emphasis on ideas as policy catalysts and on the intellectual interpretative 
value of language was most famously dismissed by the progressive historians of the early 
twentieth century. Charles Beard and Carl Becker, for example, casually rejected ideas 
and rhetoric as nothing more than tactical posturing; they viewed them as political rather 
than cultural.  Visions of American greatness, Beard believed, were not visions of the 
people or for the people but were the elite’s attempt to garner public support through 
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cant. The nature of the American system, he insisted, simply demanded hyperbole.38  
 Although Beard’s final point has merit, his view of ideology misses the point.  
Despite its clearly ideological overtones, the language of American greatness is not the 
language of manipulation. It is not simplistically shaped by charismatic leaders or by the 
intelligentsia’s manifestos; it resonates with the American people as a powerful agent for 
a reason.  The perception that the central role played by ideology is to provide the 
political elite with a repertoire of manipulative devices to seduce its consumers heavily 
underplays the American public’s willingness to embrace these ideas.  I do not mean to 
suggest that perfect harmony exits between America’s political leaders and the public. 
My aim is not to reduce “discourse to one stable system of meaning...[but to] show how 
political language” is being used to build a sense of community around idealistic 
perceptions that already exist.39 This contextualization of high intellectual and political 
life, including a greater emphasis on the relationship between the elite and the common 
citizen, has been one of the cultural historians’ many contributions to the study of history 
over the past three decades. As Gordon Wood points out, much of this research 
demonstrates that American intellectuals too “were expressing ideas that grew out of and 
had great resonance in the culture of their time and place.”  Ideology, in other words, is 
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not mere propaganda. Political ideas and political language mean only what politicians 
can convince the public to believe.40  
Even if American ideology at times serves propagandistically, this does not a 
priori rule out that it is also serves as a component in the actual determination of policy 
ambitions and public beliefs.  American exceptionalist ideology is not simply directed at 
the American public. It is of the American public. It is not a rigid tool wielded by the 
state. It is not dictated.  To understand its importance and how it functions, we need to 
consider how it manifests itself in society in specific moments in time a well as over 
time.  It is part of a collective experience and a nationally engrained learning process that 
defines what it means to be an American. Symbiotically, it acts both as a creation in the 
national psyche and as an idea unconsciously consumed in society.  Its convictions infuse 
and influence American society from school text books to the arts, to culture and religion. 
It permeates much of the American media, America’s admiration for the U.S. military – 
which, more than any other military in the world, is spoken of as the guarantor of 
freedom and peace – and of course the political arena.  It is evident in routine symbols, 
habits, shared rituals like the pledge of allegiance, and in expressions of national pride.   
 It is this national consciousness that forms the core of the ideas, thoughts, 
convictions, and the cultural milieu that American politicians bring with them into office. 
Like all citizens, these policymakers’ lives are formed by socialization. Regardless of 
what progressive historians inferred, ascension to high office hardly immunizes men and 
women from these legacies.  The baggage that accompanies politicians to positions of 
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power creates, nurtures, and sustains a national identity that consistently, and with 
tremendous popular support, highlights a world in need of American redemption. This 
guides and informs politicians in their responses to both the domestic and the 
international environment. As a result, politicians shape a set of values that Americans 
believe in for their own sake and often independently of any prospects of success.  
American exceptionalist ideology, therefore produces - and is a product of – both cultural 
and historical consciousness.41   
None of this is to say that there is not a history of opposition to visions of an 
idealistic American foreign policy.  However, American dissent has traditionally proven 
short lived and comparatively weak. Jane Addams, Samuel Clemens, William Jennings, 
Bryan, Robert LaFollette, the young Bob LaFollette, Jr., Eugene Debs, Harry Elmer 
Barnes, Randolph Bourne, Jeanette Rankin, Henry Wallace, Wayne Morse, Ernest 
Gruening, Pat Buchanan and many more have all played the virtuous role of the 
dissenting voice. Their very opposition to the establishment’s desire for commitments 
overseas made them potent representations of democratic values. Yet, on the long axis, 
their influence has been practically nil. Even when opposition has risen to a quasi-
powerful status, it has always proven temporary. The dismay brought about by the 
Philippine Insurrection, the Great War, and later the Vietnam War bruised the American 
will and its belief in American exceptionalism. But not for long.42 While recent wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and a domestic economic crisis may have caused Americans to 
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once again pause and question their own can-do ability, it would be ahistorical, if not 
naïve, to believe in the permanency of this apprehension. American perceptions of the 
United States’ missionary role in the world and the belief in American capabilities are 
simply too strong to allow such apprehension to overthrow century-worn ideas. 
Culturally, they run too deep. Far more research is needed on the sociology of ideology, 
but such research may well prove that ideology in fact serves more effectively in the 
United States than elsewhere.  It may well show that ideology – like any faith – is “most 
potent not when it is formally defined, but when it is so widely accepted that it can be left 
largely tacit and easily invoked.”  It may well show that this belief in a distinct American 
greatness is so omnipresent in America’s culture that politicians can largely “chart a 
course by them” without any widespread opposition from the national gallery of citizens 
and intellectuals.43    
***** 
Becoming comfortable with the existence and depth of this American exceptionalist 
ideology is vital if we are to fully grasp America’s role in the world.  The far more 
multifaceted manner in which history is now studied appears, in any case, to lead toward 
analytical diversity and away from a “school of thought” concentration. This raises 
genuine doubts about the possibility of exclusive interpretations of U.S. foreign policy. 
As Odd Arne Westad insisted, the diplomatic historian’s task now seems to be “to find 
ways to describe, in looking at a long axis of analysis, points that seem particularly 
promising for further scholarly inquiry, based on a combination of work already 
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undertaken and the availability of sources.”44  No new research is needed to demonstrate 
the extent of ideology. There are no archives where the influence of ideology can be 
specifically detected. What is needed is a new perspective on the facts and information 
already available. Diplomatic historians need to read sources ideologically. This means 
paying particular attention to language, the cultural and historical legacies, as described 
above, and the extent to which these come together to make up an American national 
self-perception.  This will help us clarify how and why Americans during the Cold War – 
and since – both consciously and unconsciously and with no evident interest in the facts 
on the ground, often allowed their preconceptions to dictate foreign policy. 
 So far, only a handful of scholars have seriously ventured down this path. Among 
these, the works cited above by Michael Hunt, Anders Stephanson, and particularly Odd 
Arne Westad have highlighted how ideology increases our understanding of what makes 
the United States tick.  Of the three, Westad’s works have concentrated most intensely on 
the Cold War; however, all three have emphasized that diplomatic historians hobbled by 
historical consciousness have been too twentieth century focused and consequently have 
failed to understand American foreign policy as a result of deeper cultural and social 
systems, structures, and beliefs. 45 I share these scholars’ conviction that ideology is 
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always a component in political action. I do not, however, believe that it guides policy 
autonomously. There is no absolute standard for understanding American foreign policy. 
No methodology serves as its catchall. However, even if no singular analytical 
framework has a monopoly on our understanding of historical events, attention to a 
theory of ideology will allow for more nuanced conclusions. It will allow for a 
complementary – not a contradictory – methodological framework to much of the current 
scholarship referenced in the pages above. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that 
emphasis on ideology will meet resistance from diplomatic historians.  They generally 
doubt its heuristic value.  Having witnessed the violence done to the complexity of 
historical reality by political scientists’ and international relations theorists’ intense over-
theorization and compartmentalization of foreign relations into synthetic ideas of 
systems, state models, and structures, while ignoring individual actors, diplomatic 
historians worry about anchoring historical explanations of policy in specific social, 
political, or cultural conditions. In essence, they are concerned about reductionism. 
However, their general a priori rejection of ideology is both unconvincing and surprising. 
If anything, wholesale dismissal of theoretical concepts, including ideology, is not 
practical nor even possible.  Ideology’s relevance  
rests on a simple preposition of fundamental importance. To move in a world of 
infinite complexity, individuals and societies need to reduce that world to finite 
terms. Only then can they pretend an understanding of their environment and have 
the confidence to talk about it and the courage to act on it. Policy making, like any 
other individual or collective activity, requires that simplifying clarity. Policy 
makers get their keys to ‘reality’ in the same ways that others in their culture do. 
Policy makers are formed by a socialization that begins in childhood and continues 
even as they try and retain those keys or discard them as a result of experience in 
making decisions. 
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The point is that any attempt to understand social and political realities over time 
involves intentionally abstracting from the mass of events at least some uniformities for 
special consideration.46  Intellectually, it is not possible to move in a world of unbounded 
complexity. That is why we label individuals as “Christians,” “Muslims,” “liberals,” 
“conservatives,” “rational consumers,” “Marxists,” “fascists,” “capitalists,” “terrorists,” 
“Democrats,” “Republicans,” and so on, as if these headings aptly clarify the opinions or 
convictions of entire socio-cultural groups.  Decoding, classifying, and interpreting 
complex products of national culture into a coherent system of ideas requires some 
degree of generalization. Such is the occupational hazard of theorizing. However, if done 
cautiously, it can illuminate and clarify rather than obscure.   
 The central point, then, is not whether American exceptionalism is true or not, but 
what kind of emotions, language, and, ultimately, policies it inspires. Ever since the war 
in Vietnam, it has been fashionable to dismiss American exceptionalism as a myth, to 
reject the idea, that the United States is inherently better than, or superior to, other 
nations.47 While true in and of itself, this rejection of American exceptionalism misses 
the point. It has no more value than asking if Christianity is true or real. In the final 
analysis, ideology, like religion, is not about verifiable truth. It matters not at all if 
American exceptionalism is real or imagined. It matters only what people believe. The 
central point then becomes, to paraphrase the anthropological structuralist Levi Strauss, 
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not how or if Americans think in myths, but how myths operate in the American mind. In 
this context, believers in American exceptionalism are not necessarily any more or less 
united in their global or cultural outlook than Christians or Muslims.  However, that does 
not mean that the depth of beliefs in fundamental concepts or values systematically 
expressed in language or cultural symbols by large groups of individuals can be 
marginalized.  To understand how this American exceptionalism functions in foreign 
policy, the central question historians need to ask is not if politicians subscribe to an 
ideology, but what “this ideology means and, more importantly, what kind of difference it 
makes in shaping…intentions, policies, and behaviors.”48  
These broad observations on ideology should inspire scholars to place greater 
emphasis on the importance of the core ideas and values that helped shape U.S. Cold War 
foreign policy. Integrating ideology into our understanding of the conduct of American 
actions around the world adds an important dimension to our perception of how foreign 
policy outlooks emerged, changed, and ultimately influenced this nation’s policies.  This 
approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of the preconceived notions 
Americans possessed as the Cold War began.  American fears about the Soviet Union 
went far deeper than the immediate threat posed by Moscow’s potential military might. 
 Although I do not believe that historical and cultural perceptions of American 
exceptionalism and primacy caused the Cold War, I agree with Stephanson that the 
impact of these ideas on national self-perception made the conflict a distinctively 
American one, one fought on American terms.  Joseph M. Jones, one of the architects of 
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the European Recovery Program, may have been right when he insisted that the mid-
1940s represented an era when U.S. policy changed for the better and accomplished 
extraordinary deeds.49 But if the policies were new, the ideas behind them emphatically 
were not. The Cold War epitomized ideas of greatness long in the making. It was the 
universalist challenge posed by the Soviet Union that made the United States perceive it 
as a threat. By the nineteen sixties, the Soviet nuclear fleet did, of course, come to 
constitute a credible existential threat to the United States, but by then the dice were 
already cast. By then, the war of ideology was well underway.  The Cold War did not – 
pace Robert Kagan’s commentary on the impact of September 11 – change Americans; 
the Cold War made Americans more themselves.  How this happened, why it happened, 
and what the significance of it was, is fundamental to understanding the international role 
the United States took upon itself as the Second World War came to a close. But before 
we can define how Harry Truman set out to define and defend this post-war order as 
president, we need first to trace in more detail the origins and the development of the 
American exceptionalist ideology as the nation rose from the Early Republic to the role 
of victor in the Second World War. We must illustrate how this development defined and 
calibrated an American identity and the role of the United States in the world. 
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2: America in the Minds of Men: From the Founders to the Greatest Generation 
 
    
Between the Revolutionary War and the defeat of fascism at the end of the Second World 
War, American exceptionalism contributed powerfully to the evolution of the United 
States as an ideological entity. Interpretations of international developments over the 
course of this period, made it evident to each generation of Americans that their nation 
was qualitatively different from others. Their republican New World appeared more 
egalitarian, just, and righteous when compared to the monarchial and often undemocratic 
Old World. As the country matured, the perception that this new nation was 
indispensable to the future of democracy evolved from an idea in the minds of men to 
something most Americans considered an undeniable reality.   
Americans have always debated what responsibilities accompanied this special 
status. Is it enough for America to remain an example of civic and democratic society, to 
light the world and let others draw inspiration from the obvious advantages of freedom? 
Should the United States, as John Quincy Adams insisted, abstain from seeking out 
“monsters to destroy?” Or do the virtues of their experiment require Americans to carry 
on active measures in the name of righteousness and liberty for mankind? Should they, as 
Woodrow Wilson insisted, actively seek to “make the world safe for democracy?” 
Intellectuals, politicians, and the national gallery of citizens have over time come down 
on either side of this dilemma. But they have rarely disagreed that it would be in 
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America’s and the world’s best interest for other regions and nations to adhere to the 
ideals, principles, and virtues inherent in the United States.1  
 This vision of American exceptionalism is by definition comparative. Thus an 
integral component of its ideology concerns itself with how Americans perceive their 
nation and their institutions, and, in contrast, how they view the lack of political and 
social opportunities and the lack of liberal maturity in other countries. This interplay 
between self-reflection and judgment of others has generated tremendous inspirational 
and moral energy in American foreign policy.  Over time it helped shape a national 
identity that when “infused with Protestant millennialism…gave Americans the sense that 
they were chosen people of God, possessing peculiar qualities of virtue, with a special 
responsibility to lead the world toward liberty and republican government.” 2  In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the political ideas and behaviors that laid the 
foundation for this belief were given coherence by classical republican civic and 
humanistic traditions. Links between the ancient and the new republican worlds were 
popularly reflected in early schoolbooks. As the historian Henry Steele Commager 
explained it, “[G]eographies spoke with contempt of the peoples of the East and with pity 
of those of the Old World. Histories dismissed ten centuries of Europe as the Dark Ages. 
Greece and Rome furnished heroes to compare with Washington, but no modern nation 
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did so.” This national narrative defined the New World as the only heir of the ancient 
traditions of justice and virtue.3  
Eventually this vision of national greatness would inspire Henry Luce’s prophecy 
of an American century shortly before the U.S. became a belligerent in the Second World 
War, but the conviction that theirs was a superior nation with infinite possibilities and 
global obligations had roots all the way back to the nation’s founding.4 From politicians 
to poets, the view that only Americans could save the world from itself has proved 
overwhelmingly persistent. In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson called the 
nation “the world’s best hope,” while half a century later Walt Whitman pondered in 
Pioneers Oh Pioneers!, “Have the elder races halted? Do they droop and end their lesson, 
wearied over there beyond the seas?” Answering in the affirmative, Whitman insisted 
that it rested on the American to “take up the task eternal.”5  
Regardless of the hardships caused by economic crises, sectional strife, or Civil 
War or the occasional voices of dissent from pacifists, socialists, and others, the 
nineteenth century American “cherished an uncritical and unquestioning conviction that 
his was the best of all countries, and every emigrant who crossed the Atlantic westward – 
few went the other way – confirmed him in his assumption that this fact was everywhere 
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acknowledged.”6 The enduring manifestation of this exceptionalism and the ease with 
which politicians have remained able to resurrect and cultivate this conviction in the 
American mind makes it ideological in nature. For more than two centuries, this 
conviction has fostered a national vision of the United States as the depository and 
promoter of global freedom. This idea was evident in Americans’ response to late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century revolutions around the world, in the root ideals of 
Manifest Destiny, and in the legacy left by the Civil War. This exceptionalist ideology 
also dominated the progressivist views of the 1890s, which the contemporary generation 
pressed on the world order and at home. All the way up to the Second World War, 
Americans viewed others as falling short of the standards set by their New World.  Time 
cements not only nations, but often ideas as well.   
***** 
The foundation of a unique New World is often attributed to John Winthrop and the 
Puritans who founded the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In his 1630 sermon, A Model of 
Christian Charity, Winthrop famously declared that the Puritans’ mission following their 
exodus from Europe, was to create a New World that would shine “like a city on a hill” 
for all to see. Winthrop of course was not in the New World by choice; he was only there 
because he and his associates were not strong enough to force their ideals on others back 
in England. The Puritan mission, in fact, was not one of equality or freedom, something 
Winthrop made demonstratively clear during his governorship in Massachusetts. It did 
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not inspire republican societal ideas of liberty and virtue.7 Escaping persecution does not 
by default create advocates of freedom. As such John Winthrop is a poor ambassador for 
American ideals. If he deserves a seat among the founders of American ideas it is not 
because of what he did or aspired to do in the New World, but because of his insistence 
that a covenant existed between God and the new arrivals to America. This instilled the 
myth of choseness in the American mind; a vision that has powerfully influenced 
American national self-perception and visions of global responsibility ever since. 
 The ideologization of American political thought belongs not with Winthrop but 
with the eighteenth century patriots who challenged the colonial policies of the British 
Empire. Their generation created the intellectual and spiritual structures and beliefs that 
reformed the relationship between rulers and citizens, reshaped the social orders, and led 
to the creation of the United States. They reconstituted what power and liberty meant for 
a society. As Gordon Wood insists, this made Americans “an ideological people.” The 
American conception of the nation as “the leader of the world began in 1776…The 
revolutionaries believed themselves to be in the vanguard of history.” It was this 
ideological legacy, more so than the collapse of British dominance in North America, that 
on the long axis made the American Revolution a universal event.8 
The creation of this ideological legacy was not the work of one person. Across the 
New World, inspirational orators, pamphleteers, politicians, and citizens called for 
rectifying not only the evils of British control, but the evils of modern societies as well. 
This radicalism was deeply embedded in America’s “first public intellectual,” Thomas 
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Paine. He has never been given his due as one of the inspirations of American foreign 
policy; except among scholars of colonial America, he remains mainly forgotten. But if 
we want to understand America and the nation’s role in the world over time, we need to 
acknowledge that the eighteenth century, in John Adams’ words, was “the age of Paine.”9 
Common Sense, Rights of Man, and The Age of Reason are not only three of the most 
piercing portrayals of the rise of liberalism, they are vital examples of America’s 
ideological mission. Even if he rarely gets the credit, it was Paine’s emphasis on the 
spread of American freedoms, and on liberalism that inspired not only his generation, but 
generations since. Whether American politicians and scholars of foreign policy are 
conscious of it or not, since the publication of Rights of Man in 1792, anyone who has 
attempted to design U.S. foreign policy “has been able to provide little more than an echo 
of Paine’s original philippic.”10  
Paine’s prolific writings championed republican revolutions and moral justice not 
just for Americans, but for all of mankind. 11 He insisted that “[I]f universal peace, 
civilization, and commerce are ever to be the happy lot of man, it cannot be accomplished 
but by a revolution in the system of governments.” He called for the proliferation of 
freedom, for the Americanization of the world, and for the abolition of monarchies 
everywhere. This eighteenth century defiance of the Royal houses was as natural as the 
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American challenge to communism would be in the twentieth. Just as communism would 
be viewed as antithetical to American ideals, so monarchies embodied the fundamental 
challenge of Paine’s century to a republican world.  Every attack he launched on the 
ambitions of kings and on non-democratic governments ended with the certainty of man 
throwing off his shackles. “There is a morning of reason rising upon man on the subject 
of government, that has not appeared before. As the barbarism of the present old 
governments expires, the moral conditions of nations with respect to each other will be 
changed.” 12  Paine envisioned progress toward a union of nations. International 
cooperation toward a league for peace would surge, he believed, on the ideas that were 
flowing from the rising democracies in America and, after 1789, France. This was not an 
argument for American power, profit, or imperialism, but about a way of life. 
Like later generations of Americans, Paine drew on providentialism and 
enlightenment theories, prophesizing that a society of free men would, through reason, 
reveal the design of providence. The U.S. was the model and the inspirer for human 
progress, but Paine never believed that the American Revolution was enough for 
humankind. He hailed events in France, because they confirmed the American 
revolutionary project. Together, the emerging democracies would establish principles of 
freedom that would spread from one country to the next.  In reverse, American statesmen 
two centuries later would warn against a similar dissemination of ideology – this time 
international communism – through a process they dubbed the domino effect. However, 
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in the 1790s, it was Americans who championed the spread of their ideology, believing 
that its ideas of democracy and liberty would spread like dominoes across the world. “An 
army of principles will penetrate where an army of soldiers cannot; it will succeed where 
diplomatic management would fail; it is neither the Rhine, the Channel, nor the ocean 
that can arrest its progress; it will march on the horizon of the world, and it will conquer,” 
Paine asserted.13 It is not hard to imagine those words spoken in Russian in Petrograd in 
1917 and the image of Lenin shaking his fist in the cause of the communist revolution. It 
was similar in manner, logic, and vision. But in 1793, this was America’s ideological 
prophecy.  
Thomas Jefferson concurred with Paine’s call for a “universal society, whose 
mind rises above the atmosphere of local thought and considers mankind of whatever 
nation.” The Declaration of Independence, which Jefferson later described as “an 
expression of the American mind,” outlined rights not only for Americans, but for all 
men. Centering on the contradictions of justice and tyranny, the document that made 
America spoke of the right to overthrow not only the British government, but any 
government that was destructive to its people’s welfare. Jefferson both rationalized the 
specific act of American independence and sought to inspire future conduct across the 
world. The New World he helped create was not geographically restricted to the 
Americas; rather, it represented the start of a novus ordo seclorum.14    
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 The French Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens, and 
the new French constitution seemed to confirm that this new global order was at hand. 
Like the American Revolution, the universality of French ideals posed a challenge to 
every political system. Americans cheered the announcement of the French republic, sang 
French revolutionary songs, and began wearing les tricolores. France bestowed honorary 
citizenship on Washington, Paine, Hamilton, and Madison. To a friend, Jefferson insisted 
that this “ball of liberty…is now so well in motion that it will roll round the globe... for 
light & liberty go together. It is our glory that we first put it into motion.” The Federalist, 
John Marshall, believed “human liberty to depend in a great measure on the success of 
the French Revolution.” James Monroe agreed. He shrugged at the execution of Louis 
XVI as an incident on the “path to a much greater cause,” just as Jefferson anticipated 
that the tree of liberty occasionally had to be watered with the blood of tyrants.15 But as 
violence gripped France, Paine began fearing that it would slow the universalist cause. 
From Paris, he wrote despondently to Jefferson that if the French revolution had lived up 
to its principles it could have extended “liberty throughout the greatest part of Europe.” 
In the absence of that he feared that the “great object of European liberty…[would be] 
limited to France only”, Paine wrote to Georges Jacques Danton that France’s failure to 
pay attention to moral principles – unlike in the United States – had injured the character 
of the revolution and “discouraged the progress of liberty all over the world.”16 
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Because Paine and Jefferson pushed the revolutionary cause with more fervor 
than did Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, many scholars distinguish between 
Republican and Federalist foreign policy visions in the 1790s. Certainly there were 
serious disagreements between the two sides, particularly concerning Jay’s Treaty but 
these were largely tactical. In the context of American exceptionalist ideology, what is 
significant is, as Philipp Ziesche points out in a recent study, that even if Republicans 
accepted the violence in France with greater ease than did Federalists, both held equally 
universalist beliefs. At the end of the Constitutional convention in 1787, for example, 
Federalists championed the Constitution as an “inspirational instrument to the Old 
World” that was destined to demonstrate to the European powers the superiority and 
desirability of America’s republican model of governance. Both parties saw the Old 
World as rotten and their own as the path to man’s progress and prosperity. 17 The 
principal disagreement among Americans going forward rested not on questions 
concerning the virtues of their system of governance or its global appeal to all nations, 
but rather on the methods with which such a system could be afforded to the world. 
***** 
“The free system of government we have established is so congenial with reason, with 
common sense, and with a universal feeling, that it must produce approbation and a 
desire of imitation, James Madison insisted.”18 So it did. Inspired by the achievements in 
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North America, nationalist movements in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere sought 
to replicate Americans’ success. It was understandable, as John Quincy Adams wrote a 
friend, that the nations of the Old World, ripe with tension in 1817, should see the United 
States as a potentially “dangerous member of the society of nations.”19  
 During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, Latin American 
independence movements seized on the weakness of Spain’s colonial empire. The 
initiative inspired men like Henry Clay who asserted that South America was “fighting 
for liberty and independence – for precisely what we fought for.” He introduced 
legislation to recognize the new Republics, hoping to provide them with the same boost 
French recognition had afforded the U.S. in 1778. Though diplomatic recognition only 
followed belatedly, the U.S. set a precedent of being the first to recognize new republican 
governments, establishing important principles of opposition to tyranny and 
imperialism. 20  This moral support, however, did not lead to armed support of 
revolutionaries. In part because President James Monroe and John Quincy Adams, now 
Secretary of State, feared that excessive interference might draw the United States into a 
war with the far stronger European powers but also because many including Adams 
believed being an exemplar for the world was America’s primary purpose.  The violence 
in France also tempered American support for instant republican revolutions in Latin 
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America as did the horrific stories of bloodshed Americans learned of from concurrent 
events in Haiti where a slave rebellion inspired the island’s independence from France in 
the early nineteenth century. Stories of Haitian murders of whites, cannibalism, 
infanticide, and rape not only scared Americans – particularly Southern slaveholders, – it 
served as an early, an often since repeated, warning to Americans of the impact of 
freedom in the hands of people unfit to guard it. As historian Ashli White recently 
explained it, the violence “particularized the rebellion” in Haiti. 21  It only served to 
highlight the exceptional nature of the American Revolution. 
  The absence in Latin America of the unique combination of education and 
geographical space that had provided exceptional circumstances to the colonists in North 
America as well as widespread racism and anti-Catholicism did little to convince the U.S. 
that the Latin Americans were ready for liberty.  John Quincy Adams was certain, for 
example, that they “have not the first elements of good or free government. Arbitrary 
power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education upon their habits, 
and upon all their institutions.” Although not quite as rancorous, Jefferson concurred. To 
John Adams, the Secretary of State’s father, he wrote that he did not believe them “yet 
sufficiently enlightened for self-government,” but he remained confident that Latin 
American nations would become “sufficiently trained by education and habits of freedom 
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to walk safely by themselves.” In essence, once circumstances were favorable, 
republicanism would follow.22 
 Despite concerns about events in France, Americans still deemed the conditions 
for liberty more favorable in Europe than in Latin America. As a result they celebrated as 
Greece, the nation that gave birth to democratic principles, launched its own war for 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. American citizens shared the North American 
Review’s cry that the Greek patriots must remind the American of the “the great and 
glorious part”, which his country plays “in the political regeneration of the world… 
Through France, the influence of our example has been transmitted to the other European 
states…the leaven of freedom is at work.” American newspapers rallied to the cause, and 
funds were collected all over the country to support Greece’s American hour. One 
newspaper reported it impossible to record the many efforts “to procure aid for the Greek 
cause. It is sufficient to say that the feeling is universal. Meetings are called in every 
considerable village, and country clergymen are taking up collections to augment the 
fund.” It would become the first “sustained American venture in overseas philanthropy.” 
Noah Webster, John Adams, James Madison, General William Henry Harrison, and 
Henry Clay all strongly backed the Greek cause. So too did Senator Daniel Webster, who 
in the House of Representatives thundered that what was at stake was freedom’s struggle 
against absolutism. “Does it not become us,” Webster queried, “is it not a duty imposed 
upon us, to give our weight to the side of liberty and justice, to let mankind know that we 
                                                 
22 John Quincy Adams cited in Schoultz, Beneath the United States, p. 4, see also, pp. 8-13; “Thomas 
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are not tired of our own institutions, and to protest against the asserted power of altering 
at pleasure the law of the civilized world?”23 
 As was the case in Latin America, a combination of domestic circumstances and 
the reality of a weak American military overruled any chance of active American support. 
The Missouri crisis, the First Seminole War, and ongoing negotiations over the Adams-
Onis Treaty with Spain made active American involvement in foreign revolutions 
impossible and undesirable. All Monroe could manage was his unenforceable 1823 
Doctrine that promised American non-intervention in the affairs of Europe and asked that 
the Europeans provide the U.S. with the same courtesy in the Western Hemisphere. The 
Monroe Doctrine is commonly viewed as a policy intended to separate the western 
hemisphere from European affairs along the lines suggested by Washington in his 
Farewell Address. Monroe’s early draft of his speech, however, reflected nothing of the 
sort, nor was this the view taken by many members of the cabinet or by James Madison. 
Monroe wanted to use his address to warn Americans that republicanism was under threat 
from European powers and the Holy Alliance. He wanted to formally recognize Greece, 
denounce the Europeans monarchies, and emphasize that Americans did in fact consider 
events in Europe within its realm of concern. It was only John Quincy Adams who 
convinced Monroe not to issue this strongly worded ideological statement. This view 
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carried the day and in the absence of aid to Greece, the Turks crushed the independence 
movement while autocracy and local violence spread across Latin America.24  
 This pattern of hope followed by disappointment repeated itself two decades later 
in 1848, as democratic enthusiasm once again flared across much of Europe. American 
citizens and politicians hailed the Hungarians, the French, the Germans, and many more 
as they revolted against monarchies. Once again, Washington was among the first to 
recognize the new governments in the hope the Old World would finally fulfill America’s 
dream of European republicanism. What is more, Americans claimed credit. Dismissing 
the Hapsburg monarchy’s protest of American support for the Hungarian revolutionary, 
Lajos Kossuth – only the second foreigner after Lafayette to address the U.S. Congress – 
Daniel Webster, now Secretary of State, made clear “that the prevalence of sentiments 
favorable to republican liberty is the result of the reaction of America upon Europe; and 
the source and center of that reaction has doubtless been, and now is, these United 
States.” During a visit to the U.S., Kossuth met Abraham Lincoln who declared him 
Europe’s “most worthy and distinguished representative of the cause of civil and 
religious liberty.”25 Despite this moral support, democracy was not coming to Europe. 
The European revolutions tapered out and slipped into brutal violence, they were 
suppressed by monarchical forces everywhere with no stable republican governments 
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emerging alongside the American model. These failures to establish regimes akin to 
theirs intensified a myth in the minds of Americans. To preserve their millennial vision, 
the memory of the American Revolution became a tale of virtuousness, lacking any of the 
violence on display across the Atlantic. In Americans’ historical and cultural 
consciousness, national spirit, character, and God’s will were the sources of American 
freedom. Not even the deep sectional crisis, which intensified just as Europe’s 
revolutions faltered, could temper these convictions in the American mind.26   
 Since Americans abstained from military intervention in support of these 
nineteenth century revolutionaries, many scholars view American commitment to a 
universalist freedom as half-hearted rhetoric and exceptionalism as mere grandiloquence. 
They instead define U.S. nineteenth century foreign policy as exemplary realist. This 
misses the point. To Americans, republicanism was about civic humanism and virtue; it 
was the character and spirit of the people that made a republic. The conclusion 
Americans drew, particularly after the failure in France, was that people had to desire 
republicanism to bring it about. Political and social maturity through education and 
property were prerequisites to liberty. Americans wanted to export their values and 
ideals, but also came to believe that when people were ready – and only then – they  
“would sooner or later become as republican as [the Americans] had…[For now, 
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Americans] could best accomplish their mission of bringing free governments to the 
world simply by existing as a free government.”27  
This perception of hierarchy and of different stages of social evolution, the idea 
that liberty was not immediately attainable for all, fit naturally with Americans’ 
nineteenth century social perceptions. In was because of these perceptions of hierarchy 
that they saw no immediate contradiction between the belief in American exceptionalism 
as the tonic of liberty for all mankind and the existence of slavery at home - although 
plenty of abolitionists were of course challenging this by the 1850s. It was common, for 
example, not to deny blacks equality or self-rule “as a matter of right.” Jefferson, among 
others, supported the idea of repatriation of blacks because he believed all had “the right 
to self-rule as a people…[repatriation] was meant to assure for blacks the same rights 
Americans were asserting. But the blacks had first to have a separate station, for that to 
become an equal one.”28 Similarly, regarding native Indians, while all whites took for 
granted that the natives’ way of life was doomed, the common belief was that they would 
take their place in the dominant culture when ready or perish if unable to do so. The 
eventual herding of natives onto Federal lands was not merely a reflection of aggressive 
settlers or racism, it was a manifestation of native inability to assimilate. It was one of the 
first signs that “underdeveloped” civilizations and nations needed to tutelage to progress 
                                                 
27 Wood, The Idea of America, p. 328. 
28 Gary Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence (New York: Vintage, 1979), p. 
306. 
 71 
in what Americans deemed to be a responsible manner.29 The interaction with natives did 
not change the general American perception, that all foreigners and people of all races 
were, at some level, inferior. The consensus was that the world would want to adopt, and 
would attempt to adopt, American ideals once it was mature enough to understand the 
self-evident superiority of the republican system. In spite of republicanism’s failures 
outside of North America during the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore Paine’s 
legacy of more activist methods lived on. Few questioned the exceptionalist vision that 
the nation had come to embody. 
***** 
This American exceptionalist vision was epitomized by John O’Sullivan, editor of the 
Democratic Review, in 1839. Echoing every past major national thinker on America’s 
global role, he defined America as “the nation of human progress” and “destined to 
manifest to mankind the excellence of divine principles” and ensure the creation of 
“many Republics, comprising hundreds of happy millions.” Mirroring the Declaration of 
Independence, he described a horizonless future for man guided by liberty and American 
principles. But O’Sullivan spoke not of motives or of empire. The true mission of 
Manifest Destiny was never just Texas, California, or the Pacific. It was – as Paine had 
insisted – the world. To O’Sullivan, America’s birth was “the beginning of a new 
history…our country is “destined to be the great nation of futurity.”30  
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The zest of westward expansion at the expense of the native Indians and 
Mexicans has led many historians to dismiss such lofty claims as mere rhetoric. Instead 
they define nineteenth century American foreign policy as perpetual expansion in the 
pursuit of empire and profit, often based on racial motives. One scholar even questions if 
“the idea and reality of America [is] possible without empire?” Given America’s massive 
absorption of land during this period and President Polk’s weak justification for the 1846 
war against Mexico—which  gave Americans control of the Southwest and California – 
such an argument is not without merit. Certainly, commerce “gave expansion an 
irresistible momentum.” 31  Many of the politicians and speculators who pressed for 
expansion did so in pursuit of profit in the west. Their stories of power and avarice are 
telling and they contribute significantly to our understanding of Midwest and Pacific 
American history.  
But too much emphasis on the influence of imperialism and capitalism obscures 
that significantly more was going on. Scholarly arguments that define expansion and 
foreign policy as “manifest design,” and dismiss idealistic arguments as mere 
rationalizations of economic or social desires, are left wanting. History on the long axis is 
more than the sum of its parts. America was more than a nation of hustlers. 32 The 
national socialization that shaped the cosmologies of those Americans who moved 
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westward would have reinforced every argument that men like O’Sullivan pressed. Theirs 
was a nation with no natural shared ethnic identity, a nation, in other words, that knew no 
natural borders. The ideology of exceptionalism and the essence that theirs’ was a nation 
unlike any other – a boundless nation – constituted the essence of the American 
religiosity. This ideology existed – pace historian Loren Baritz – more in the bloodstream 
than in the mind. This is why expansion cannot simply be seen as a euphemism for 
empire. Only if individuals’ agency can be explained without the influence of memory, 
without the impression of socialization, without the influence of past and present, or 
without nationalistic expectations for the future – that is, without the impact of cultural 
and historical consciousness – would the argument that American expansion was driven 
largely by a desire for empire or profit appear convincing.  
It is insufficient to think only in terms of capitalism and empire, particularly in the 
context of nineteenth century America, because even American contemporaries explained 
westward expansion in far more complex terms than mere imperialism. And they did not 
need to. Even in an era of rising abolitionism, the rationalization of expansion by 
references to profit or empire should have been perfectly acceptable; it is only by modern 
standards that expansion appears unpalatable if not genocidal.  But such an explanation 
was not acceptable for Americans. If it had been, then theirs would have been a nation 
like any other, and that was something that contemporaries, as well as past and future 
generations always rejected.  
 Expansion, when viewed within the larger context of American history, in other 
words, tells us something significant about Americans’ national self-perception. It was 
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the epitome of progress. Even John Quincy Adams, no supporter of slavery or war, 
insisted that the U.S. had a “moral and religious duty” to expand. Though he deplored 
Andrew Jackson’s methods, Adams still viewed expansion as America’s destiny. His 
contemporaries concurred. “Democracy in its true sense is the last best revelation of 
human thought…[its] essence is justice [its] object is human progress,” Democratic 
Review insisted.33 It was therefore without a hint of doubt that the highly influential 
nineteenth century historian George Bancroft argued that as God’s chosen people 
Americans would ensure man’s development and that America's spreading influence 
would bring liberty and freedom to more and more of the world. Culturally, this belief 
was evident in symbols and in values. The changing iconography in magazines and 
posters, for example, confirmed Bancroft’s views. In the 1790s, these had detailed 
classical symbols of liberty. By the 1830s and 1840s, however, images depicted lush 
fields and factories, reflecting the American belief that progress followed liberty. 
Expansion ipso facto came to mean the growth of liberty in the American mind.34  
Behind every foreign policy initiative from the Mexican war onwards then, 
policymakers and intellectuals successfully could establish ideational links between 
contemporary actions and the founding generation’s purpose for the nation. This helps 
explain why Manifest Destiny’s tone of moral certainty and sweeping ideas sat so well 
with Americans; Manifest Destiny was simply an extension of the founders’ legacy. It 
                                                 
33 “Democracy Must Finally Reign,” Democratic Review (March 1840).  
34  Bancroft’s views are discussed in, George Athan Billias, “George Bancroft: Master Historian, 
“Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, vol. 111, no. 2 (Oct. 2001), pp. 507-528. On 
iconography see, Michael Kammen, A Season of Youth: The American Revolution and the Historical 
Imagination (New York, 1978), pp. 76-109. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusade State, p. 83. 
 75 
also helps explain the deep disillusion felt by the true Manifest Destinarians when Polk 
balked at the complete takeover of Mexico and proved unwilling to fight London over 
Oregon. The president’s hesitation in both cases illustrates the political realities that 
elected men face. During the latter half of the antebellum period, the unpredictable 
domestic consequences of slavery made unrestrained expansion – for now – too great a 
price to pay. It is testament to the tremendous ideological potency of American 
righteousness, however, that the forces of universalist ideals could only be checked by 
sectional strife rather than completely extinguished.  It is testimony to the permanence of 
these convictions that even when that the price came in the form of civil war, Abraham 
Lincoln easily linked this conflict to America’s global obligation. It was America’s duty, 
he insisted as he honored the dead at Gettysburg, to ensure “that these dead shall not have 
died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom—and that 
government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the 
earth.”35 What made the Gettysburg Address one of the most powerful political speeches 
in American history was not its recognition of the battle’s victims but that in one brief 
paragraph, President Lincoln had fueled America’s rebirth with a simple reminder of the 
glory of the nation’s inception, the values that the American experiment represented, and 
its global missionary responsibility. The Civil War was at its core, after all, a clash of 
cultural, social, and political ideas; it was a war about ways of life. It does not get much 
more ideological than that. 
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***** 
This belief in American destiny unsurprisingly had consequences reflected in behavior 
once the domestic crisis concluded by the end of the 1870s and the nation strengthened 
militarily and financially. These changes began to erode many of the founders’ 
apprehensions concerning the nation’s entanglement in affairs overseas. Indeed, if 
Jefferson or John Quincy Adams had had the technological, financial and military power 
available to later generations, they too might have found being “just” an exemplar to the 
world too tepid. We will never know. What is clear, is that by the end of the nineteenth 
century the founders’ heirs were no longer content with such a passive role.   
 In 1898, Americans intervened militarily in Cuba and the Philippines in hopes of 
ending Catholic Spain’s brutality and to ensure their ability to protect a future canal 
linking the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. They embraced President McKinley’s self-
imposed duty to “educate the Filipinos and uplift them and Christianize them, and by 
God’s grace do the very best we can for them, as our fellow men.” Given America’s 
national self-perception, it was hardly surprising that such progressivism became an 
integral part of foreign policy as well. To many, the extension of this progressivism 
abroad simply confirmed the direction America’s moral compass had always pointed in. 
This was why, despite some public criticism at home, that so many Americans 
effortlessly dismissed the violence perpetrated in their nation’s name. McKinley’s 
successor, Theodore Roosevelt found it as easy as his predecessor had, to tap into the 
nation’s popular enthusiasm for an American role in the world. Contrasting the U.S. with 
China, Roosevelt believed that his nation by its very nature could not “be content to rot 
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by inches in ignoble ease within our borders,” but rather “must strive to play a great part 
in the world.” Despite Emilio Aguinaldo’s insurgency against the American presence in 
the Philippines, Roosevelt saw no choice for the U.S. but to stay and civilize the islands 
or otherwise risk tarnishing the reputation of American greatness. For Americans, this 
greatness was epitomized by the nation’s ability to enlighten the uneducated, for the 
Filipinos could not be handed the “impossible task of working out their own salvation.” If 
the United States abandoned the Philippines, they would not only be ensuring the 
downfall of the Filipinos, they would also be admitting that America’s mission was not 
without limitations.36  
Like presidents before and since, therefore, Roosevelt saw few contradictions 
between his vocal support for international law and the often brutal actions by American 
marines in the Philippines. His thinking concerning Latin America was similarly 
ideological. The 1904 Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine spoke of a natural U.S. 
responsibility to ensure justice when its neighbors failed to fulfill the responsibilities of 
modern nations. Order, he believed, could only come at the hand of the Americans. His 
successors William Howard Taft and Woodrow Wilson would, with some modifications, 
pursue similar policies up through the early years of the Great War in 1914 when Wilson 
intervened south of the border on several occasions. Significantly, he did not intervene to 
support American businesses – he viewed it as a “very perilous thing to determine the 
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foreign policy of a nation in terms of material interest” – but because, as he insisted, “the 
idea of America is to serve humanity.37 
Many scholars interpret this shift in U.S. foreign policy, beginning with the 
Spanish War, as a strong deviation from American tradition. Some view these policies as 
responses to domestic concerns of over-civilized decadence, moral degeneration, or 
stifled masculinity. They view the economic crisis, the abundance of consumer goods, 
and the absence of war as central to the watershed they define in 1890s foreign policy and 
as central to the interventionism America pursued. Others second that conclusion, using it 
to build on their argument that expansion was primarily about markets; they see nothing 
but imperialism during this period.38 Both gender and mammon have their place here, but 
primarily as unique pieces of insight into a particular generation, not as exclusive 
explanations of American foreign policy or national identity. Although there certainly 
was a crisis of masculinity in the 1890s, and although some businessmen dreamt of the 
China market, there was far more continuity than change in this era.  
 In fact even before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the reverend 
Josiah Strong echoed the contour and culture of the American mind. The nation’s mission 
was to “spread those principles…necessary to the perfection of the race to which it is 
destined; the entire realization of which will be the kingdom of heaven fully come on 
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earth.”39 Like O’Sullivan, and so many others before or since, Strong was making the 
white man’s burden an American one. With Spain defeated, Senator Albert J. Beveridge 
(R-IN) similarly insisted that Americans must establish “order where chaos reigns,” 
making them responsible for the fate of others. In contrast to the European imperial 
powers, the Americans assumed more than a rhetorical responsibility. They did not annex 
the Philippines, but instead, through private and public efforts, launched tutelage projects 
to prepare the country for self-rule. The U.S. government, the Rockefeller Foundation, 
the International Health Board, The Carnegie Corporation of New York, and many others 
played vital roles in establishing schools, hospitals, and roads throughout the Philippines. 
By 1952, even Aguinaldo, the old hero of the anti-American insurgency, praised this 
American nation-building effort.40    
Along similar lines, Woodrow Wilson at the end of World War One insisted on 
creating the Mandate system to help prepare former German and Ottoman territories for 
independence and self-rule. These efforts to ensure the eventual national self-
determination help explain why Americans – however unconvincing the argument may 
appear in hindsight – felt that they, with no apparent contradiction, could talk about their 
“empire” as progressive and the Europeans’ as archaic and authoritarian. While it often 
must have seemed like a distinction without a difference to the Filipino, the Cuban, or the 
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Haitian that bore the brunt of this “progressivism,” U.S. foreign policy was embracing a 
mission reinforced by its historical consciousness and dedicated to the improvement of 
the world. The generation of politicians that came to power in the 1890s and would lead 
Americans into the Great War, therefore, did not symbolize a new beginning for 
America, but rather a fulfillment of American ideology. Only in scope were their actions 
new. Whether “the schoolboyish bellicosity of Theodore Roosevelt or the 
schoolmasterish moralism of Woodrow Wilson,” the insistence on America as the agent 
of human progress converged with providence during this era once again. In such a 
context, exemplarism could not satisfy a nation that for over a century had defined itself 
as man’s savior. It was no surprise, then, that the quest to actively make the world safe 
for democracy was just around the corner.41 
***** 
America’s entry into the First World War in April 1917 marked the apotheosis of 
progressivism. Even when President Wilson kept America neutral in the wars’ first years, 
he did so as a matter of disinterest – in the classical sense of the word – but not because 
he was indifferent to the war. Only from a position of high morality, he believed, could 
Americans help bring an end to the European slaughter. He blamed the European balance 
of power system, authoritarian governments, and imperialism for the war. As McDougall 
has put it, Wilson, sounding “like that old Enlightenment radical Tom Paine,” blamed 
“governments for the corruption of men instead of men for the corruption of 
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governments.” But his attempts to bring peace thorough American-led mediation failed. 
No one complied when he called for the belligerents to pursue “peace without victory.”42 
 Wilson had in part won re-election in 1916 on the slogan “he kept us out of war.” 
However, domestic pressure was building for greater American involvement. It came in 
particular from the New Republic and its founder Herbert Croly. Even before the war, 
Croly, in the highly ideological book The Promise of American Life, had argued that the 
U.S. “must by every practical means encourage the spread of democratic methods and 
ideas.” 43 Alongside Croly, Walter Lippmann and John Dewey pushed similar views. 
They dismissed the notion that America’s contribution to mankind could be exemplarist 
only. Referencing Paine, Lippmann in 1915 called for a “League of Peace” to prevent 
future wars. Such a league’s “service to mankind may well be,” Lippmann insisted, 
“world citizenship.” The journal’s editors pleaded with Wilson to pursue global 
leadership. If the U.S. took on what they believed was its destined role, the President 
would turn “this crisis into the service of mankind” and pledge “the country to the 
principle that only in a world where Belgium is safe can the United States be safe.”44 
Despite such pleas, moving the national consciousness from peace to war should 
not have come easily. Politically the nation in 1917 was as divided as at any point in its 
history.45 Nevertheless, as Wilson addressed Congress that April he demonstrated the 
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ease with which American politicians can invoke American exceptionalist ideology when 
he appealed to the American people’s sense of mission above all else. The manner was 
especially telling because there was no need to appeal to morality. There was no need to 
speak of a peculiar American responsibility to save the world. If Imperial Germany 
defeated the British Empire it would be a threat to America’s role in the world -- 
including the western hemisphere.  There were, in other words, grounds for entering the 
war on concerns of national security. But Wilson did not make the realist argument. 
Instead, in a manner that only Americans could, he turned the Great War into an 
ideological crusade. It is simplistic to argue that this intervention was nothing more than 
“ancillary to their main concern, which was to help the English” or that intervention was 
largely a stylistic cover for an American bid for global hegemony. Wilson did not desire 
victory over Germany, but rather aimed to destroy “those banes of humankind that 
Germany stood for – imperialism, militarism, and autocracy.” He may have meant it 
scornfully but the British economist John Maynard Keynes was right, the war to Wilson 
was “essentially theological.” 46   But it was a theology rooted not only in strong 
Presbyterian convictions but also in a belief that only America could make the difference 
in a fallen world.  Though he certainly was not immune to the economic benefits the war 
brought to America, he insisted that America had no self-interests, craved no territory, 
and would demand no reparations. Wilson brought Americans into the war “for the rights 
of mankind and for the future peace and security of the world.”  
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The right is more precious than peace, and we shall fight for the things which we 
have always carried nearest our hearts - for democracy, for the right of those who 
submit to authority to have a voice in their own Governments, for the rights and 
liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free 
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last 
free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we 
are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has 
come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the 
principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. 
God helping her, she can do no other.47 
 
Wilson’s address was an ideological summoning of America’s cultural and historical 
consciousness. It spoke to – what Gordon Wood in a different context calls – the genus 
Americanus. He chose this kind of rhetoric not only because he believed in it – he did – 
but because the American people did. Even one of his strongest Senate critics, Bob 
LaFollette (R-WI), conceded that Wilson’s words were expertly “calculated to appeal to 
American hearts,” and they did just that. Another critic, the writer Randolph Bourne, 
strongly attacked intellectuals for affirming Wilson’s ideological rhetoric and following 
in his warpath. It was “as if the war and [intellectuals] had been waiting for each other,” 
Bourne insisted. He was only half right. The desire to live up to a global responsibility 
ran far deeper than just the intellectual minority. Americans rallied to the war “to make 
the world safe for democracy,” to make it “a war to end all wars.”48 
 Wilson’s justification of a war for justice and democracy received a boost from 
the collapse of Czarist Russia in the early months of 1917. This event was especially 
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inspirational to those progressive Americans who had been actively involved in a 
“crusade for a free Russia” since the 1880s. A telling drawing in Life magazine from May 
carries the caption “Welcome Russia.” It depicts Lady Liberty riding a Russian bear and 
carrying a sign with the years 1776 and 1917 inscribed. In a similar spirit, the elder 
George Kennan (the relative of later diplomat George Frost Kennan) announced that “the 
struggle for freedom in Russia…has ended at last in the complete triumph of democracy,” 
while Harvard scholar Leo Wiener insisted that Russia and the U.S. were now “bound to 
work together as the two greatest republics on the terrestrial globe.”49 Lippmann too 
believed that “Democracy is infectious – the entrance of the Russian and American 
democracies is sure to be a stimulus to Democracies everywhere.” He was certain that the 
war would “dissolve into democratic revolution the world over.”50 The context may have 
been different, but the language was all Paine.  
 Once again, Americans would be disillusioned by a European revolution. The 
Bolshevik coup at the end of 1917 sent shock waves through the U.S. not only because it 
meant Russia’s withdrawal from the war, but because it brought to the international 
political arena a new ideological power that mirrored Americans’ own ambitions. Indeed, 
the only way the U.S. response to Lenin’s international communist movement can be 
understood, is if its call for world revolution is viewed as a direct challenge to America’s 
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global mission. It was a response that domestically was evident in the First Red Scare as 
well.51  The Bolsheviks believed history to be on their side, much as Americans did. 
Their mission to overthrow the nation state everywhere was a call for the most radical 
transformation of mankind’s political future to emerge since either 1789 or 1776. 
 The October Revolution did not prevent an Allied military victory, but for 
Wilson, winning the war proved easier than winning the peace. Schooled as he was in an 
American culture that hailed liberty, righteousness and justice, his attempt to create an 
American-led League to save the world from itself was hardly surprising. His call for 
collective security to enchain “the monster that had resorted to arms” signaled a battle 
between good and evil that many Americans believed their nation destined to engage.52 
But Wilson was the wrong messenger. The Senate rejected Wilson’s design for a new 
world order largely because of his obstinate, go-it-alone, moralistic political style and the 
seemingly ungrateful and uncooperative European politicians. These same issues also 
served to undermine the President at home. Nevertheless, the calamity of Wilson and the 
progressives’ attempt to establish a world order in the American image did not ignite a 
seismic shift in U.S. ideology.53 Wilson’s opponents and successors did not question 
American greatness any more than previous generations had. Like Americans before 
them, they merely disagreed over how to discharge this responsibility. 
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***** 
American foreign policy between the two world wars is often described as “isolationist.” 
When compared to Wilson’s ambitious plans, the United States’ rejection of membership 
in the League of Nations, protectionist trade policies, demands for war-debt repayments, 
exclusive exclusionary immigration policies, and strict neutrality during the period from 
1921-1941 does indeed imply limited international cooperation on America’s part. 
Despite this limited cooperation, the U.S. was neither isolationist, nor particularly anti-
Wilsonian during this period. In voice perhaps, but not in deed. This is unsurprising, 
because, even though Wilson’s aims had been more ambitious than deemed palatable by 
many Americans, it was the man more so than his policies that most despised by 1919. 
Even one of his strongest later critics, the diplomat George Frost Kennan, eventually 
came to accept that Wilson, much like Thomas Paine, had simply been ahead of his 
time.54 From an ideological perspective, the interwar period is significant because it was 
during these two decades that Americans found themselves faced with powerful 
alternative interpretations of modernity. The challenge posed by these foreign ideologies 
inspired ideas and policies that would take America into war again in 1941; ideas that 
would remain central to U.S. foreign policy long after VE day and VJ day. 
 Between the wars, Americans engaged the world on an unprecedented scale. 
Globally they launched private and public modernization projects for the “construction of 
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an American world order.”55American volunteer organizations and missionaries working 
through NGOs launched efforts to promote American values, encourage trade, provide 
medical support, institute educational reforms, and spread American culture in China, 
Latin America, Russia, and elsewhere. These efforts were, in part, driven by Americans’ 
determination to contribute to the welfare of others, but they were also driven by 
America’s new-found economic strength.  It was a reflection of how the U.S. had 
replaced Great Britain as the primary economic power in large parts of the world.56   
This global effort to spread the American dream, in Emily Rosenberg’s apt 
phrase, was not done solely through non-governmental organizations; the government 
also lent a hand. Even when Republicans controlled the White House from 1921 to 1933, 
America remained firmly internationalist. Men like Elihu Root, Charles Evan Hughes, 
Frank Kellogg, and Henry Stimson all pressed for American involvement in the world. In 
the inaugural issue of Foreign Affairs, Root charted a very Wilsonian vision. Defining 
Americans’ agenda as the world, he insisted that the “control of foreign relations by 
democracies creates a new and pressing demand for popular education in foreign affairs.” 
By implication, then, being a mere exemplar was no longer feasible. Hughes went a step 
further in a 1922 speech to the American Bar Association. Convinced that Americans 
                                                 
55  Such projects built on nineteenth-century American efforts to create educational institutions in the 
Middle East and Asia  as well as extensive missionary activities in the Far East, particularly China. Like the 
Peace Corps later on, these organizations were genuine enough in their own right, but they also played a 
vital role in spreading American ideals abroad. See, Ekbladh, Great American Mission.  
56For good examples of this relief work see, Foglesong, American Mission, pp. 60-82, Ekbladh, The Great 
American Mission, pp. 14-76. See also the two books by Emily Rosenberg, Spreading the American 
Dream: American economic and cultural expansion, 1890-1945 (NY: Hill & Wang, 1982), particularly, pp. 
108-160 and Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-
1930 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); William R. Hutchinson, “Modernism and Missions: 
The Liberal Search for an Exportable Christianity, 1875-1935,” in The Missionary Enterprise in China and 
America, ed. John K. Fairbank  (Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 110-131. 
 88 
stood on the side of international justice, he insisted that the creation of permanent 
international courts should be “a distinct feature” of U.S. foreign policy. 57  
Internationalism was also evident in the United States’ policies on arms control, 
international drug trafficking, health and disease prevention, and in its greater sense of 
global economic responsibility, the latter lasting at least until October 1929. To 
strengthen its own position, the government committed itself to treaties outlawing war 
and set up an observer position at the League of Nations. Republicans also continued 
Wilson’s policy of denying legitimacy to the Soviet regime, with President Coolidge 
insisting that he would not work with Moscow until they proved willing to “take up the 
burdens of civilization with the rest of us.”58  
 Scholars who view this era as one of tepid or isolationist U.S. foreign policy do 
so, it would appear, on a false premise. It is worth noting, after all, that it was the 
creation – and the American creation at that – of an international league to secure peace 
that was revolutionary, not the absence of its American leadership. There were, of course, 
some members of Congress as well as private citizens, including several that became 
influential in the America First Committee in the 1930s, who remained strongly opposed 
to any greater U.S. role in the world. The rapid erosion of the global capitalist system, for 
example, caused powerful Senators like Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) and Gerald Nye (R-
ND) to intensify their support for U.S. neutrality and the influential theologian Reinhold 
Niebuhr to declare “the western world in the process of disintegration.” But even as they 
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did, challenges were looming that soon nullified the belief that America would sit on the 
sidelines. As Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (R-MA) acknowledged, neutrality was an 
unsustainable luxury of geography.59  
By the early 1930s, ideological threats appeared that, through their own unique 
interpretations and visions of modernity, posed strong challenges to America’s role in the 
world: fascism in Italy, militarism in Japan, international communism, and National 
Socialism in Germany. Authoritarian powers appeared to be on the rise, while the liberal 
democracies were faltering. For most of the thirties, Americans tried to stem the 
ideological threat through tactical maneuvers such as establishing diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union – the last major liberal democracy to do so – in the hope that they 
could both convince Stalin to halt his pursuit of anti-democratic activities around the 
world, and enlist his help containing Japanese expansionism in the Far East. This policy 
proved unsuccessful as evidenced by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 and the 
continued Japanese expansion into China after 1937.60  
Americans also launched a number of development efforts – preludes to the 
modernization programs of the fifties and sixties – intended to provide less advanced 
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nations the ability to develop socially, politically, and economically. These programs 
were particularly inspired by the growing “assumption that all societies carried a latent 
bacillus for totalitarianism that was easily made virulent by the forces of modernity,” as 
Ekbladh aptly puts it. Poor and underdeveloped nations appeared especially susceptible, 
further supporting the perceived need for American-led international development. 61  
These development efforts drew inspiration from a number of New Deal programs 
including the Tennessee Valley Authority. Liberals like Arthur Morgan, Roosevelt’s head 
of the TVA, Eugene Staley, who during later became influential in the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Edgar Snow and Nelson Rockefeller took on 
increasingly important roles, particularly in China and Latin America. In China, Snow 
began publishing the journal democracy in an effort to spread American political ideals. 
It proved short-lived because of the Sino-Japanese war, but it was a prime example of the 
desire among Americans to influence the far corners of the world. Similarly in Latin 
America, the U.S. government launched cultural and economic programs to undermine 
the perceived fascist threat in the western hemisphere.62  
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The editor of Time and Life magazines, Henry Luce, struck this chord in a famous 
1941 article. Though the article is often only superficially referred to because of its 
prophecy of the “American Century” that followed, Luce’s piece was considerably more 
substantive. Echoing so many previous thinkers on foreign policy, he summoned 
Americans, claiming that it, “now becomes our time to be the powerhouse from which 
the ideals spread throughout the world and do their mysterious work of lifting the life of 
mankind.” He wanted Americans to become “the Good Samaritans of the world.” Like 
Staley, Luce was calling for an American global modernization mission. In the absence 
of American guidance, he worried that lesser nations would pursue other ideological 
paths towards modernity, paths antithetical to America’s visions.  The wars by then 
raging in Europe and Asia Luce insisted, were not simply about territory or national 
security but about values and the American way of life.63  
***** 
Even without men like Luce or organizations like the Committee to Defend America by 
Aiding the Allies, sounding the alarm over foreign ideological threats, it was never likely 
that the American perception of national greatness could be contained. The fall of France 
in the summer of 1940 underlined that the global military and ideological crisis could not 
be solved in America’s favor without active U.S. involvement. In December, Roosevelt 
warned the American people that failure to stop the Axis powers would mean a “new and 
terrible era in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by threats 
of brute force. And to survive in such a world, we would have to convert ourselves 
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permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war economy.” Though Hitler and 
Hirohito talked “of a ‘new order’ in the world,” they actually desired the “revival of the 
oldest and the worst tyranny.” Reviving Wilsonian language, Roosevelt insisted that the 
fight against the Axis was “democracy’s fight against world conquest.” America had a 
duty to fight for “the defense of our civilization and for the building of a better 
civilization in the future.”64  
In March 1941 Congress formally abandoned neutrality. The Lend-Lease Act, 
which supported the Allies financially and with materiel, signaled – far more than Pearl 
Harbor did – America’s entry into the war. While Roosevelt commended that Act’s 
passage, Senator Arthur Vandenberg feared that the law would turn the White House into 
the headquarters for all future wars. In his diary he wrote, “I hope I am hopelessly wrong 
when I say that I fear they will live to regret their votes beyond anything else...I had the 
feeling I was witnessing the suicide of the Republic.” Vandenberg misunderstood. Lend-
Lease signaled that Americans would live up to the global responsibilities the nation had 
always assumed history intended for it to bear.65  
 Four months later, Pearl Harbor quelled the last opposition to war within the 
United States. The Japanese attack made obsolete any serious beliefs that America could 
best serve the world and protect itself as merely an exemplar. It confirmed the suspicion – 
present ideologically since the nation’s birth – that America’s freedoms were always 
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under threat. If the great oceans had once been viewed as the protectors of the American 
experiment, they were now seen as a highway to America. Realist scholars often argue 
that this threat explains U.S. efforts in the Second World War and in the Cold War. They 
see American actions as straight-up responses to the national security threats posed by 
Hitler and later by Stalin. But the conclusion Americans drew was much grander than a 
straightforward response to security threats. They recognized that highways run in both 
directions, concluding, as David Reynolds points out, that only in a world organized 
along American ideals and principles could Americans be secure. Only in that sort of 
world could freedom be preserved, and only though an active American role could it be 
secured. This belief was evidenced by the manner in which Americans chose to fight the 
war and in their active construction of an international order. Both had deep roots in 
American thought on the nation’s role in the world. Both were prodigiously ideological.66  
Even before the Japanese attack, many Americans were defining the war in a 
language that resonated with their sense of mission and freedom. In 1940, Henry 
Stimson, now FDR’s Secretary of War, paraphrased Lincoln and the bible, insisting that 
the world could no longer survive “half-slave and half-free.”  For more than 400 years, he 
insisted, “Americans’ ancestors have been struggling to build up an international 
civilization based upon law and justice.” Now they were faced with ultimate struggle 
between freedom and despotism. In this struggle, Stimson believed, there could be no 
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compromise.67 This view that the war was existential awakened another Civil War legacy 
that Jackson Lears, in his study of the American mind, calls “the long shadow of 
Appomattox.” The Axis powers were not seen as ordinary foes, but as challengers to 
everything America stood for, just as the Confederacy had during the Civil War. Despite 
the impracticality and the certain additional loss of American lives, Roosevelt demanded 
– as had Lincoln – the enemies’ unconditional surrender. The aggressors would be held 
morally responsible for the war, punished accordingly, and would have their ideologies 
eradicated. This justified the execution of the war by any means necessary. Once again, 
Americans turned a war into a global crusade, into a conflict of moral right and moral 
wrong, into an eschatological struggle.68  
 As detailed in following chapters, the execution of the war covered only half of 
America’s perceived responsibility. The eradication of America’s enemies and their false 
world visions ignited the historic claim to design a new global order. As Wilson’s heir 
apparent, it was no surprise that Franklin Roosevelt undertook measures to ensure this 
order, nor was it surprising that the American people so wholeheartedly embraced them. 
But Roosevelt wanted an even more closely integrated system than the one Wilson had 
proposed at Versailles. Like Wilson, FDR believed this new order demanded American 
leadership and that the development of “positive nationalisms” was the key to freedom 
and democracy in the world. The thirties had shown what could happen when societies 
were not “exposed to the American form of progress, but rather were hijacked by false” 
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ideologies. In 1943, when Roosevelt met Churchill in Casablanca, the President laid out 
his thoughts for a grand vision of international reform. Roosevelt’s plans for reforms and 
practices laid out in this “globalization moment” would lead towards the creation of new 
international institutions by the end of the war. Structurally, this would come in the form 
of the United Nations and the new international economic order. But what Roosevelt 
sought in more practical terms was, according to David Kennedy, a world order in which 
the U.S. would “play an engaged international role—but only if the rules of the 
international system were altered in accordance with American goals, putting the world 
on a pathway to more international cooperation and better international behavior.”69  
Roosevelt summed up the historic American mission that the Greatest Generation 
was now fulfilling when, in October 1944, he insisted that Americans would never “again 
be thwarted in our will to live as a mature Nation, confronting limitless horizons. We 
shall bear our full responsibility, exercise our full influence, and bring our full help and 
encouragement to all who aspire to peace and freedom.”70 The President’s words echoed 
the nation’s cultural and historical legacy. It is one that influences the decisions of every 
American president. Whatever professional ideas or perceptions of national interests they 
bring to office, the values and cosmologies instilled by their distinct American 
socialization and heritage is at least to some degree inescapable. American exceptionalist 
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ideology has always been teleological in nature. If it were not, the core of its convictions 
would not have proven so permanent over time. If it were not, rhetoric from the 
Revolutionary era would not seem so strikingly contemporary to every generation.  
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3. The Quest for an American World Order, 1941-1945 
 
The United States’ home soil was left untouched by the Second World War.  While 
American wartime losses —just below five hundred thousand— were substantial, they 
were dwarfed by the casualties of other powers, who for the second time in thirty years 
could speak of lost generations. Unlike the citizens of Europe and Asia, Americans were 
not displaced, and they were not starving.  Their infrastructure was intact and their 
agricultural and industrial production high. The absence of domestic destruction and 
social chaos afforded Americans the opportunity to think more clearly about the 
reconstruction and redesign of the postwar order than any of their allies. American 
exceptionalist ideology made them think about it more comprehensively. Just as the 
Great Depression had provided President Franklin Roosevelt with “a chance to reform 
America, so the Second World War offered an opportunity to reform the world, not so as 
to enrich America, but to preserve the nation and proselytize its values.”1  
Roosevelt envisaged the United States as the epicenter of a new international 
postwar world. His ideas, even if often general thoughts rather than carefully designed 
plans, reflected traditional American visions of freedom, liberty, private property, 
morality, and justice. Assisted by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, FDR sougth a strong 
organization of United Nations that would ensure international security, establish 
permanent global peace and maintain a commitment to the protection and promotion of 
                                                 
1  Warren F. Kimball, The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as War Time Statesman (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1991), p. 186. For an excellent account that focuses on the postwar export of American 
values in the narrower field of human rights see Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: 
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human rights around the world. He also backed an economic order under the Bretton 
Woods system in which international institutions, supported by the strongest powers, 
could secure free trade and provide financial support for developing nations and for 
countries facing dire economic conditions. The responsibility of the great powers, he 
believed, would be to serve and not to dominate the peoples of the world. The world he 
sought, the world Americans sought, was one in which empires were dismantled, 
preferential trade systems undone, and national self-determination thrived.  
 Upon returning from the Inter-Allied Foreign Minister Conference in Moscow in 
1943, Hull summed up these ideas before a joint session of Congress in words that could 
have just as easily emanated from Paine or Wilson. He announced to rapturous applause 
that in the American-backed postwar order there would “no longer be need for spheres of 
influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements 
through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to 
promote their interest.”2 This increasingly utopian American perception of the postwar 
world presumed that other powers would transform into responsible members of the new 
order. As Roosevelt told one reporter in 1943, he expected the war to have calmed the 
revolutionary enthusiasm in the Soviet Union. He now anticipated all major powers 
participating in a “social as well as international peace, with progress following 
evolutionary constitutional lines.” This implied that not only would the Soviet Union 
reform but Great Britain too would be forced to abandon its policies of imperial 
preferentialism and colonial overlordship. No longer would there be a place for planned 
                                                 
2 Congressional Record, 78th Congress, November 18, 1943, pp.  9678-9679; Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New 
York, 1948), vol. 2, pp. 1314-1315.  
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political and economic systems or discriminatory imperial practices.3 Almost fifty years 
later, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama proclaimed this Rooseveltian prophecy 
fulfilled when, in an influential essay, he argued that the global spread of liberal 
democracy and free market capitalism signaled the completion of mankind’s socio-
political evolution and the triumph of western values over other political ideologies.4  
Roosevelt’s project for the postwar world stood in stark contrast to the narrower 
visions of the other members of the Grand Alliance. Winston Churchill’s Great Britain 
harbored more traditional ambitions. The Prime Minister expected a world dominated by 
strong powers in which the British Empire held a seat equal to that of the United States. 
Josef Stalin too thought in terms of power and influence. His Communist vision for the 
postwar order rested, as Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov make clear, on a 
“socialist imperialism” that at minimum gave the Soviet Union absolute control of 
Eastern Europe.5 A less ideologically minded victor than the U.S. might have viewed this 
kind of power division with favor. But for both Roosevelt and later Truman, the sense of 
mission and the influence of American exceptionalism were far too strong to allow such a 
scheme. Both presidents blamed the old game of great power politics and the alliances 
that came with it for twice bringing the world to the brink of destruction. They had no 
intention of rebuilding such a world. In 1942, then Senator Truman lamented that World 
                                                 
3“Roosevelt’s World Blue Print, Saturday Evening Post, April 10, 1943.” Sumner Welles, Roosevelt’s 
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War II was simply the Great War by extension. In 1919, “the victors of that war had the 
opportunity to compel a peace that would protect us from war…They missed that 
opportunity.” America, he insisted, would not fail again.6  
Not all received this gospel of a liberal world order—a gospel resting on 
moralistic and legalistic principles—with equal favor. Several diplomats and intellectuals 
derided the postwar plans as inconceivable, because they depended on the Soviet Union’s 
voluntary abandonment of Communism once the war ended. They rejected the notion that 
any international organization for the preservation of peace and security could take the 
place of “realistic” foreign policies dealing with the European power relationships, and 
they chastised Roosevelt for believing that mankind’s inherent goodness would lead to 
peace and order.7   
The Roosevelt Administration had little interest in this vein of argument 
regardless of the authority of those who championed it. The Administration’s entrenched 
view that the superiority of its ideas and belief in the universal application of American 
ideals provided the United States with a mandate for international change disallowed the 
skepticism of dissenters. America’s historical and cultural consciousness, strengthened 
during the war, led both the President and the public to the conclusion that America was 
the world’s best hope. This intense conviction overshadowed any concern that in their 
                                                 
6 Harry Truman, “Election Eve Speech, Jackson County, MO, November 2, 1942,” Harry S. Truman 
Library, MO (hereafter HSTL), Harry S. Truman Papers, U.S. Senator and Vice President Collection, Box 
287. 
7 Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Little, Brown, and Company, 1943); Carl 
Becker, How New Will the Better World Be? (New York, 1944); William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself: 
A Preface to World Affairs (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946); George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-
1950 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1967). 
 101 
determination to weave the foundations of democratic capitalism and individual liberties 
into the international system they would challenge a force in Moscow of equally strong 
cfonviction.  The result was an American postwar policy planned on the basis of hopes 
and ideals rather than one designed to serve realistic ends.  
***** 
American postwar peace planning was shaped by the experiences and memories of the 
Paris Peace Conference. The commonly held view among policymakers was that 
Wilson’s failure in 1919 to secure a global world order on American terms was a result of 
his not having wielded his power over the Europeans while they were still reliant on U.S. 
war efforts. Franklin Roosevelt was determined not to repeat this mistake.8 Though FDR 
was insistent on forcing an American influenced postwar order, his pendulum, 
nevertheless, swung back and forth throughout the war between divergent views of this 
order’s precise structure. His plans fluctuated to such an extent that scholars seven 
decades hence still debate whether Franklin Roosevelt was an idealist or a realist. Any 
conclusion about exact plans for the postwar world is complicated not only by the 
President’s premature death but also by the fact that he often acted as his own Secretary 
of State. Roosevelt made major foreign policy decisions almost completely independently 
of experts. He sidelined his secretaries of state and his vice-presidents to the extent that 
no aide inside the White House or the State Department could confidently interpret the 
                                                 
8 Hull, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 1116; William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
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President’s plans or his designs with any great degree of authority.9 This should not be 
taken to mean that Hull was an insignificant figure in the cabinet. Even if he never quite 
gained the President’s personal trust in the way Harry Hopkins or Sumner Welles did, 
Hull was Secretary of State for eleven years and for large parts of that time, he served as 
the primary spokesman for Roosevelt’s visions. If Hull appears less influential to some 
scholars it may well be because he was more consistent in his views than FDR ever was 
but it worth noting that on major postwar designs, Roosevelt, albeit often in a round-
about way, accepted Hull’s views.  
At one point, Roosevelt’s postwar peace initiative leaned toward placing security 
responsibilities exclusively in the hands of the major powers. The most frequently cited 
plan in this regard was the Four Policemen concept, which Roosevelt outlined to British 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March of 1942 and two months later to Soviet 
Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov.10  The plan involved assigning regional policing 
powers in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, 
and the United States—the same four powers FDR envisioned would control the 
decision-making body in a future international security organization. The details of the 
plan and Roosevelt’s motivations behind it are, however, unclear. Did Roosevelt envision 
a small fellowship of well-armed nations maintaining world security? While he certainly 
imagined the great powers as the natural gendarmes of the world, it appears that he never 
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supported granting these nations such autonomy as to rule entire regions; policing in 
Roosevelt’s view was for order, not domination. 11  Perhaps, then, a more plausible 
explanation for the policemen concept is that FDR – affected by the League’s inability to 
respond to interwar conflicts – was seeking to ensure that peace would actually be 
enforceable once the Axis powers capitulated. Another likely explanation is that 
Roosevelt feared Congress would not authorize the deployment of American military 
forces overseas after the war’s end. Ensuring that the other great powers patrolled the 
beat on other continents, then, would prevent any international organization from being 
held captive to the moods of the American legislature.12 Whatever his motivations, the 
details of the Four Policemen plan remain vague and unclear. “The conception of a small 
policing body,” Roosevelt explained to Stalin at the Tehran conference in 1943—a full 
eighteen months after he first suggested the plan—was “just an idea, on which future 
study was required.”13 A year later the plan was dead and never again gained any serious 
attention. Even as permanent members of the Security Council, the four powers never 
acquired any of the regional control that FDR’s plans seemed to imply.  
 From 1944 on, planning returned instead to ideas that Roosevelt had first 
advanced three years earlier. In August 1941, FDR met Churchill in Placentia Bay, 
Newfoundland, to discuss their separate war aims and plans for the postwar order. 
Having narrowly survived the Battle of Britain and now having allied with Stalin after 
Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union in June, Churchill’s delegation was hoping for a firm 
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American military commitment to help win the war. 14  The Americans, in contrast, 
approached the conference cautiously. Restrained by an emotional domestic debate over 
possible American belligerence, Roosevelt wanted the meeting to result only in a joint 
British-American declaration emphasizing that he and Churchill had discussed “certain 
principles relating to the civilization of the world.” He wanted to “enunciate the 
humanitarian principles Hitler’s opponents would follow after the war” and in the process 
preempt Stalin and Churchill from signing any old-world style, territorial deals that might 
signal the balance of power system’s return to Europe. 15  Thus, the conference 
demonstrated the considerable gap in American and British thinking on the postwar 
world. While the Prime Minister sought a European order dictated by realpolitik and was 
intent on preserving the British Empire, the President’s ambitions were principled and 
global. The discussions were the first clear sign of Washington’s intent to leave an 
American thumbprint on the world once the war ended. 
 Plainly stated, Washington doubted that the Europeans would, on their own 
cognizance, show responsible leadership in the postwar world. FDR’s confidante, Adolf 
Berle, expressed this clearly, when in a memo to the President shortly before the 
meetings with Churchill he stated that “on the record of the past twenty years and the 
present conflict, it hardly seems that the British can make a statement of program; and 
their highly opportunist policy leaves her with little moral authority outside her own 
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territories.”16 At Placentia Bay, it fell to the tough talking Under Secretary of State, 
Sumner Welles, to explain American ideas to Churchill and his chief negotiator, the 
Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan. Aware 
of Britain’s war-weariness, Welles did not shy away from pressuring the British to accept 
American designs. In the realm of economics, for example, he made it clear that 
American aid to Britain was dependent on the postwar establishment of “the freest 
possible economic interchange without discriminations, without exchange controls, 
without economic preference utilized for political purposes and without all of the 
manifold barriers which had...[been] responsible for the present world collapse.” This 
demand, entered into the Atlantic Charter concluded at the end of the Conference by 
Roosevelt and Churchill, deliberately targeted the 1932 Ottawa Imperial Preference 
Agreements between London and its dominions.17  
The Charter also called for sovereign rights and self-government of all peoples, 
improved international labor standards, social security, and for the establishment of “a 
wider and permanent system of general security.” In spirit, the document read like an 
internationalized version of the Four Freedoms the President had announced in his State 
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of the Union seven months earlier and the Fourteen Points Wilson had announced almost 
a quarter century before.18 It was a program designed to put an end to European global 
dominance and European empires.19 Winston Churchill, a gritty imperialist, predictably 
opposed this intervention in London’s internal affairs. In part because of the Prime 
Minister’s obstinacy, and in part out of fear that too strong a declaration might cause 
political opposition in Britain, the Americans revised the Charter language to imply that 
the agreement would show “due respect for... existing obligations.” This, then, appeared 
to afford the British the illusion of exemption from defined obligations. The compromise 
on language leads some scholars to conclude that Churchill successfully gutted the 
American “trade provision,” but such a view underestimates Washington’s determination 
and strength.20 Roosevelt’s assured Welles that “when the moment becomes ripe,” he 
would exert decisive pressure to build world order the Charter prepared for.21 The altered 
language might have helped Churchill politically but it would be a temporary reprieve. It 
was tactical on FDR’s part. Nothing more. As the war continued, Britain’s position 
continued to erode, affording the U.S. the leverage needed to establish its own agenda. 
This agenda served only to further undermine the British Empire.22  
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 Despite its highly inspirational language, the response to the Charter in the United 
States was mixed. The President of Columbia University, Nicholas Murray Butler, hailed 
it, in a letter to Roosevelt, as “another Declaration of Independence, but this time of 
international independence.” The Washington Post called it “a momentous document 
freighted with high hopes and great responsibilities.” Otherwise, the American press was 
incredulous. Most found the document too vague to mean American belligerency, while 
others found it too strong to ensure that America remained at peace.23 Regardless, it soon 
became clear that the Atlantic Charter was more than a symbol of good faith. In January 
1942 – helped by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that formally made the U.S. a 
belligerent in the war – Roosevelt and Churchill, along with Soviet Ambassador Maxim 
Litvinov, Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong, and representatives of twenty-two other 
governments at war with the Axis powers, signed a Declaration of the United Nations.  
Based on the Atlantic Charter, the declaration pledged its signatories to defend “life, 
liberty, independence, and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in 
their own land as well as in other lands.”24 It was the first formal American attempt to 
globally redefine states’ responsibilities to citizens and ensure the protection of 
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also, Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World, pp. 55-56. 
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individuals across borders in the same the way American citizens were protected by 
principles of rights at home.  
In pamphlets and posters, the U.S. Office of War Information linked these values 
to historical perceptions of a global American mission and merged them with the 
principles of the Four Freedoms. One pamphlet declared that America, “with its ideas of 
equality…against odds…has prospered and brought fresh hope to millions and new good 
to humanity. Even in the thick of war the experiment goes ahead with old values and new 
forms… [the] earth shrinks in upon itself and we adjust to a world in motion holding fast 
to truth as we know it.”25 Vice President Henry Wallace in a speech to the Free World 
Association embraced similar views. Calling for the liberation of the world he insisted 
that while the bible preached social justice, the concept “was not given complete and 
powerful political expression until our nation was formed as a Federal Union.” This, 
Wallace believed, was America’s mission in the war.  Welles concurred. On Memorial 
Day, at Arlington National Cemetery he declared that it must now be U.S. policy to 
“bring in its train the liberation of all peoples. Discrimination between peoples because of 
their race, creed, or color must be abolished. The age of imperialism is ended…in all 
oceans and in all continents.”26 
Concurrent State Department plans are evidence that more than propaganda was 
at play. The Department had begun drawing up ideas for the postwar order as early as 
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December 1939. In the aftermath of the United Nations Declaration, these plans were 
prepared with a renewed vigor and infused with powerful American ideals.27 The 1942 
Draft Constitution for an International Order went as far as to contain a strongly worded, 
16-article long “Bill of Rights” for mankind. The bill aimed to outlaw dictatorship and 
ensure citizens of the world freedom of religion, freedom of speech, property rights, 
education, procedural rights, and other ideals lifted from America’s founding 
documents.28 The following spring, in a memo to the President, Hull explained that for 
these rights to be effectively pursued by the international community they needed to be 
established in writing as a mandate of the new international institution then still in its 
exploratory phase. By the late summer of 1943, “human rights” was integrated as Article 
9 in the first American draft of what was already informally being referred to as the 
United Nations Charter.29   
***** 
While the State Department under Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles prepared treaty 
language on international security and human rights, economic postwar planning moved 
to the Treasury Department under Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr. and his right hand 
man, Harry Dexter White. Morgenthau was an old friend of FDR’s and one of the few 
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Jews in the President’s inner circle. He would later play a prominent part on the War 
Refugee Board as well as author the punitive Morgenthau Plan proposal regarding the 
future of postwar Germany. It was as the President’s chief economist, however, that 
Henry Morgenthau left the greatest legacy. By the outbreak of the War, the consensus 
among American economists and politicians was that nationalistic and imperialistic 
policies had exacerbated the interwar global depression. To prevent future economic 
crises, Morgenthau’s top priority as Secretary became the creation of an international 
financial system to cope with issues like hunger, unemployment, displacement, and social 
chaos at the end of the war. Between 1942 and 1944, these plans revolved around the 
design of what would become the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), or World Bank, to help 
stabilize postwar conditions.  
On top of these ambitious initiatives, the Americans attached demands for free 
trade. For over a decade, Cordell Hull had been the Administration’s advocate for 
principled non-discriminatory trade policies, but ideologically the roots went far deeper. 
Ever since George Washington’s Farewell Address, in which he advised that in trade with 
foreign powers Americans “hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor 
granting exclusive favors or preferences,” non-discrimination, equality, and reciprocity 
had, as the economic historian Richard Gardner points out, been principles of American 
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economic policy. It was only reluctantly that the United States had been drawn into trade 
wars of mercantilism.30  
The idea of free trade was already a central component of the 1941 Lend-Lease 
agreements with Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Formally approved by Congress in 
March 1941, the Lend-Lease Act, had given the President the authority to “sell, transfer 
title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government [the 
President deems vital to the defense of the U.S.] any defense article.”31 While Lend-
Lease was vital for its war contribution to Great Britain and to the Soviet Union, the 
Administration also attached to it a, in the eyes of the recipients, more sinister caveat 
intended to reform international trade rules. Article VII of the agreement specifically 
served to liberalize international economic and trade policies now and in the future.32 
Repayment for lend-lease aid would not come, as Britain’s John Maynard Keynes had 
hoped, in the form of monies, goods, bases, or even unused goods. Assistant Secretary of 
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State, Dean Acheson, dismissed any such solution as “wholly impossible” and of no 
interest to the United States; repayments would have to come in policy concessions. As 
Hull informed the President in April 1942, “compensation will, to a large extent, consist 
of cooperation in the attainment of the basic objectives in the economic field, envisaged 
in the Atlantic Charter.”33 What he meant was that the cosmetic exceptions that Churchill 
had managed to insert into the Charter were unsustainable, as the Prime Minister likely 
knew. The scope of American plans did not allow for such concessions. This view 
reflected the often overlooked fact that to Roosevelt’s generation, it was not only the 
fascists and the communists who were deemed fundamentally un-American in thought 
and deed; it was the British as well. As Kimball points out, to Americans, Britain 
“epitomized much of what was wrong with the world.” Britain’s wrongs were among the 
many injustices Americans set out to right as they designed the new order.34  
 In 1942, Morgenthau and White began outlining a complete reformation of the 
international financial order to include the Fund, the Bank, and free trade ideals. Publicly, 
they were aided by officials from the Treasury and State departments who had begun 
inundating newspapers and journals with articles explaining the need for changes to 
currency and trade policies and for American leadership in the world.35 Domestically, the 
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policy had the backing of key members of the U.S. Senate as well. In March 1944, Harry 
Truman (D-MO), Elbert Thomas (D-UT), and Hartley Kilgore (D-WV) sponsored a 
popular resolution arguing that “enduring peace” depended on the “abandonment of 
political nationalism and economic imperialism and autarchy.”  The resolution declared 
America the “nominated nation” and its purpose to be the establishment of a “progressive 
future for ourselves and for the world at large.”36 Few seemed to doubt “that the world’s 
peoples readily would embrace the liberal American vision that would redound to their 
benefit.” 37  As Morgenthau wrote to White, these economic initiatives would reveal 
whether the Soviet Union was “going to play ball with the rest of the world on external 
matters, which she [had] never done before and [if] England [was] going to play with the 
United Nations or [if she was] going to play with the Dominions.”38 Americans hoped 
that answers to these questions would come at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference scheduled for July of that year in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, 
and at the Dumbarton Oaks conference set to convene for discussions on the United 
Nations in Washington, D.C. later that fall.  
 The delegates from the forty-four countries who met at Bretton Woods sought 
agreements on sustainable long-term solutions to the problems plaguing the international 
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economic system. In his conference-opening speech, Roosevelt summed up the attendees’ 
mission, announcing that “commerce is the lifeblood of a free society. We must see to it 
that the arteries which carry that blood stream are not clogged again.” This speech 
captured the American anticipation that at war’s end, liberalization and interdependence 
rather than preferentialism and nationalism would be the prime drivers of the 
international economy. It also implied that even restrictive, one-party states would be 
expected to initiate processes of liberalization and to abandon discriminatory policies of 
monopolism and monopsony when it came to international trade. This was what 
Roosevelt meant when he emphasized that these nations were gathered for the work of a 
“free society.”39 
The Administration envisioned that its goals could be achieved through the 
establishment of new institutions that would promote regulation and cooperation on 
currency exchange, development, and trade. The Final Act of the United Nations 
Monetary and Financial Conference agreed upon at Bretton Woods outlined such 
mechanisms in the form of the IMF and the IBRD. The primary aim of the proceedings 
was to ensure that all participants would adopt monetary policies with controlled 
exchange rates in which their currency would be tied to the U.S. dollar which in turn 
would be tied to gold. The dollar would take on the role played by gold under the pre-war 
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system, in effect making it the world’s currency. 40  The IMF was created to assist 
countries with loans to cope with short-term balance of payment problems resulting from 
the war, to restore currency convertibility, and to bring an end to nations’ irresponsible 
practices of currency devaluations. In contrast, the purpose of IBRD was to provide long-
term aid for reconstruction projects in devastated and less advanced countries for the sake 
of sustainable world welfare and peace. 41  Economic stability, Americans believed, 
fostered political freedoms and curtailed nationalistic and ideological radicalism. 
As the war entered its final year, the United States was economically healthier and 
wealthier than any nation. In 1944 Americans were producing almost fifty percent of the 
world’s goods. It was no surprise, therefore, that these new economic organizations were 
American designed and American-led. Anything else would have been inopportune if not 
impossible. In the Bretton Woods negotiations, this financial supremacy allowed 
Washington to secure for itself – over only muted protests from the other powers – virtual 
control of the distribution of finances to countries in need. This did not mean that the 
U.S. would singlehandedly determine the appropriation of funds, but rather that it was the 
only power with the influence necessary to veto aid or any change to the organizational 
structures.42 The Administration may have frequently insisted that these new institutions 
be “financial institutions run by financial experts” and executed “wholly independent of 
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political connection,” – a position advocated by Morgenthau during his Senate 
Committee testimony on the agreements – but that was a simplified view.43 The Bretton 
Woods system had obvious financial advantages for American industry. Elimination of 
trade barriers would lead to flourishing exports, particularly in the immediate postwar era 
as other nations struggled to rebuild. Perhaps more significantly, Bretton Woods was a 
sign of the supranational American-led order that was being built.  
In this context, New Left historians have traditionally viewed Bretton Woods as 
nothing more than an extension of the open door policy, a vehicle to establish American 
world hegemony over the flow of money and trade and to gain unrestricted access to the 
closed Russian market. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, for example, have insisted that it was 
the United States’ primary goal to create a world where American business “could trade, 
operate, and profit without restrictions anywhere.” 44  Such an explanation, however, 
overlooks both political and practical factors. Bretton Woods’ emphasis was on 
multilateralism, not on strict self-interest; its creation of a liberalized international 
economic order was not a zero-sum game. It did not achieve American economic success 
at the expense of others, but was designed to reinforce the financial strength of all its 
members. This was the purpose behind the elimination of preferential economic blocs 
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such as the Ottawa System.  Moreover, the system was neither aimed at socialist 
economies nor was it, contrary to the argument of scholars like Fred Block and Thomas 
Paterson, the first step in an aggressive Cold War policy. Raymond Mikesell – one of the 
chief economists present at Bretton Woods – explained that American postwar planners 
confidently believed that a way could be found “whereby nations with capitalistic, 
socialistic, and ‘mixed’ economies could function together.” In fact, negotiators went to 
great lengths to create a system that included the Soviet Union. Americans believed that 
an “orderly world trading system required the cooperation of the Soviet Union and that 
all countries would benefit by the establishment of such a system.”45  
Eventually, as described in chapter four, the Soviet Union opted out of 
participating in the Fund and the Bank, but a careful reading of the American delegation 
minutes does not – much in contrast to the preparation of the Marshall Plan three years 
later – indicate that they envisioned or prepared for such an outcome. In fact, the chief 
Soviet negotiator, M.S. Stepanov, did not give them any reason to believe so. The 
negotiations reveal differences of opinion among American and Soviet economists, the 
most extensive of which concerned the Soviet demand for a status equal to Great 
Britain’s in the new system. These differences, however, never seemed sufficient cause 
for the Soviet Union to abandon the agreement. Throughout the conference Stepanov was 
in close contact with Moscow, ensuring that Stalin and Molotov were well informed of 
the progress. This only furthered Americans’ belief that Moscow would ratify the 
                                                 
45 Raymond F. Mikesell, “Negotiating at Bretton Woods,” in Negotiating with the Russians eds. Raymond 
Dennett and Joseph E. Johnson (World Peace Foundation, 1951), pp. 100-116 (quotation on p. 106).  
 118 
treaty.46 On the final day of the conference, Stepanov praised the American delegation’s 
flexibility, applauded how the members had “successfully worked out draft agreements,” 
and “appealed to the Conference to accept the Final Act.” For his part, Morgenthau 
declared that going forward, “the only enlightened form of national self-interest lies in 
international accord.”47 Optimism in both the American and Soviet camp was high when 
the conference concluded on July 22. 
***** 
Negotiations over the establishment of an international security organization to replace 
the League of Nations began shortly after the conclusion of the economic process at 
Bretton Woods. The meetings took place in three stages, starting in August 1944 and 
concluding in the summer of 1945. The first conference was held in Washington D.C., at 
Dumbarton Oaks, the second in the Crimea at the Three-Power Meeting at Yalta, and the 
third in San Francisco as the war in Europe was coming to a close. In the United States 
hopes for the postwar order were succinctly captured in the plain Midwestern language of 
Wendell Willkie, the Republican whom Roosevelt had defeated in the presidential 
election of 1940. In One World, his travelogue about his 1942 whirlwind tour of Europe, 
North Africa, Latin America, Russia, and Asia, Willkie delivered a passionate American 
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account of a world free of imperialism and dependency. The book made its readers feel, 
as the British Ambassador to Washington cabled home, “that America is rising to the 
height of its material and spiritual power…[and] that a missionary world task is before 
the United States which the nations are eagerly and desperately expecting it to fulfill.” A 
year later in An American Program, Willkie summed up this mission when he announced 
that Americans “are fighting a war for freedom; we are fighting a war for men’s minds. 
This means that we must encourage men’s just aspirations for freedom not only at home 
but everywhere in the world.”48  
 The ideal of Willkie’s “one worldism” was one of the driving spirits of American 
postwar policy under Roosevelt and later Truman who, shortly before Dumbarton Oaks, 
replaced Henry Wallace as FDR’s running mate on the November ticket. Largely selected 
because he was acceptable to all, Truman was also a strong internationalist.49 In January 
1944 at the United Nations Forum in Philadelphia, Senator Truman spoke of the need for 
a “world organization to ensure that the ‘four freedoms’ shall be not only freedoms for 
the United Nations but a heritage for all peoples of the world.” He was convinced that 
“history has bestowed on us that solemn responsibility.”50 The responsibility to save the 
world from itself rested with the America, he argued six months later. In words that could 
have been Wilson’s, he asked if Americans did “not owe it to our children, to all 
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mankind…to be sure these catastrophes do not engulf the world a third time. This is 
America’s destiny.”51 Formally endorsing Roosevelt’s plans for the war and beyond, he 
argued “that some good can come out of this war is [sic] that we are willing to assume the 
obligations God intended for us to take…I believe God Almighty intended that this 
nation take its rightful place.”52 The covenant that made America exceptional was alive 
and well. 
In August, Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Jr. led the U.S. delegation 
at Dumbarton Oaks where representatives from the U.S., Great Britain, the Soviet Union, 
and China gathered to begin exploratory talks on the proposed United Nations.53 The 
conference was the first collective attempt by the members of the Grand Alliance to 
establish an effective postwar security order. In D.C., the stakes were viewed as high. On 
the Senate floor, Joseph Ball (D-MN) proclaimed that the “peace of the world and of 
these United States depended on American membership.” Others opposed the talks, but 
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saw the risks as equally high. Ohio Senator Robert Taft feared that U.S. membership in 
any international order would be the beginning of the end for the republic. Harold Burton 
(R-OH) opposed the talks as well. He worried, on the other hand, that absent a strong 
social and humanitarian agreement, the talks might revert to a plan intended to “dominate 
the world with three or four other men representing great powers.”54   
The primary conference objective was, as the Washington Post defined it, “the 
heading off of a Third World War.”55 In an effort to fulfill that goal, the main topics of 
early discussion concerned the structure, membership, and voting process of the General 
Assembly as well as the Security Council. Within days, disagreements on these matters 
threw the United Nations’ future into doubt. In the Assembly, Stalin demanded seats for 
each of the Soviet Union’s republics, 16 in all. In the Council, he insisted on veto power 
for all permanent members in all instances. Washington rejected both demands. Their 
early planning had called for a one-nation-one-vote structure in the Assembly to ensure 
institutional equality, a concern Stalin would not permit. Even more worrisome to 
Stettinius, though, was Stalin’s insistence on veto power even in disputes involving a 
nation’s own actions. As Roosevelt explained to Stalin in a note hastily composed mid-
conference, Moscow’s demands undermined the legitimacy and the equal opportunity of 
the United Nations. 56 But Stalin would not budge. Fearing the worst, the American 
delegation decided that a solution should be postponed until further discussions could be 
held. These different expectations for the U.N. highlighted the substantial differences 
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regarding the postwar world that existed between Moscow and Washington. While Stalin 
viewed the United Nations strictly in security terms, the Americans were seeking a far 
more egalitarian international organization.57  
The likelihood of disagreement was evident in the “tentative proposals” each 
power submitted in advance of the conference. Stettinius’ delegation arrived with a 
highly progressive agenda that emphasized new international responsibilities and order, 
included strong emphases on social and economic fields, and championed human rights. 
In contrast to this principled agenda, Soviet and British proposals were conservative, 
seeking only to deal with issues deemed vital to immediate postwar cooperation. No 
wonder, then, that both nations balked at the American proposal to, 
[make it]the duty of each member of the organization to see to it that conditions 
prevailing within its jurisdiction do not endanger international peace and security 
and, to this end, to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all its 
people and to govern in accordance with the principles of humanity and justice. 
Subject to the performance of this duty, the Organization should refrain from 
intervention in the internal affairs of any of its members.58 
 
Washington, in other words, was proposing an organization in which a member’s 
inability to preserve internal tranquility and rights could lead to the organization’s 
intervention. There is little doubt that a Charter proposing such high-minded ideals would 
have been difficult to get U.S. Senate approval but the vision was telling of America’s 
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historical desire to support individual freedoms and to dominate the postwar order. In any 
event, unlike the Americans, neither London nor Moscow saw global peace as something 
tied to principles of “human rights” and “fundamental freedoms.”59 Europeans had seen 
too much death and mayhem to merit such unlimited faith in the natural progress of 
mankind. They would rather protect what they had than risk further costs on an American 
illusion. Given the imperialist nature of both powers they also presumably felt that they 
had much to lose. A frustrated Stettinius briefed Roosevelt that no immediate solution on 
human rights would be forthcoming in lieu of the obstinacy shown by the other two. He 
compromised for now with a heavily watered down reference to rights—a reference that 
did not stand alone, but was second to social and economic cooperation—which stated 
that “the Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social, and 
humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.” The statement paid lip service to the principle, but much to the State 
Department’s frustration, it left the issue unresolved.60  
The elimination of the responsibility to defend human rights, however, was 
overshadowed by the debate over voting procedures which threatened the entire United 
Nations project. Coupled with Moscow’s abandonment of the Poles during the concurrent 
Warsaw uprising, Stalin’s apparent insistence on the right to dictate the future of 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, and his refusal to provide future independence for the 
Baltic states, the Soviet veto demand appeared particularly worrisome to the Americans. 
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A frustrated Hull confided to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow that he had begun to 
wonder “whether Stalin and the Kremlin have determined to reverse their policy of 
cooperation with their Western allies.”61 It was a strong statement, especially considering 
Hull had heavily championed American-Soviet cooperation since the Moscow 
Conference in the fall of 1943.  
Dumbarton Oaks came to a close in the first week of October with a blueprint for 
further negotiations and a rather weak statement of principles. Americans had presented 
their ideals, and Moscow had rejected them. Allen Drury, a reporter with many 
connections in the Senate, echoed the sentiment felt by many when in his diary he wrote:  
Out of that big house in Georgetown has finally come the Dumbarton Oaks 
Agreement, the “suggestions” for a “United Nations Security Organization.” Such 
timid minds, these were, so petty and so small. Apparently afraid to formulate a 
really strong world body, they have been content to propose instead a method for 
organizing international chaos in the most respectable manner. It probably deserves 
to pass the Senate, for it is apparently the best the frightened little men who run the 
world can manage.62  
 
Like so many others, Drury did not believe this lived up to the dreams of the Atlantic 
Charter. Many Senators were also appalled at the Allies’ unwillingness to cooperate.  “It 
would be pointless,” Burton Wheeler (D-MN) confided to Drury at the end of the year, 
“for the President to send the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to the Senate unless Britain and 
Russia changed their present policies in Europe.” Ball agreed, claiming that if “present 
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unilateral decisions by the Allied nations in the liberated areas of Europe continues, it 
may do irreparable damage to the principles of international collaboration.”63  
As it was, opposition to internationalism never rediscovered the strength of the 
interwar era. The most vocal opponent, Robert Taft, in a 1943 speech before the 
American Bar Association had called for a resurgence of exemplarism. He rejected 
turning over any American sovereignty to a “Worlditania” and dismissed any plans that 
“may appeal to do-gooders who regard it as the manifest destiny of America to confer the 
benefits of the New Deal on every Hottentot.” By late 1944 Taft’s was a minority 
position. Roosevelt and Truman carried the election four weeks after Dumbarton Oaks. 
The Nation was quick to emphasize that “the elections have announced to the world that 
1944 is not 1920.” Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg agreed. In early 1945 he, in a 
powerful speech, repudiated his isolationist views on America's role in the world 
endorsing Roosevelt's postwar plans. Given his status in the GOP, The New Republic's 
assertion that Vandenberg's turn-around represented a “turning point in world affairs” 
hardly seemed an exaggeration. 64 Domestic opposition to the U.N. and to American 
global leadership was by early 1945 nothing more than a fringe element in U.S. politics. 
***** 
Despite the election victory, the Roosevelt Administration remained acutely aware of 
discontent at home. Shortly before he departed for Yalta in February of 1945, the 
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President warned that the United States needed its allies in war and in peace. He claimed 
that “the nearer we come to vanquishing our enemies the more we inevitably become 
conscious of differences among the victors. We must not let those differences divide us 
and blind us to our more important common and continuing interests in winning the war 
and building the peace.” At the same time, he remained committed to his beliefs, insisting 
that while 
…the statement of principles in the Atlantic Charter does not provide rules of easy 
application to each and every one of this war-torn world's tangled situations…– it is 
an essential thing – to have principles toward which we can aim.  And we shall not 
hesitate to use our influence- and to use it now—to secure so far as is humanly 
possible the fulfillment of the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We have not shrunk 
from the military responsibilities brought on by this war. We cannot and will not 
shrink from the political responsibilities which follow in the wake of battle.65 
Perhaps Roosevelt never recognized the incompatibility of these two visions. Fulfilling 
the principles of the Atlantic Charter was always likely to cause discord among the allies. 
He likely hoped his personal relationship with Stalin would smooth over the policy 
differences that had arisen at Dumbarton Oaks and more generally over Europe’s 
future. 66  Roosevelt’s confidence in his diplomatic persuasiveness in one-on-one 
situations was both a great strength and a great weakness. In Stalin, Roosevelt saw a vital 
wartime ally and a leader he deemed an essential partner in the postwar world. He never 
quite understood that Stalin was not a normal statesman. He never understood that the 
                                                 
65 Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Message on the State of the Union, January 11, 1945,” in PPA Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, 1945, pp. 32-42. 
66 During the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, Roosevelt had similarly attempted to use personal diplomacy to 
convince the Soviet representative that Moscow’s demands on the Security Council voting procedure were 
unacceptable. In the middle of the Conference, he invited Gromyko to the White House for a personal 
meeting. For more on this, see Stettinius, diary entry September 8, 1944, The Diaries of Edward Stettinius, 
pp. 129-132; Meeting with Ambassador Gromyko in the President’s Bedroom, September 8, 1944, FRUS 
1944, vol. I, pp. 784-787. 
 127 
“symbiosis of imperial expansion and ideological proselytism” reinforced by Marxist 
globalism did not make Stalin a man with whom normal pacts could be reached.67  
 American support for self-government and independence, ideals Washington 
considered essential for the sustainability and respectability of the U.N. was the gravest 
example of this long-term irreconcilability between the great powers. At Yalta, the 
primary concern in this regard was the future of the territories and peoples soon to be 
liberated from Axis occupation and those held under mandate by the soon to be extinct 
League of Nations. To emphasize the Alliance’s support for the Atlantic Charter, 
Roosevelt pressed Churchill and Stalin to sign The Declaration on Liberated Europe, 
which guaranteed the independence of all occupied European nations. The signatories 
promised support for democracies “through free elections of governments responsive to 
the will of the people.” Moscow at first viewed the Declaration with suspicion, but as 
Molotov later relayed, the language mattered little; the significant factor was, in Stalin’s 
words, simply “the correlation of forces.” In Eastern Europe, that correlation strongly 
favored the communists.68 FDR likely understood these practical limitations; however, 
after the negative domestic reaction to Stalin’s positioning in Eastern Europe during the 
second half of 1944, having Moscow on record as supporting democratic principles 
granted Roosevelt some needed political cover. 
The Declaration’s principles were tied to American support for decolonization, an 
issue that had been on FDR’s agenda since 1941. Embodied in the nation’s own 
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anticolonial heritage, support for independence movements was part of America’s 
historical and cultural consciousness. But, in practice, Americans were ambivalent about 
self-government. Ideologically, they heralded principles of freedom and independence, 
and yet, as Brad Simpson shows, Americans had rarely conceded self-government as a 
right. In 1940, the German-American theologian Paul Tillich articulated this view, 
declaring that the responsibility of independence “should be reserved for those who are 
able to carry it.” Echoing Jefferson’s thought on blacks and Native Americans, noted in 
chapter two, Tillich insisted that “it is by no means a deprivation of Freedom and full 
humanity if the large majority of people are excluded from political self-determination.” 
Not everybody was ready for the responsibility that came with independence and self-
government. Roosevelt concurred. In a press conference with the Negro Newspaper 
Publishers Association (NNPA), he explained that while Americans endorsed national 
self-determination, there were people “completely incapable of self-government…You 
have got to give them some education first. Then you have got to better their health and 
their economic position.”69 A year later, in 1945, he warned that in “a democratic world, 
as in a democratic Nation, power must be linked with responsibility, and obliged to 
defend and justify itself within the framework of the general good.”70  
This support for tutelage, however, could not have disguised the significance FDR 
placed on self-determination as a principle. In the spring of 1944, Hull explained to 
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Anthony Eden that Washington’s expectation was that the “United Nations [would] 
assume a special responsibility” and that it would be its “duty and purpose [my 
italics]…to cooperate fully with the peoples of such areas in order that they might 
become qualified for independent national status.” In July, he repeated these demands to 
Richard Law, the British Minister of State, highlighting that the world’s future peace and 
prosperity depended on “all nations having special relationships with backward peoples” 
proceeding “with an awakening and a general forward movement relating to more 
opportunities, more facilities, [and] more encouragement” for these peoples. Colonial 
powers should follow the “course and policy of the United States in the Philippines.”71  
Hull’s comments followed in the wake of remarks the President had leveled 
against British imperial policy in Gambia earlier that year. Denouncing London’s policy 
as nothing more than “exploitation,” Roosevelt lamented the complete absence of 
“education whatsoever,” as well as Britain’s refusal to support local agriculture. Once up 
and running, FDR wanted the U.N. to inspect and report on colonial powers, making sure 
to “let all the world know” the injustices of their rule.72 In a 1944 Memorandum to the 
President on the Far East, Hull pushed for “early, dramatic, and concerned 
announcements…making definite commitments to the future of the regions of Southeast 
Asia.” Americans should call for “specific dates when independence or complete self-
government will be accorded…steps to be taken to develop native self-rule…[and a] 
pledge for economic autonomy and equality of economic treatment.” It was evidence that 
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Americans had linked permanent peace with freedom, human rights, and independence. 
“We believed that we were taking the long-range view, and that a lasting peace in the 
Pacific was of greater ultimate benefit to Britain, France, and the Netherlands – as well as 
to the whole world – than the possible immediate benefits of holding on to colonies,” 
Hull insisted.73  
Based on these views of the postwar world, the Department of State developed 
plans for an International Trusteeship Administration (ITA) – later renamed the 
International Trusteeship Council (ITC) – to carry forward and apply the provisions of 
the Atlantic Charter. The purpose was to ensure U.N. supervision of nations held in trust, 
guaranteeing that they were led toward “preparation and education…for self-
government,” that their inhabitants were “protected against exploitation,” and that any 
form of “forced labor” was abolished. Unlike the Mandatory System at the end of the 
World War I, the ITA was intended to carry out continuous inspections with observers 
monitoring and reporting any violations, it was to secure the “establishment of free 
commerce for citizens and states, and “the promotion of equality of economic 
opportunity consistent with the safeguarding of the interest of local inhabitants.” 
Furthermore, inhabitants were to have the right to “petition directly…to the [Security] 
Council.”74 This latter right was significant, because American plans for the Security 
Council at this stage still aimed to suspend veto power for permanent members against 
which a complaint was brought, thereby providing trustees an avenue for a hearing if so 
requested and action if so decided by the Council. 
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 Trusteeship plans had been on the American agenda leading up to Dumbarton 
Oaks, but were removed at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military grounds.75 
By Yalta, however, the military situation had improved enough for the topic to reemerge.  
Here it fell to Stettinius, now Secretary of State after Hull had resigned due to ill health in 
November 1944, to present these visions to Stalin and Churchill. The Prime Minister’s 
reaction was predictable. Accounts vary slightly on Churchill’s response, but according 
to one eye-witness the Prime Minister flew into a rage. Interrupting Stettinius, Churchill 
yelled that he would “not have one scrap of British territory flung into [trusteeships]. He 
continued, “I will have no suggestion that the British Empire be put into the dock and 
examined by everybody to see whether it is up to their standard.” 76  According to 
Churchill, the Atlantic Pact had never signaled a willingness to surrender any part of the 
British Empire. A 1942 diary entry by Vice-President Henry Wallace, however, implies 
that Churchill knew better. Referencing a conversation with FDR, Wallace wrote that the 
President insisted the Atlantic Charter “applied to the Pacific as well as to the Atlantic 
[and] that Churchill thought it applied to a wider area [too] until he got mixed up in the 
Indian trouble.”77 Publicly as well, FDR clarified that the “Atlantic Charter covered not 
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only the Atlantic but the whole world.” Echoing this statement, a cartoon in The New 
York Times depicted the President wrapping the Charter’s scroll around the world with a 
caption making clear that it applied “to all humanity.”78 
After Churchill’s outburst, Stettinius made it clear that there were no plans to 
force the issue of independence in existing empires, but that territorial trusteeship would 
apply only to existing League of Nations’ mandates, territories detached from the enemy, 
and territories that might be placed under trusteeship voluntarily by the states responsible 
for their administration. This statement assuaged Churchill enough that he agreed to 
accept the trusteeship plan. Perhaps he deceived himself into believing that support for 
independence could be contained outside of the British Empire, despite the fact that he 
had now in effect authorized support for all mandates to gain independence. Whatever the 
British government believed – or hoped – American pressure throughout the war ought to 
have made it clear that U.N.-defined responsibilities for territories held in trust would 
naturally be expected to apply to colonies as well.79 
The British were hardly the only ones deceiving themselves. Roosevelt left Yalta 
brimming with optimism. In addition to the agreement on trusteeship matters, the Big 
Three had agreed on an April date for the San Francisco Conference to formally create 
the United Nations, on the principled matter of Eastern Europe’s future, and on a rough 
timeline for the Soviet Union’s entry into Pacific War. Upon his return to Washington, 
Roosevelt hailed the Yalta Protocol. Addressing a joint session of Congress, he declared 
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that the peace would “be based on the sound principles of the Atlantic Charter.” Harry 
Hopkins summarized these feelings, claiming that after Yalta, we “really believed in our 
hearts that this was the dawn of a new day we had all been praying for…that we had won 
the first great victory of the peace – and by ‘we’ I mean all of us, the whole civilized 
human race.” On relations with the Soviets, he believed that they “had proved that they 
could be reasonable and far-seeing, and there wasn’t any doubt in the mind of the 
president or any of us that we could… get along with them peacefully for as far into the 
future as any of us could imagine.”80  
Events proved Hopkins and Roosevelt wrong. So, was the President misleading 
the public into believing that the difficulties of the fall were now a thing of the past?  Or 
was he perhaps simply trying to buy time? Given that the Senate was likely to debate and 
vote on the Bretton Woods Agreements and a yet to be completed United Nations Charter 
before year’s end, FDR certainly had reason to exaggerate the state of affairs. It is also 
possible, of course, that the President truly believed that the agreements reached meant 
the Soviet Union and Great Britain would play by the American designed rules for the 
postwar order. Unfortunately, Roosevelt’s death shortly after Yalta leaves us with few 
answers to these questions. What is clear is that he vastly misjudged the incompatibility 
of the Yalta agreement with the continued existence of the Soviet Union as an ideological 
force and Great Britain as an imperial nation.  An Americanized world based on the 
Atlantic Charter could not co-exist alongside these two powers. 
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 In the aftermath of Yalta, the Administration stepped up the domestic campaign in 
support of the Yalta Protocol and the United Nations. The State Department’s newly 
created Division of Public Liaison (DPL) filled the media with inspiring stories and 
worked with interested private groups – from church groups to organized labor – to 
promote the values of the new organization, including its human rights emphasis. A 
simultaneous campaign, championed by the eloquent Dean Acheson, backed the Bretton 
Woods system.81 In need of atonement for 1919, American officials presented the new 
international order as assurance that the world would measure up to American principles. 
It was a message the American people were ready to hear. If in December 1941 World 
War II had been a war for vengeance, it had by 1945 also become a war for 
righteousness.  
On March 15, Roosevelt, speaking to his advisor Charles Taussig, laid out what 
became his final views on trusteeships. These confirmed and clarified the direction in 
which his thoughts had always been heading. The President insisted that, French Indo-
China and New Caledonia should be taken from France and put under a trusteeship. He 
said, “well if we can get the proper pledge from France to assume for herself the 
obligations of a trustee, then I would agree to France retaining these colonies with the 
proviso that independence was the ultimate goal. Taussig then “asked the President if he 
would settle for self-government. He said no.” He then “asked him if he would settle for 
dominion status. “He said no--it must be independence. He said that is to be the policy 
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and you can quote me in the State Department.”82 Given the comparable nature of French 
Indo-China and British imperial possessions, FDR’s stance did not bode well for 
European empires in general. Roosevelt had a meeting scheduled with Stettinius and his 
major advisors on trusteeships for April 19, presumably to clarify his views in advance of 
the San Francisco conference scheduled to start six days later. That meeting was never 
held. 
Eight days after FDR’s conversation with Taussig, on March 23, the British 
Embassy informed London of developing American plans that now included having the 
U.N.  “send out technical representatives, doctors, sanitary experts, economists, and 
social analysts” to investigate conditions in colonies.83 Lord Halifax accurately captured 
the American vision when he told London that the Administration’s promotion of “non-
conformist idealism and non-conformist self-interest” is committing “the American 
nation to economic responsibilities as a world political and military power...[the] 
widespread belief [exists here] that the world awaits on the United States to give the lead 
in these matters.”84 Accordingly, he believed the U.S. would take a strong anti-colonial 
stance at the upcoming United Nations Conference.  
President Roosevelt was scheduled to deliver the primary address in San 
Francisco on April 25. To prepare for his biggest stage performance as the postwar 
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leader—and to rejuvenate, the President departed for the Little White House in Warm 
Springs, Georgia on March 29, 1945.  Here Roosevelt held his last press conference on 
April 5. By his side stood Sergio Osmena, President of the Philippine Commonwealth 
and of a people about to gain its independence after four decades of American tutelage. 
His presence sent a clear message to the Europeans: the United States would expect the 
world to follow its example. 85  A week later, at just before four in the afternoon, 
Roosevelt suffered a cerebral hemorrhage. He died within the hour. It would be left for 
others to determine his wishes and policies for the global world order.   
***** 
On that day, April 12, at seven in the evening, less than three hours after FDR’s death, 
Harry Truman took the presidential oath of office. Ahead of him lay an overwhelming 
task. Roosevelt’s death had shocked the nation and the world. He had “so embodied 
everyone’s notion of who ‘the president’ was that it seemed incomprehensible that 
anyone else could be president of the United States,” William Leuchtenburg wrote.86 
Nonetheless, Truman was indeed the President; the future of the postwar world was in his 
hands. His first official act was to confirm that the San Francisco Conference would go 
ahead, easing any worries that Roosevelt’s plans would be silenced by his death.87 On 
April 16, in his first major policy announcement, the new President, embracing the 
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language of American exceptionalism, asserted that the world is looking “to America for 
enlightened leadership to peace and progress. Such a leadership requires vision, courage 
and tolerance. It can be provided only by a nation devoted to the highest ideals.”88  
Nine days later, he opened the San Francisco Conference with a radio address.89 
Asking for God’s guidance, he reminded the delegates that the awesome responsibility of 
creating a just and free world rested on their shoulders. The public’s hopes were high for 
the new organization. An elated Stettinius informed Truman of ever increasing public 
support. An April Gallup poll, showed 83 percent of Americans favored U.S. 
membership and U.S. global leadership.90 Even considering the American aversion to 
international embroilment during the interwar period, there was nothing remarkable about 
the American people’s affection for the new organization. Largely viewed as the 
apotheosis of Wilsonianism, the U.N.’s principled ideals of justice, rights, and liberty for 
mankind were custom-made to the predilections of American opinion.   
Despite the public enthusiasm, American officials privately worried about the 
future of the postwar order. Soviet policies in Europe were causing cracks in the Grand 
Alliance, particularly the Soviet policy towards Poland, where Moscow had tightened its 
grip since Yalta. In addition, there were fears that Stalin’s interest in the organization was 
cooling. Only in the aftermath of Roosevelt’s death did the Soviet leader choose Molotov 
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to head what was otherwise a fairly low-level Soviet delegation traveling to San 
Francisco. There was growing concern within the Truman Administration that if pressed 
too hard, the Soviet Union might not sign a charter at all. Like his predecessor, Truman 
deemed the Soviet Union’s participation in the organization vital for its success. His level 
of concern was evident when he made it a point to publicly announce that Molotov would 
be meeting him in Washington on his way to California to pay his respects to the dead 
President and to reinforce the “earnest cooperation in carrying forward plans for 
formulating the international organization as laid down by President Roosevelt.”91  
Historians’ discussions of the San Francisco conference traditionally focus on the 
disputes over voting procedures, regional security alliances, and Polish representation. 
Important as these issues were, the debates over self-government and human rights 
provide greater insight into America’s ideological vision for the world. Although 
technically part of separate discussions at the Conference, Americans demonstrated that 
they clearly viewed both self-government and human rights as closely linked. But 
negotiations proved difficult. On the issue of self-government, the American delegation 
was caught between a rock and a hard place. At one extreme, the European imperial 
powers opposed any charter language that assigned the U.N. a role in leading territories 
toward independence. In contrast, the Soviet Union and China, two powers hoping to 
gather support across the Far East, called for the immediate independence of all colonized 
territories. As described above, the American support for trusteeships fell somewhere in 
the middle of these two positions. Washington supported independence and self-
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government in principle, but was unwilling to rashly back liberation movements unfit for 
the responsibilities of governance. 92  From the beginning, the American purpose of 
trusteeships had been to clarify the legal obligations of nations holding territories in trust, 
ensuring that they would work responsibly for independence under U.N. General 
Assembly and Security Council influence. Even though Americans still maintained this 
view at San Francisco, they treaded lightly out of fear that any language unacceptable to 
Moscow or London might lead their delegations to walk out of the conference. No matter 
what position they took on these issues, Americans risked “being played for suckers,” as 
the State Department’s Harley Notter put it.93 
The tension between American ideological hopes for the postwar order and the 
political realities of great power diplomacy became evident in a heated debate among 
members of the American delegation on May 18. Harold Stassen made the argument that 
the U.S. ought to support “progressive development toward self-government…[which] 
might lead toward independence,” but refused to accept the Soviet-Chinese position of 
outright demands for independence. Charles Taussig, on the other hand, deemed that 
position unacceptable.  Half-hearted support for independence, he insisted, would put 
Americans on record as supporting European imperialism. Referencing his March 15 
meeting with Roosevelt, Taussig argued that anything less than outright support for 
independence would make a mockery of the dead President’s vision. Linking FDR’s 
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support for national self-determination with State’s push for human rights amendments, 
he argued that an American position should not contain shades of grey.94 Leo Pasvolsky, 
one of the State Department’s most skilled officials, found himself somewhere in 
between these two views. Too “much emphasis on independence as the sole goal was 
bad,” he argued, but “emphasis on independence [is] our tradition.” Though reluctant to 
put their weight behind the Europeans, most delegation members—including Arthur 
Vandenberg, Tom Connally, and John Foster Dulles—leaned toward Stassen’s position. 
Immediate support for independence, they concluded, would do little for democracy and 
liberalization in the underdeveloped world. If left to their own devices, poorer countries 
would merely be susceptible to communism or other ideological visions considered a 
menacing threat to an American inspired world order. This was not a neo-colonial 
position developing; it was, as described in the previous chapter, the traditional American 
perspective of underdeveloped cultures and peoples. It was a perspective that went back 
at least a century and a half. The development of democracy took time and patience. The 
Soviet-Chinese position did not allow for that. 
In the delegation discussions Isaiah Bowman, a former advisor to Wilson at 
Versailles and an influential member of the Council on Foreign Relations, captured the 
dilemma when he stated that the core of the problem was “Russia promising to do one 
thing and doing another.” Even while the communists spoke of independence, they were 
contriving domination. Bowman was not alone in his concern; his position reflected a 
growing view within American political and military circles that the U.S. and the Soviet 
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Union would become the two major powers after the war. There would likely be, 
Bowman concluded, “an inevitable struggle between Russia and ourselves.” Though he 
hesitated to outline the form and seriousness of that struggle, he cautioned that there was 
little value to alienating the British and the French. New Jersey Congressman Charles 
Eaton captured this sentiment most clearly. As he saw it, the basic problem was who was 
going to be “the masters of the world.” Eaton “did not want Russia in control of the 
world.” It was as he saw it “a struggle as to whose ideals were going to dominate”95  
 Secretary of State Stettinius shared Stassen’s view that in a post-war world 
increasingly dominated by Americans, self-government would often lead naturally to 
independence “for those who had earned it and indicated the ability to use it.” So as not 
to appear opposed to freedom, however, he supported a suggestion that the American 
delegation “dress up” Stassen’s position.96 At San Francisco, therefore, Americans came 
down in support of progressive self-government and independence for trusteeships but 
avoided using similar terminology in any Charter chapter dealing with colonial territories. 
Unwilling to endanger the entire U.N. project, this was as far as the Americans deemed it 
pertinent to go. In the final analysis, Stettinius insisted that this middle ground was 
satisfactory, because there was no doubt “where we stood as a nation…on human rights 
and self-determination.”97  
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Stettinius was not being disingenuous.  Historians tempted to read history 
backwards may argue otherwise, especially given American Cold War support for 
regimes with deplorable human rights records. However, the Secretary’s view reflected 
the State Department’s position throughout the war, a position they maintained 
throughout the conference as well. When the issue of human rights surfaced at San 
Francisco, only the Americans pressed for human rights to be a central obligation of all 
members. Aware of the significance attached to the preamble in the U.S. Constitution, 
Stettinius insisted on placing the issue among the United Nations’ basic foundational 
purposes.98 As the New York Times reported, the Truman Administration placed human 
rights “at the heart of the matter” of the new organization.99  To the Americans, they were 
creating not simply an organization of principles but one concerned with international 
justice. In his memoirs, Truman recorded that he “felt strongly about the need for a world 
‘bill of rights,’ something on the order of our own.” He wanted definite language 
regarding “human rights and fundamental freedoms” 100 and called for the charter to 
mirror the U.S. Constitution in a manner that assigned each nation a role similar to those 
held by House and Senate members.101 
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Despite this presidential support, and strong backing from several American 
NGOs, the human rights issue was not straightforward even for the American delegation. 
Stettinius opposed language containing mere generalities and vague hopes, but the 
American delegation was also very conscious of the need for language that was passable. 
The issue was complicated even further by Soviet demands that the charter specifically 
encourage “the right to work and the right to education…without distinction as to race, 
language, and sex.”102 While not opposed to such language in principle, Americans were 
unwilling to only reference these rights. The fear was that somehow this might elevate 
“work” and “education” above equally pressing rights. Vandenberg made it clear that 
given the significance of the American Bill of Rights, he “would hesitate to pick out one 
or two of them for special mention,” implying that a statute of defined rights would need 
to be more detailed. The problem was that U.S. delegates understood the danger of 
pressing for specific mentions of freedom of speech, religion, assembly and other rights 
that might caution the Soviet Union to reject the Charter.  Under American pressure, 
Molotov accepted that references to human rights should only be included in the 
Charter’s preamble while all agreed postponing further discussions on a specific bill of 
rights for the Assembly to determine once in session.103 In a press conference on May 14, 
Stettinius declared that it was his “conviction, that the foundation which we are laying 
here for the economic and social collaboration of nations in the cause of fundamental 
                                                 
102 Minutes of the Twenthy-Sixth Meeting of the United Nations Delegation, May 2, 1945, FRUS, 1945, 
vol. I, pp. 528-548. See in particular, pp. 532-534 and the American delegations concern over the amended 
language suggested by the Soviet delegation, pp. 546-548. 
103 Speaking to the media, Stettinius hailed this principled agreement on human rights, but declared it too 
time consuming to obtain an “enumeration of individual and collective rights and freedoms” at this 
meeting. See “Stettinius Urges World Bill,” New York Times, May 16, 1945. 
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human rights and freedoms may well prove the most important of all the things we do 
here for the peace and advancement of the peoples of the world.” He insisted that the 
“drafting of a code” of rights should be the first task of the new organization.     
***** 
On June 25, Truman delivered the closing speech at the San Francisco Conference. He 
praised the delegations’ work and the charter as a “victory against war itself” that “had 
given reality to the ideal of that great statesman of a generation ago – Woodrow 
Wilson…Let us not,” he continued, “fail to grasp this supreme chance to establish a 
world-wide rule of reason – to create an enduring peace under the guidance of God.”104 
The world now had “a solid structure upon which we can build a better world.” He shared 
Vandenberg’s view of the Charter as “an emancipation proclamation for the world.” A 
week later, in front of the U.S. Senate, Truman added that “improvements will come in 
the future as the United Nations gain experience.” This was only the beginning of a more 
perfect society of nations. The Senate concurred, ratifying the United Nations Charter 89-
2 and the Bretton Woods Agreement 61-19.105 In celebration, Life magazine published a 
picture series showing each of the fifty delegates from around the world attaching their 
signature to the Charter. The Washington Post euphorically compared the achievement to 
the 1787 Constitutional Convention.106  
                                                 
104 Harry S. Truman, “Address at the Closing of The United Nations Conference,” June 26, 1945. HSTL, 
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These romanticized views would help create “inflated and unreal” expectations 
for the United Nations.107 The Rooseveltian foreign policy that Truman continued was 
intended as a New Deal for the world. The institutions and principles intended to promote 
collective security, stabilize and grow economies, and ensure the protection of 
individuals through international rules and justice, sought to reshape and redesign the 
international order along American inspired ideals. Roosevelt wascertain that 
“Americanism…was so very sensible, logical, and practical that societies would adopt 
those values and systems if only given the chance.” At times, as in the case of Lend-
Lease, slight coercion might be needed to ensure that this American agenda succeeded, 
but Roosevelt considered these legitimate means to an end.108  
In retrospect, it seems remarkable that even though the American plans for both 
Bretton Woods and the United Nations sought to transform the beliefs inherent in the 
British Empire and the Soviet Union’s communist ideology, there were no serious 
discussions or considerations among Americans that these plans would lead down an 
irreconcilable path. As historians, our scholarship is shaped by the evidence available. 
Sometimes, however, it is the absence of evidence that is most telling. Americans were 
certainly aware that procedural and technical differences existed between Washington 
and Moscow, but as Harry Dexter White wrote later, to the best of his recollection no 
“influential person expressed expectation of the fear that international relations would 
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108 Kimball, The Juggler, p. 186. 
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worsen” after the war.109 Americans had, they believed, set the world on the path to 
redemption and on the path to progress. They expected the world to follow that path.  
Perhaps the fiery journalist William Henry Chamberlin was right when he 
charged that American conduct during the war was simply “a depressing compound of 
profound factual ignorance, naiveté, wishful thinking, and emotional hysteria.” Lord 
Halifax made the same point – only more eloquently – in a cable to London. The 
American problem, he argued, was the nation’s permanent tendency to believe in 
“declarations and blueprints…to cure most of the ills of the world; this naturally leads to 
a sharp sense of ‘let down’ whenever events refuse to conform to the aspiration of men of 
good will and generates amongst them a corresponding tendency to blame the outside 
world… for wantonly putting obstacles in the path of idealistic American statesmen.”110 
In a manner one could expect from a people so immersed in their own ideological vision 
for the world and so determined to create a novus ordo seclorum after the Second World 
War, Americans were blind to their own limitations and the applicability of the idealistic 
programs they had set in motion. They were as of yet “unaware of the extent to which, 
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given the immediate realities of world politics, they would have to compromise the ideals 
written into the Charter.”111   
 
                                                 
111 Cathal J. Nolan, Principled Diplomacy: Security and Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1989), p. 200. 
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4. Coming Undone: The American World Order, 1945-1946 
When viewed from a distance of more than six decades, the Cold War has an aura of 
inevitability, an internal narrative logic woven together by political, military, economic, 
and ideological causes. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, however, conflict was 
not what Americans anticipated as VE day and VJ day finally arrived. In the summer of 
1945, the widely held belief in the United States was that, guided by American moral 
leadership, the United Nations would become the guarantor of global peace and justice 
and the unifier of America’s one world vision. Even in that context, the Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations understood that the new organization’s institutional stratification 
prevented it from being a perfectly egalitarian congress; the design, functions, and 
authority of the Security Council reflected the great powers’ understanding that while all 
nations were equal, some – pace George Orwell’s Animal Farm – were more equal than 
others. Across the United States, however, such concerns of procedure and structure 
worried few people. Americans trusted that institutional flaws would be corrected in due 
course and that collaboration in the interest of peace and liberty would abound as the 
organization matured. Americans largely shared Senator Arthur Vandenberg prophecy 
that the United Nations would become a “town meeting of the world,” a forum for 
consensus and cooperation, rather than a place for nationalistic votes and ideological 
confrontation.1 
                                                 
1 Arthur H.Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1952), p. 
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 Even if the concrete objectives of U.S. leadership and the path forward often 
remained abstract and vaguely expressed, Americans expected the United Nations to 
direct global affairs according to American values and on American terms. Mankind’s 
poor record for utopian undertakings did not dim Americans’ optimism. A Saturday 
Evening Post columnist accurately captured the national sentiment just three weeks after 
Japan’s surrender. “The history of the New World,” he wrote, “represents a bright page 
of progress…toward a millennium based on technology and democracy under American 
inspiration.” To the American “no evil on earth is incurable… [he believes] that at last 
the decisive hour has struck to redeem the world under American inspiration.” In his 
Christmas message at the end of 1945, Pope Pius XII added that the “American people 
have a genius for splendid and unselfish action, and into the hands of America God has 
placed the destinies of afflicted humanity.”2  
Widespread as these views were, not everybody shared such sanguine 
assessments. A few intellectuals, in particular, viewed hopes of “one-worldism” with 
despondency. Among the most eloquent and influential of these thinkers was Reinhold 
Niebuhr. A former pacifist and member of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians, Niebuhr 
had by the Second World War become an unapologetic realist and supporter of the war 
effort. Unlike the Administration, he chastised notions of excessive optimism for the 
postwar era. His writings peeled away the layers of American exceptionalism and 
denounced it as dangerous and misleading. In his most powerful wartime work, The 
Children of Light and The Children of Darkness, Niebuhr derided prophets of an 
                                                 
2 “American Optimism versus European Pessimism,” Saturday Evening Post,  September 15, 1945; 
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integrated peaceful world under an international organization as naïve and blind to the 
flaws inherent in human nature. No society, he insisted, “not even a democratic one, is 
great enough or good enough to make itself the final end of human existence.” People’s 
innate fallibility, he was convinced, exposed any noble vision to rid society of evil and 
any hope to ensure global freedom from war as mere fantasy. The powers of self-interest 
and man’s personal ambitions, he deemed, were too pervasive to secure a lasting peace. 
Utopian international organizations were therefore, by extension, likely to disappoint.3  
The influential and respected columnist Walter Lippmann shared many of 
Niebuhr’s opinions. In 1919, as a young, opinionated writer accompanying Woodrow 
Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference, Lippmann had hailed the League of Nations as the 
vehicle to save mankind. By 1945, perhaps suffering from buyer’s remorse, he instead 
argued that the United Nations’ Charter was out of touch with political reality. The 
institution’s structures, he believed, were in fundamental conflict with the organization’s 
lofty ambitions. He argued that postwar collaboration between the members of the Grand 
Alliance, rather than the pursuit of a utopian world order, represented the world’s best 
hope for a secure postwar peace.4  
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In hindsight, Niebuhr’s and Lippmann’s dour views of the American dream for 
the world appear prophetic. Neither the United Nations nor the United States ever lived 
up to the righteous mission their champions envisioned. Yet such challenges to an 
Americanized world order remained in the minority. Following the idea of a New Deal 
for the world, so deeply engrained in the American exceptionalist vision, most deemed it 
America’s responsibility, in conjunction with the United Nations, to establish a new 
moral international world order. National debates remained largely confined to the nature 
of this global duty. Few questioned if the responsibility was America’s. For almost a year 
and a half after the Second World War ended, this internationalist vision defined the 
trajectory of U.S. foreign policy. The Truman Administration pushed collaborative 
efforts for the new society of nations in a genuine effort to eliminate the catalysts of the 
last two wars from the world. The provision of American global leadership would ensure 
the reconstruction of the international economic order, global health, international control 
of atomic energy and weapons, and keep the world safe from war. It was a mission to 
internationalize Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms.” The United Nations’ ideals were to 
become a vehicle for America’s New Deal for the world. 
Over time the different ideological visions in Washington and Moscow hampered 
these global efforts. In Eastern Europe, Germany, the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, and 
in the United Nations Security Council, the two new superpowers found themselves at 
odds. However, even if in hindsight the contours of the Cold War appear clear, in the 
eighteen months after the Second World War ended, it is important to recognize that the 
particular ideology and the psychology that defined that fifty-year struggle did not yet 
 152 
guide or dominate American policy. In 1939, Harry Truman had claimed that the world 
needed a “moral re-awakening” and that it was “the role of this Great Republic [to] save 
civilization.”5  The fulfillment of that prophecy was to come, congressman John Rankin 
(D-MS) explained at war’s end, by the United States leading the world on a march “to 
modern progress…into that golden age that Tennyson dreamed of”, when he called for a 
parliament of man.6 It was one world not a bifurcated one that America sought; a world 
based on international collaboration, but on American terms.   
***** 
American optimism and the sincerity of one-world collaboration is often absent in 
accounts of the postwar period. It is testimony to the Cold War’s grip on our 
understanding of the postwar period that many commentators continue to draw a straight 
line from early American-Soviet disagreements and discussions in the spring and summer 
of 1945 to Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech a year later, to the Truman Doctrine in 
1947, and to American containment policy. This interpretation implies a seamless 
evolution of a deteriorating superpower relationship and suggests that the American 
wartime ideas for the postwar world were merely, as Elizabeth Borgwardt recently wrote, 
“pet projects on the addled agenda of a dying president.” 7 Whether scholars blame 
Moscow or Washington for the Cold War, they often trace the beginning of the Cold War 
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to the meetings between President Truman and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov in April 1945 and to the meetings at Potsdam between the Big Three in July the 
same year. Even before the guns fell silent in Europe and Asia, the argument often goes, 
the Atlantic Charter spirit descended into superpower confrontation.8  
The speaking notes Secretary of State Edward Stettinius prepared for Truman in 
advance of the Molotov-meetings certainly implied that all was not well with the Soviet-
American relationship. Stettinius warned the President that the U.S. could not “be party 
to the formation of a Polish Government which is not representative of the Polish people” 
and recommended that the President make clear that U.S. diplomats’ lack of access to 
Eastern European states was unacceptable. 9  Ambassador Averell Harriman, in 
Washington to assist the less experienced Truman in the talks, added that since “the 
Crimea Conference…the Russians have been greatly disturbed by the fact that for the 
first time they realized that we are determined to carry out what we said.” As if to 
emphasize this position, Truman replied that he would make “no concession from 
American principles or tradition.” He expected liberalism, not tyranny, to rule in Europe. 
The Yalta agreement, as Truman understood it, was not up for debate.10  In his memoirs, 
Truman recalled how he dressed down Molotov during the talks and demanded that 
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Moscow live up to its Yalta promises. An exasperated Soviet Foreign Minister protested, 
saying “I have never been talked to like that in my life.” According to Truman’s 
recollections, his own reply was brusque: “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get 
talked to like that again.”11 
 This exchange demonstrated the new President’s determination. The available 
records, however, cast strong doubts regarding the accuracy of Truman’s recollections. 
The American note taker and interpreter, Charles Bohlen, described Truman’s 
performance as firm. The comments as the President recalled them, however, are not 
recorded in either the American or the Soviet minutes; they only appear in memoirs 
written over a decade later. Indications are, in fact, that the meetings ended on a fairly 
good note with joint photos being taken of the participants afterward.12 The Americans, 
in other words, were not anticipating the coming of the Cold War. Consciously or 
unconsciously, memoirists often exaggerate the quality of their own performance, of 
course and in light of the Cold War it was perhaps unsurprising that Truman later 
attempted to leave the impression that he, from the beginning, had taken a tough stance 
against Moscow.   
Whatever the reason for Truman’s embellished reminiscence of the meetings with 
Molotov, his memoirs led some scholars to conclude that the U.S. here abandoned FDR’s 
conciliatory policy toward the Soviet Union. The most unwavering Cold War revisionists 
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conclude that the President, backed by an aggressive State Department, was determined 
to impose his will on the Soviet Union.13 The use of the atomic bombs against Japan, 
they believe, was unnecessary to win the war, meaning that Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
must have served primarily to intimidate Josef Stalin and to warn the Soviets of the 
potential consequences if they were to step out of bounds in Europe.14  
The Potsdam Conference three months later was certainly contentious at times as 
well but the records imply more collaboration than animosity between the three leaders. 
As at Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and San Francisco, a desire for accord dominated the 
proceedings. Americans viewed disagreements as temporary and solvable. Truman might 
have been appalled by reports of Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, but he “felt that Stalin 
would eventually bow to American pressure” on the issue of Eastern Europe.15 Tense 
negotiations also took place regarding Germany’s future, but the perception in the 
American camp was that common ground would be found on both reparations and the 
international status of the former enemy. In his memoirs, George Kennan labeled these 
solutions “unreal” and “unworkable.” Nonetheless, they did reflect the President’s and 
the public’s perception at the time that the new order required international accord; this, 
of course, meant friendship with Stalin as well. “I like Stalin,” Truman wrote to his wife 
Bess from Potsdam. “He is straightforward. Knows what he wants and will compromise 
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when he can’t get it.” In his diary Truman showed concern for Stalin’s health. He worried 
that if “Stalin passes” and “some demagogue on horseback gained control of the efficient 
Russian military he could play havoc with European peace for a while.”16 
In the context of the Cold War, these meetings were neither as decisive nor as 
divisive as some scholars imply. That the Cold War eventually became a reality should 
not distract from our understanding of the extent to which the U.S. sought postwar 
cooperation – something its leadership had always deemed vital to the global order they 
expected to  shape – well into 1946. The American Zeitgeist of 1945 stimulated 
collaboration towards peace, progress, and liberalism. This belief and hope dominated not 
only policy statements, but also the vast majority of letters and telegrams sent to the 
Truman White House from American citizens throughout this period. These 
correspondences show an outpouring of support for postwar reconstruction, 
modernization, and cooperation. One citizen, for example, praised Truman, hoping that 
victory would secure the global spread of the “principles and ideas of the President of the 
United States and the American people.” Many others called for American leadership 
through the U.N. and encouraged the establishment of some form of democratic world 
government. The consensus was that people were crying out for American leadership 
now that the U.S. was “at the summit of the world.” Americans liked Truman because he 
was “a regular guy” as a cab driver from Washington, D.C. put it and because he was 
“trustworthy,” and “a man of the people.” At the same time, opinion polls show that 
Americans expected Truman and Americans to lead in the world. One Gallup poll taken 
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across the United States, Canada, France, Sweden, and Denmark, unanimously concluded 
that the United States would be the most influential country in “world affairs after the 
war.” George Gallup reported in early July, a week after the end of the San Francisco 
Conference, that after “two months in office…a coast to coast check up shows that nearly 
nine out of every 10 Americans approve of the way Truman is handling his job.” Even 
taking a natural honeymoon period into account the number was, Gallup explained, 
unprecedented. It exceeded by three percentage point the national support given to 
“Roosevelt in a poll on a similar question in January, 1942, shortly after Pearl Harbor 
attack had rallied the country behind the Administration.”17  
Reaching conclusions based on letters to the president and understanding the 
extent to which they are representative of the popular mood is methodologically complex. 
However, when paired with national polls supporting similar trends and a strong 
affirmative media outpouring in favor of a leading American presence in the United 
Nations, they cannot be dismissed as insignificant. By August 1945, a majority of 
Americans believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union would continue, that the 
United Nations ought to serve as the sole arbiter of international affairs. Fifty-eight 
percent of Americans believed the U.N. headquarters should be in the United States. By 
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early 1946 that number climbed to seventy percent.18 The location of the United Nations 
and the World Bank headquarters in the New York and Washington reflected just how 
dramatically the center of the world order had switched across the Atlantic. Combined, 
this reflected the feeling in America that notwithstanding the despair prevalent across the 
globe, with their guidance, progress for mankind was on the horizon. 
***** 
Five days after the Japanese surrender in August, a New York Times sketch depicted 
James Byrnes, the recent replacement for Stettinius as Secretary of State, holding two 
large doctor’s bags as he smiled toward an image of a bruised and hurting globe. The 
caption simply read, “Doc Byrnes and patient.” It was one of many public signs that 
unlike after the First World War, Americans expected responsibilities beyond the end of 
the fighting.19 Ensconced in American ideals and backed by American funds, Americans 
expected United Nations agencies to take the lead role in restoring the liberated areas. 
Their purpose was to feed the starving, engage in disease eradication programs, to 
safeguard political and economic fairness and security, and promote human rights.  
The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development were central to this vision but the war’s rapid conclusion overtook the 
pace with which the Bretton Woods organizations could become operational. As a result, 
many of the wartime United Nations agencies took on the urgent responsibility of helping 
the world progress from the war’s chaos. As early as the spring of 1943, the United States 
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19 “Doc Byrnes and Patient,” The New York Times, August 19, 1945. 
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had taken the leading role in organizing United Nations humanitarian aid. Americans 
sponsored the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that led to the 
establishment of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) with a mission statement 
aimed at defeating global hunger. Americans also took the lead in running and funding 
the most successful wartime and postwar international relief agency, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration commonly referred to as UNRRA.20  
UNRRA’s ambitiously stated purpose was to “plan, co-ordinate, administer or 
arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area 
under the control of any of the United Nations through the provision of food, fuel, 
clothing, shelter and other basic necessities, medical and other essential services.”21 Over 
seventy percent of the more than ten billion dollars UNRRA supplied to nations in 
despair came from U.S. coffers. The vast majority of this support went to China and 
Eastern Europe, the areas most violently struck by Axis aggression.22 The American 
contribution stemmed from a belief that reconstruction of the war-torn nations was 
essential to shaping a more stable, peaceful, cooperative, and healthy world. “If UNRRA 
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should fail, there is grave doubt that any collaboration of the United Nations can survive 
the test of practical application,” testified UNRRA’s first Director, the former Governor 
of New York, Herbert Lehman, to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1944.23  
Europe was of particular concern to the U.S.  In August 1945, a New York Times 
political cartoon showed Death staring across the lands of a charred European continent. 
The paper defined “famine and pestilence” as new foes to conquer. Four months earlier 
Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy had brought home a similarly dismal image 
after visiting Europe. Via his boss Henry Stimson, McCloy relayed a disconcerting 
message to Truman. He predicted “complete economic, social, and political collapse” in 
Europe “the extent [to which]…is unparalleled in history.” In the absence of a determined 
U.S.-backed international effort, desolation might make people susceptible to false 
prophets’ promises of progress in return for ideological commitment. As Stimson 
personally warned the President, the next winter would cause “pestilence and 
famine…[potentially] followed by political revolution and Communistic infiltration.”24 
The message reflected the concern of the previous decade that an impoverished society 
would be susceptible to the influence of non-democratic values. 
The Truman Administration believed, as had its predecessor, that international 
cooperation on aid fostered unity between the Allies and the liberated areas and served as 
a bulwark against communism. In an address to Congress, the President explained that 
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“UNRRA is the first of the international organizations to operate in the post-war 
period…Apart from purely humanitarian considerations, its success will do much to 
prove the possibility of establishing order and cooperation in a world finally at peace.”25 
A central component of this American economic mission was the belief that stability and 
progress provided a remedy for radical ideologies and would forge a clear path to a 
unified world. In his departing speech as UNRRA head in 1946 Lehman argued that, the 
“basic problems of understanding between men and between nations exist today as 
certainly as they existed generations ago…[but] UNRRA has now given the first simple 
proof that this understanding can be attained. Now let the leaders of the United Nations 
profit by that experience, and lead their peoples to a world of peace and security.” 
Fiorello H. LaGuardia, the former New York Mayor and Lehman’s successor, similarly 
defined the organization as a “tremendous influence for good, for right, for justice, for 
peace, along with world leadership.”26  
Despite such optimism, UNRRA met domestic opposition from some Republican 
Congressmen who denounced it as nothing more than a global Works Progress 
Administration. The majority of opposing voices, however, do not appear to have 
dismissed aid in principle, but rather worried that Americans were giving handouts 
without making aid conditional on other nations adopting policies consistent with 
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American wishes on trade liberalization and the establishment of democratic values. 
Others worried that UNRRA’s multinational structure prevented Americans from 
receiving adequate credit and goodwill for its contributions. Because contributions 
flowed from several different nations, and because local political leaders most often 
handled the distribution of aid on the ground, supplier nations were often unknown to the 
recipients. This raised particular concern among some Congressmen that the Soviets, who 
were not actively contributing to UNRRA’s operating budget, might use American 
“supplies sent to areas under its shadow to strengthen the hands of those favoring the 
spread of communism.” American concerns over misappropriation of funds, however, 
extended to Great Britain as well, a nation widely believed to use UNRRA funding 
intended for the homeland to support “proxies in Greece and elsewhere.”27  
Revisionist historians have often implied that UNRRA, along with the IBRD and 
the IMF, served primarily as vehicles for American industry. The framework endorsed by 
such scholars characterizes U.S. postwar foreign economic policy as merely the 
politicization of a desire to establish a global economic system able to secure “maximum 
[national] economic growth, efficiently allocate economic resources, and foster economic 
and political stability.”28 There is, of course, little doubt that U.S. policymakers thought 
increased trade would be in the national interest. Historians need to be careful, however, 
                                                 
27  Jack N. Behrman, “U.S. International Financial Cooperation, 1945-1950,” The American Political 
Science Review, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1953), pp. 431-460;  Kevin M. Casey, Saving International Capitalism 
During the Early Truman Presidency: The National Advisory Council on International Monetary and 
Financial Problem (New York: Routledge, 2001), pp. 67-69; Ekbladh, The Great American Mission, pp. 
86-88. For a good collection of documents highlighting the tremendously challenging operation UNRRA 
faced, see HSTL, Robert E. Asher Papers, Box 1. 
28 Casey, Saving International Capitalism, pp. 7-8. 
 163 
not to isolate this pursuit of profit from the larger picture of early American postwar 
policies. Economic foreign policy was just one complementary piece of a global policy, 
which established numerous cooperative successes and which ideologically reflected the 
American sense of mission in the world. Such successes included, in addition to UNRRA, 
the United Nations Organization for Education, Science and Culture (UNESCO), the 
eventual creation of the World Health Organization, and the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) which sought to promote “economic and social progress” and to 
improve standards of living worldwide. It was through ECOSOC, for example, that the 
Truman Administration in early 1946 pressed for the establishment of the U.N. Human 
Rights Commission.29 In these regards, the American postwar effort was inseparable 
from how Americans historically thought of their mission and its link to global progress. 
The American National Planning Association fully agreed, claiming that “our technology 
is now one of the most precious national resources…[it will ensure for us] a position of 
world leadership [and will aid] the  masses of mankind…reaching for higher living 
standards.” Almost in echo, a singular Saturday Evening Post headline declared simply at 
the end of 1945 that “World Relief is America’s Job.”30 
     ***** 
Americans believed economic collaboration essential to avoiding another depression and 
to keeping the world united. At the same time, they worried greatly about their newfound 
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ability to destroy it. As discussions on security and global collaboration in 1945 and 1946 
reveal, the American atomic monopoly did not necessarily make diplomacy easier to 
conduct. The task of navigating American national interest, global visions, and 
superpower cooperation—all while holstering the atomic bomb—fell to Secretary of 
State, James Byrnes. As a former Supreme Court justice, Senator, and the man nearly 
selected ahead of Truman on Roosevelt’s 1944 ticket, Byrnes brought skill and flexibility 
to foreign policy. At the same time he also proved to be a far more independent Secretary 
of State than either Stettinius or Hull had been.31  
In early September of 1945, Byrnes joined Molotov and the new British Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, for talks in London at the first high-level postwar meetings 
among the great powers. The three-week conference did not go well.32 The Soviet Union 
approached the conference as a classic opportunity to carve up the world. Molotov 
requested trusteeships in the Mediterranean and in North or East Africa as well. Byrnes 
quickly shut him down.33 In true Rooseveltian fashion, he rejected any attempt by the 
great powers to exert their will on independent peoples and any horse-trading of colonies. 
This would not be another Bismarckian  Berlin Conference. Prior to his departure for the 
United Kingdom, Byrnes had implied to John McCloy that he believed he could do much 
better in the negotiations with Moscow if “he went with it [the atomic bomb] in his hip 
pocket.” 34  The Americans never explicitly used the bomb to apply pressure on the 
Soviets during the negotiations, but the monopoly likely buoyed Byrnes’s counter 
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demands for elections and civil rights in Romania and Bulgaria. He warned that the U.S. 
would not recognize any governments unrepresentative of the peoples of these territories. 
Molotov was unmoved. Soviet records in fact imply that the American atomic monopoly 
may well have made Moscow more determined not to retreat from its position. The 
Soviet Foreign Minister dismissed Byrnes’ demand, in effect ignoring the Declaration on 
Liberated Europe to which Stalin had affixed his signature in February.35  
The impasse in U.S.-Soviet relations at the London Conference caused Byrnes to 
adjust his strategy. Likely based on information he received from Harriman, he appears to 
have been of the belief, rather naively, that Stalin’s demands for Soviet-controlled 
governments across Eastern Europe were primarily aimed at addressing Soviet security 
concerns that had been heightened by Napoleon’s and then Hitler’s use of that region as a 
corridor to Moscow. If Americans lessened these Soviet security concerns, the Secretary 
of State reasoned, their need for Communist governments in the region would diminish as 
well.36 Byrnes understood that Hiroshima and Nagasaki had changed the military and 
political landscape, escalating Soviet fears. As Craig and Radchenko accurately argue, in 
this context, tension could only be lowered if the great powers reached an 
accommodation on research, technology, and possession of the new weapon. From this 
Byrnes drew the conclusion that the U.S. must surrender its own weapons to international 
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monitoring or face the likelihood that “the Soviet Union, and perhaps other nations as 
well, would refuse to submit themselves to the authority of international government.”37  
In November, Byrnes – alongside Bevin, and Canadian Foreign Minister William 
MacKenzie, – announced a joint initiative to place atomic weapons and research under 
international control. This Anglo-American-Canadian Agreement proposed the creation 
of a U.N. Commission to collaborate on “a reciprocal basis with others of the United 
Nations [on the] detailed information concerning the practical industrial application of 
atomic energy just as soon as effective enforceable safeguards against its use for 
destructive purposes can be found.” 38  The agreement reflected the signatories’ 
determination to pursue cooperation among the great powers in general as well as their 
commitment to further promote the creation of a governing authority to oversee nuclear 
technology under the auspices of the U.N. It was not an attempt to exclude the Soviet 
Union from talks over atomic energy. As Henry Wallace wrote in his diary, the meetings 
with Ottawa and London were simply “preliminary to conferences with the Russians.”39 
Domestically, the initiative raised opposition from several Congressmen 
unwilling to trade away the United States’ military advantage.40 George Kennan shared 
this concern. Six weeks earlier he had informed Byrnes—in a cable that was pessimistic 
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even for Kennan—that if the Soviet Union possessed the bomb they would not hesitate to 
use it against Americans if they deemed it advantageous to “their power position in the 
world.” The Soviet leaders would not, he warned, be restrained by “scruples of gratitude 
or humanitarianism” even if the knowledge of atomic energy had been “imparted to them 
as a gesture of good-will.” The decision to reveal any knowledge to the Soviet 
Government “without adequate guaranties for the control of its use…would,” he 
believed, “constitute a frivolous neglect of the vital interests of our people.”41   
To Kennan, and many others, it seemed particularly dangerous to willingly 
surrender America’s monopoly at a time when the direction of Soviet postwar foreign 
policy remained unclear. Of particular concern was the pressure Moscow ever since the 
war’s final months had been applying on its southwestern neighbor Turkey. Stalin 
pressed the Ankara government for a renegotiation of the 1936 Montreux Convention 
which outlined control of the Turkish Straits. Desiring access to the Mediterranean, 
Moscow demanded joint Soviet-Turkish control of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, the 
establishment of permanent Soviet military bases along the straits, and substantial 
territorial concessions. Unlike the Eastern European states which had either collaborated 
with Nazi Germany or been liberated by the Soviet Union – forcing Americans to tacitly 
accept some degree of Soviet influence – Turkey had been neutral during most of the war 
although like Sweden they had provided Germany and others with resources. At Potsdam 
Truman and Byrnes backed the Turkish rejection of these demands, insisting that this was 
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not a bilateral issue; “the question of the Black Sea Straits concerned the United States 
and the whole world.” Washington was willing to allow for the internationalization of the 
straits, but was determined not to grant Moscow exclusive control of them. Throughout 
the fall of 1945, Moscow stepped up its anti-Ankara propaganda and further increased its 
pressure on the Turkish government and in the process heightened concerns regarding the 
wisdom of surrendering the atomic monopoly.42 
Regardless of these concerns, the Truman Administration’s plans for increased 
internationalization of American foreign policy had firm public support. Opinion polls in 
1945 and 1946 consistently backed a central role for the United Nations, including 
influence over member nations’ military capabilities and responsibilities. The 
internationalization of atomic energy also had the backing of a number of scientists – 
including Niels Bohr and Albert Einstein as well as Manhattan Project scientists J. Robert 
Oppenheimer and Edward Teller – former Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, the National 
League of Women Voters, Walter Lippmann and many others.43 In his influential column 
“Today and Tomorrow,” Lippmann cautioned the American people, that “awareness that 
the great power we now possess is newly acquired is the best antidote…against our moral 
and political immaturity.” The monopoly, he reckoned was temporary. Like the atomic 
scientists he understood, in strong contrast to men like Forrestal and Vandenberg, that 
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there were only temporary secrets. Dean Acheson agreed telling reporters that 
collaboration on atomic science would create a “closer understanding” between the 
Soviet and the Americans.”44  
Largely ignoring the dissenting voices, Byrnes planned to discuss international 
control of atomic energy with Stalin during upcoming meetings in Moscow in December 
in advance of the first United Nations General Assembly meeting scheduled for January 
in London. The Secretary’s plan, approved by Truman, called not only for U.N. 
supervision of weapons but also the exchange of and collaboration on, scientific research 
and development if necessary, before the establishment of safeguards against potential 
violations on atomic research and production.45 As he had hoped, Byrnes did receive 
Stalin’s support for co-sponsorship of a U.N. resolution to establish what would 
eventually become the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC).46 The 
New York Times called the conference “a new start for peace” but as access to Soviet 
documents now show, Stalin’s support for the internationalization of atomic weapons was 
deceptive. He had long since made the decision to unilaterally pursue the construction of 
a Soviet atomic bomb regardless of any collaborative efforts that might be proposed. 
What likely would have surprised Byrnes even more, considering that the initiative 
contained an eventual promise to share the knowledge of the bomb, was Moscow’s 
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interpretation of the U.S. proposal as nothing more than an attempt to “relegate the Soviet 
Union to a position of a second rate power.”47  
The unilateral Soviet efforts on atomic development were unbeknownst to 
Byrnes. He left Moscow in a buoyant mood, convinced that Americans could face “the 
new year of 1946 with greater hope.”48 Upon his return to Washington, Byrnes selected 
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson to head a group of experts tasked with 
formulating an American proposal for international collaboration on oversight, 
inspection, and safeguarding of atomic energy and weapons. To that group, Acheson 
would add Tennessee Valley Authority Director David Lilienthal, Robert Oppenheimer, 
former Manhattan Project leader General Leslie Groves, and several others. Thus, 
American policy in 1946 shifted toward eliminating atomic weapons from national 
armaments and halting their future development.49  
***** 
Even as cooperation on atomic energy seemed to be nearing, other events threatened to 
pull the United States and the Soviet Union apart. During the final months of 1945, 
perceptive journalists such as the New York Times’ James Reston had already begun 
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writing with some clarity about “the Russian problem.” Few, however, at the time 
thought U.S.-Soviet differences insoluble. 50 For example, it was with confusion, not 
despair, that the State and Treasury Departments received Stalin’s decision not to ratify 
Bretton Woods by the end of the 1945 deadline.51 The war’s damage to agriculture and 
industry made the Soviet Union a prime candidate for direct IMF support, which by 
American accounts made participation all the more logical. Refusal to join put any 
chance of their receiving international aid in jeopardy since UNRRA’s operations were 
on their last year and since Washington, at this stage, was unlikely to approve bilateral 
loans to nations outside the new international economic order that after all had been 
crafted to ensure a collective responsibility and cooperation.52  
In January 1946, the State Department instructed the U.S. Embassy to provide 
insight into Moscow’s recalcitrance. Since Harriman departed his post as Ambassador 
that same month – soon to be filled by Walter Bedell Smith – the task of explaining 
Soviet behavior fell to the sharp pen of now chargé d'affaires, George Frost Kennan. A 
veteran Foreign Service officer, Kennan had served five years in Moscow during the 
thirties under William Bullit, where he witnessed Stalin’s purges firsthand. After spells in 
Berlin and Prague, he returned to Moscow late in the war as Deputy Chief of Mission 
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under Harriman. From there, Kennan delivered one powerful assessment after another of 
the Soviet Union and of Stalin. Time and again he cautioned against the kind of seamless 
one-world cooperation that FDR envisioned and Truman hoped for. Such policies, he 
believed, were unlikely to yield success given the incessant imperial and ideological 
ambitions on display in Moscow. For Kennan, Communism represented “an enemy…He 
was a grave observer of spiritual phenomena, some white, some black. Nothing much in 
between. One was either with us or against us,” recalled John and Patricia Davies who 
knew him in Moscow.53  
 Attempting to clarify Moscow’s economic policies, Kennan in early 1946 
explained that Stalin’s lack of cooperation rested on “complete Soviet confidence” that 
the U.S. faced economic problems at home including internal labor unrest of such a 
magnitude that Washington would be forced to export “on credit…on a large scale” to the 
Soviet Union. Communist ideology manifested a “conviction that economic struggle 
between the U.S and Great Britain [was] bound to lead to actual tension between those 
two countries.” In short, Stalin’s hesitation over Bretton Woods stemmed from his belief 
that inherent conditions in the capitalist system would, in time, force the U.S. to issue 
bilateral loans to the Soviets that would come with far fewer strings than membership in 
an international organization.54  
Kennan’s interpretation was soon provided extra impetus by a number of election 
speeches given by Stalin and his Politburo in early February. Stalin, Georgy Malenkov, 
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and Lazar Kaganovich hailed the Communist system’s “superior democracy” and called 
for the Soviet Union to consolidate victory “and increase [the] economic might of 
USSR.” 55  Stalin in particular brought back the ideological Leninist language of the 
inevitability of conflict between communists and capitalists, implying that he did not 
share the American vision of a world united under the U.N. He derided the idea that 
capitalist powers were capable of fairly and honorably distributing resources and raw 
materials, and he predicted future conflict. The Second World War, Stalin argued, proved 
the supremacy of communism and the superiority of collectivization. Though Stalin’s 
speech was intended to explain and prepare his own people for the domestic sacrifice to 
come, it was read by many overseas as a repudiation of the American world order.56  
On February 22, Kennan sent a five and a half thousand word telegram to 
Washington attempting to explain these events within a larger Russian and Communist 
context. Dubbed the Long Telegram, Kennan’s cable reinforced an argument that he had 
been trying to make for years to Averell Harriman, Harry Hopkins, and anybody else 
willing to listen. Tracing the roots of Russian nationalism and imperialism on one hand, 
and Communist ideology on the other, he explained that Marxism-Leninism served as a 
fig leaf of “moral and intellectual respectability.” Because Moscow by definition sought 
to expand, American collaboration with the Soviet Union was not a sustainable policy. 
While “impervious to the logic of reason,” he concluded, Moscow was still “highly 
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sensitive to the logic of force.” It was clear, he insisted, that with a regime this aggressive 
by nature, “no permanent modus vivendi” would be possible.57  
Stalin’s speech and Kennan’s Long Telegram have become Cold War icons. But 
in retrospect it is easy to exaggerate their influence on U.S. policy. Yes, Secretary of the 
Navy James Forrestal, along with Walter Lippmann, Republicans John Foster Dulles and 
Arthur Vandenberg, and Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas – the latter 
hyperbolically calling Stalin’s speech, “the declaration of World War III” – deemed 
Moscow’s narrative of global affairs deeply troubling. But most responses were in fact 
fairly calm. The two-week lag between Stalin’s speech and the Long Telegram reflected 
that Kennan too found the speech so pedestrian and so adherent to traditional Muscovite 
rhetoric that there was no reason to provide more than a summary of its contents.58 When 
questioned by reporters Truman quipped that “we always have to demagogue a little 
before elections” and Dean Acheson informed one alarmed State Department official that 
he was “just seeing hobgoblins under the bed.” 59  The Washington Post and Time 
magazine, as well as several other news outlets, found the speech intriguing but 
unthreatening. The Saturday Evening Post concluded that the speech should not stop 
American efforts to create their “one world.”60 
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Similarly Kennan’s classified cable has, in hindsight, been assigned more 
influence than it likely had at the time. As Cold War scholars have frequently argued, it 
was widely circulated, primarily by Forrestal, and it reached Truman’s inner circle as 
well.61 Yet, there is no indication that it set in motion any earth-shattering Cold War 
thoughts or policies. When asked about the Long Telegram later, Clark Clifford, 
Truman’s primary advisor, was unable to recall that “any particular significance was 
attached to it” at the time. It was, as he recalls it, simply “one of a number of inputs.” The 
cabinet had “memos from the Secretary of State, War, Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
and Admiral Leahy; these were all top people [and] Kennan had not achieved the 
reputation then that he later was to achieve.”62  
American policy did not jerk into crisis mode either when that same month the 
reporter Drew Pearson broke a story about Soviet espionage in Canada. Based on 
classified information from Igor Gouzenko, a defected former cipher clerk at the Soviet 
Embassy in Ottawa, the story implied similar atomic espionage against the United 
States.63 The Truman Administration had in fact known of the Gouzenko affair since the 
previous September but had chosen not to reveal the story out of fear that it might 
jeopardize international collaboration. Internally, Byrnes and Acheson quietly took steps 
                                                 
61 For some of these exaggerations, see Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 108-109; Pollard, p. 55; 
David A. Mayers,  George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), pp. 100-101. Offner sees the Long Telegram as emblematic of what he calls 
Truman’s “get tough” policy. Certainly Washington’s tone was changing, but February 1946 is far too early 
to place the beginnings of this policy. Offner, it would seem, is a victim of having read history backwards 
and of being too conscious of the Cold War’s coming. See his Another Such Victory, pp. 132-134.  
62 Oral interview with Clark M. Clifford. HSTL, Oral History Collection. See also Miscamble, pp. 279-280. 
63 Amy Knight, How the Cold War Began: The Gouzenko Affair and the Hunt for Communist Spies (New 
York: Carroll and Graf, 2005), pp. 104-111. Knight argues that Pearson likely received the classified 
information from FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover who hoped to force the Truman Administration to shelve 
its plans of international atomic control. 
 176 
to weed out employees with “suspected histories,” but beyond that the story had garnered 
remarkably little concern.64 Even in the face of espionage Truman was not ready to give 
up on a united world order or to accept the inevitability of conflict with Moscow.  
The depth of this global commitment was about to be brought to the test. In early 
March the former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill visited the United States. 
From Washington he and Truman journeyed to Fulton, Missouri where Churchill had 
been invited to deliver a speech at Westminster College. “The Sinews of Peace,” as he 
dubbed his speech, warned the western powers not to repeat the indecision they had 
shown in the thirties. An “iron curtain,” Churchill declared in a somber voice, had 
“descended on the continent” of Europe, separating it into a Soviet and a democratic 
sphere. He called for the “fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples” 
including military collaboration and warned against “Communist and neo-Fascist” forces. 
Although Churchill also suggested greater military collaboration within the U.N., it is 
tempting, in the context of what followed in the world, to view his address as an omen, if 
not a declaration, of the Cold War. Since Truman shared the stage with Churchill it is 
equally tempting to imagine that the former Prime Minister and the President must have 
intensely debated the state of global affairs on the long train ride to the Midwest and that 
Truman thoroughly approved of the speech’s message. The indication is, however, that 
whiskey and poker “took priority over international affairs” throughout Churchill and 
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Truman’s journey and Truman had not read the advance copy of the speech as carefully 
as he perhaps should have.65  
Although the President had glanced at Churchill’s speech in advance, its 
presumptive message of a divided world ventured much further than Washington was 
willing to go. An editorial in Collier’s magazine from later that month emphasized that 
the U.S. needed to be “world umpire and world leader.” A supplementary sketch in the 
same issue showed Uncle Sam holding the reins of the world, one labeled “leadership,” 
the other “conciliation.”66 Collier’s message reflected how Americans thought of their 
role in the world in March 1946. It remained a one-world role under American guidance 
not in alliance with Great Britain. Churchill’s language was seen as too divisive, his tone 
too provocative, and his message too affirming of an old world balance of power system. 
Several U.S. Congressmen condemned “Sinews of Peace” as hyperbole and 
warmongering. Liberal Senators like Glen Taylor (D-ID) and Claude Pepper (D-FL) were 
among the most critical. Taylor insisted that the former Prime Minister simply wanted to 
“cut the throat of the UNO and destroy the unity of the Big Three.” Andrew May (D-KY) 
insisted that “he thought the U.S. should take no position on any military alliance [as 
suggested by Churchill] until a chance had been Russia to state her aims through the 
United Nations.” Conservative reporters like Henry Chamberlain supported Churchill but 
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they were in the minority. The New York Herald Tribune found the speech “off target” 
and Walter Lippmann considered it an “almost catastrophic blunder.” As he pointed out, 
the “line of British imperial interest and the line of American vital interest are not to be 
regarded as identical.” In his view, as long as the United States was trying to make peace 
through the United Nations it would “unattractive” and “unwise” to unite with Britain 
given the number of peoples who “under British rule or within the sphere of influence [of 
Britain] are not English speaking and do not have a joint inheritance of freedom.”67 
When queried about the speech by journalists, even Truman got defensive. He 
denied having seen an advance copy and insisted that “this is a country of free speech. 
Mr. Churchill had a perfect right to say what he pleased. I was there as his host in 
Missouri, because I had told him if he would come over here and give a lecture at that 
little college, that I would be glad to introduce him.” Probably to ensure that he did not 
appear to have endorsed the speech, Truman also instructed Acheson not to attend a 
function in honor of Churchill in New York.68  
Churchill’s “iron curtain” address is most often thought of in a European context 
but British concerns extended to the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal 
as well. Initial Soviet attempts at gaining influence in Turkey had been blocked, but by 
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December 1945 a far more complex crisis arose in neighboring Iran. During the war, 
London and Moscow had jointly occupied Iran to prevent Nazi Germany from gaining 
access to Iranian oil. The Anglo-Soviet agreement gave the Red Army control of the 
northern half of Iran and the British control of the southern half.  Both occupying armies 
pledged to withdraw no more than six months after the war’s end. By late 1945, however, 
the Soviets reneged on this commitment. Instead Stalin threw his support behind the left-
leaning Tudeh Party inside Iran while simultaneously backing a separatist movement in 
the Iranian province of Azerbaijan close to the Soviet border.69 These actions caused 
concern in Washington. On one hand, the U.N. had been created to protect smaller 
nations in crises like this. On the other, as Loy Henderson, the State Department’s 
Director of Near Eastern and African Affairs, told Byrnes in consideration of both the 
Turkish and Iranian affairs, it might be vital “to spare the UNO this supreme test at the 
very outset of its existence, for it might not survive such a test.”70 Despite these concerns, 
Washington encouraged the Iranian government to launch a formal complaint with the 
Security Council, which it did in January. As Byrnes explained to his staff, he had told 
the Iranian Ambassador that “we would support him” and that he did “not intend to 
violate that assurance.”71  From Moscow, Kennan wrote the former General and now 
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special envoy for Truman, George C. Marshall, that even if the Soviets might for now 
“take possibilities for direct and immediate UNO sanctions…[lightly], they must know 
that the policies they are following…if further pursued, have deep and unfortunate 
repercussions on great power relations and collaboration.”72  
Intense Security Council debates followed in March, as the agreed upon Soviet 
withdrawal deadline formally expired. Furious at having to defend Stalin’s actions in 
front of the international community, the Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko attempted 
a dramatic seventeen-day boycott of the Council in hope of forcing a solution. He 
misunderstood, however, that to the Americans the principles of the organization, at this 
stage at least, outweighed their determination for superpower harmony. 73  In April, 
Moscow and Tehran reached an agreement that led to the removal of Soviet troops from 
the territory.74 Washington hailed the outcome as a victory for the United Nations and an 
assurance that the organization, as intended, was capable of protecting the weaker states 
from the more powerful ones.75 
In the aftermath, Ambassador Smith met with Stalin and Molotov for two hours in 
Moscow. Although at times the encounter grew heated, Smith assured Stalin that the 
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United States supported collaboration with the Soviet Union for the purposes of 
maintaining peace. He emphasized that American policy remained committed to the 
solving of international problems through the United Nations. The Ambassador even 
extended an invitation from President Truman for the Soviet leader to visit the United 
States. Stalin declined, responding that although he would like to, “age has taken its toll. 
My doctors tell me that I must not travel and I am kept on a strict diet.”76  
Truman’s offer of improved relations was not disingenuous. The President was 
deeply disturbed by Churchill’s speech. He had publicly remained neutral after 
Churchill’s performance, but a private memorandum in his personal papers, jotted down 
two weeks later, makes it emphatically clear that he was not. Here he criticized both the 
speech’s contents and its implications. As an alternative to Churchill’s divisive rhetoric, 
Truman instead suggested “that the U.S. should lead in the UNO by offering” what he 
called, “a positive program for international cooperation.” He wanted a collaborative 
U.S.-Soviet solution on Iran and Turkey, what he referred to as a “Potsdam Agreement 
for the Middle East.” He worried that in the absence of American leadership, conflict 
between London and Moscow might lead to “the breaking up of the world into hostile 
and competing blocs of nations.” He pondered that perhaps more frequent Soviet-Anglo-
American Foreign Minister Conferences would “guarantee that all major future problems, 
for the next few years at least, would be settled within the UNO framework.” The future 
of atomic energy being such a problem, Truman was determined that Americans should 
make “every possible effort” to press forward with the “work of the United Nations 
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Atomic Energy Commission” to guarantee “international control of this new force.” As 
Truman saw it, the U.S. appeared “the only nation capable of pressing a view at this time, 
neither ambitious nor fearful, [and] capable of making the spirit of the UNO come alive.” 
The president was convinced that the “American people in their hearts are looking to 
their leaders for this kind of constructive leadership. This administration cannot fail them 
and mankind.”77 Faith in the U.N. was alive and well in the White House. So was faith in 
American exceptionalist ideology. 
***** 
At the height of the Iranian crisis, and in the middle of the fallout from Churchill’s 
speech, the Acheson group completed its report on international atomic cooperation. The 
Gouzenko espionage case had had no impact on either the work or the conclusions. As 
highlighted above, Truman and Byrnes viewed a solution on atomic weapon as central to 
global peace and order and both men welcomed the Acheson group’s conclusions.78 The 
reaction from the American press was favorable too, calling the Acheson-Lilienthal 
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report, as the group’s final document became known, “brilliant” and “a balanced 
approach” to the complex issue of international oversight.79 The reported reflected the 
philosophy, of which J. Robert Oppenheimer was the primary spokesman, that “an 
international arrangement on atomic energy could be the foundation stone of a wider 
agreement leading to enduring peace.”80 
At the end of April, Dean Acheson appeared alongside former Manhattan Project 
administrator and founder of Raytheon, Vannevar Bush, on CBS for a lengthy discussion 
of the report’s conclusions. The core of the matter, as the Under Secretary of State 
explained it to the American public, was the need for international regulation of atomic 
research and technology, along with international control of natural elements like 
uranium and thorium, essential to the creation of atomic energy. Conscious of Soviet 
sensitivity to international onsite inspections, the report instead recommended placing the 
“mining and possession of uranium and thorium under the control of an international 
body” as a similarly effective method of ensuring compliance. Seeking a collaborative 
effort the authors also, as Acheson relayed it in his memoirs, carefully avoided 
“dangerous words,” that might “wreck any possibility” of Soviet acceptance.81 
 The report was intended as a roadmap for American policy at the upcoming 
UNAEC meeting in June. Regardless of its popular reception, however, Bernard Baruch, 
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the man Truman appointed to present America’s case to the international community, “hit 
the ceiling when he saw the report.”82 Unimpressed with Acheson’s recommendations, 
Baruch threatened to resign immediately if the State Department insisted on using it as a 
“working paper” for U.S. policy. Byrnes had recommended Baruch to Truman because of 
the wealthy financier’s previous experience in supporting presidents and the two men’s 
cooperation during Byrnes tenure as Director of the War Mobilization Board. More 
importantly Baruch had extensive connections on Capitol Hill, including close 
relationships with several high-ranking Republicans.83 The appointment backfired. The 
Secretary underestimated the extent to which Baruch, now in his mid-seventies, loathed 
being the Administration’s errand boy. Baruch wanted to leave an indelible thumbprint 
on policy. His actions and attitude left Acheson and Lilienthal unimpressed. In his diary 
the latter dismissed Baruch and his personal team of advisors as “silly men” and their 
views as “childish.” Acheson too was unmoved by their views and by Baruch’s intellect, 
but his and Lilienthal’s opposition carried little weight. Reflecting on his own 
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recommendation years later, Byrnes considered it the “the greatest mistake” he ever made 
but the heavy pressure on the Democratic Party ahead of the November midterm 
elections made the political consequences of dismissing Baruch too great to bear.84  
 On June 15, Baruch presented his revised version of the American proposal to the 
UNAEC. It called for the creation of an international Atomic Development Authority 
(ADA) which would have sole control of all phases of research, manufacturing, and 
production of atomic energy. The ADA would execute inspections throughout member 
nations to guarantee against unilateral weaponization. Baruch also insisted that the 
exceptional nature of the atomic issue demanded that the permanent members of the 
Security Council relinquish their veto prerogative on this particular issue and that the 
United Nations, acting on recommendations from the ADA, should be granted the 
authority to punish any nation violating the agreement. Only once effective controls were 
in place would the U.S. yield its atomic monopoly.85  
Bernard Brodie, one of the postwar era’s most insightful commentators on 
modern warfare, questioned Baruch’s view of the veto since, as he put it, “no one clearly 
knows to what kinds of decisions in the program the veto will have relevance.” 
Oppenheimer too was unimpressed and deemed it unlikely that the Soviets would accept 
it.86 After some reflection, Truman aligned himself with Baruch’s conclusions. As he 
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explained to Baruch in a letter, “we should not under any circumstances throw away our 
gun until [we are] sure the rest of the world can’t arm against us.”87 The President, in 
other words, was unwilling to rely on the good faith of others. While hardly 
unreasonable, the Soviets viewed the abrogation of the veto on atomic matters as a sly 
attempt to undermine their influence in the Security Council and as a violation of 
sovereignty. Combined with the virtual American dominance of the United Nations that 
characterized the organization until the non-aligned nations and former colonized nations 
entered the U.N. in the nineteen-fifties and sixties, Baruch’s Plan can only have appeared 
as further strengthening America’s political and military hand. In June and July, 
Gromyko presented a counteroffer demanding the abolition of all atomic weapons prior 
to the approval of any rules on inspections or oversight.88 Given Moscow’s own on-going 
atomic research this was a cunning but fruitless proposal.   
In a period of international calm, the Truman Administration would perhaps have 
entertained Gromyko’s proposal. Given the growing concern that Moscow was willing to 
use  its veto far more liberally than the United Nations’ founders had intended, the Soviet 
counter proposal was stillborn. 89  Americans were willing to surrender their atomic 
advantage to the authority of the United Nations, but not if Moscow had the power to 
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hold the organization hostage. Kennan understood as much. As he explained to Dean 
Acheson, Gromyko's proposal counted on “the American conscience and the merciless 
spot-light of free information and publicity in the United States...to guarantee the faithful 
fulfillment of such obligations on our part.” At the same time, he explained, “they are 
counting no less confidently on their own security controls to enable them to proceed 
undisturbed with the development of atomic weapons in secrecy within the Soviet 
Union.”90 Kennan did not know about the Soviet nuclear program underway but he knew 
the Soviet political leadership. Partly in response to this stalemate, Truman signed into 
law a much debated bill on atomic energy in early August. Commonly referred to as the 
McMahon Act, it removed permanently from the possession of the military all control of 
atomic weapons. In the realm of American foreign policy, the law introduced the so-
called “classified at birth” clause that prevented Americans from sharing any atomic 
information with any foreign power or individual.91 If the Americans could not have an 
international agreement they approved, it was looking increasingly less likely that they 
would share anything at all.  
***** 
The wavering between the Acheson-Lilienthal report, the Baruch Plan, and the passage of 
the McMahon Act reflected the deepening tensions among Americans over the nation’s 
foreign policy course. The outlines of the Cold War were appearing even though their 
consequences were by no means yet clear. Truman wanted international collaboration, 
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but on American terms. This had always been Washington’s expectation for the postwar 
order. Americans were not yet, in the summer of 1946, thinking of the world as a zero-
sum game between the free world and the Communist world. Still, the nation’s 
acceptance that its responsibilities were now global caused Americans to suspect Stalin’s 
moves in every corner of the globe. Foreign policy was no longer executed in a vacuum. 
No matter how tangential, incidents were quick to be linked in this era of growing 
uncertainty and mistrust.  
 One example of this was the resurrection of the Turkish crisis just as debates on 
the international control of atomic energy intensified in the UNAEC. In the late summer 
of 1946, Stalin again stepped up the pressure on Ankara on the Straits issue. For over a 
year Moscow’s demands had caused a higher than normal level of mobilization in Turkey 
draining that nation’s already depleted coffers. In August an increase in Soviet troop 
numbers in neighboring Bulgaria and Romania raised fears in Washington that Moscow 
might either invade or be seeking to turn Turkey into a satellite state. 92  Although 
Truman’s advisors did not specifically cite Kennan’s Long Telegram, it was his 
conclusions regarding Soviet aggression against neighboring states that they began to fear 
were coming true. When briefed on the situation by Acheson and several other high level 
advisors, Truman concluded that it was time to send Moscow a message. Americans, he 
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insisted “might as well find out now rather than five or ten years later whether the Soviets 
were bent on world domination.”93 He authorized Acheson to deliver a stern note to 
Moscow, immediately released to the public as well, in which the U.S. chastised the 
Soviet Union for attempting to solve the issue bilaterally rather than through the United 
Nations. To show his determination, Truman also ordered the aircraft carrier USS 
Franklin D. Roosevelt into the Mediterranean, which led to Soviet accusations of 
American “gangster diplomacy.” As the situation intensified some members of the 
American press feared these developments would lead to war. 94 Soviet sources now 
appear to confirm that it was only when Donald MacLean – one of a group of Soviet 
spies in MI5, often referred to as the Cambridge 5 – informed Stalin of the seriousness of 
the American response that Moscow stood down in early September.95  
 Events unfolding simultaneously in Germany had no direct link to either the 
Turkish situation or to the on-going debates on atomic weapons, but their proximity in 
time nevertheless raised international tensions even further. At the Potsdam Conference, 
the victorious powers had divided Germany into four zones, each controlled by one 
occupying power. This zonal division arose strictly from practical administrative 
considerations, not from political or ideological ones. As was the case in Korea (see 
chapter six), this decentralization was expected to be temporary, and great power 
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collaboration was expected to endure. The decision to place the Allied Control Council 
headquarters in Berlin, deep inside the Soviet zone, was one sign of this united effort, as 
was the decision to jointly try high-ranking members of the Nazi political and military 
machinery at Nuremburg.   
Nevertheless, the first year of occupation had not gone well. The Americans 
agreed with Moscow on little. Meanwhile the German people starved. By early 1946, the 
Military Governor of the American zone, U.S. Army General Lucius Clay, began 
lobbying for increased integration among the four zones to ensure economic and social 
stabilization. The initiative reflected a genuine American concern over conditions within 
Germany as well as an American desire that the occupying powers move forward on the 
original plan to treat Germany as a single unit rather than four separate occupation 
zones. 96  Clay was also suspicious, however, of the Soviet Union’s expropriation of 
industry from within its zone. Although Byrnes had agreed to zonal reparations, the 
extent at which Moscow executed this policy was deemed detrimental to both Germany’s 
and Europe’s recovery as a whole. Equally disturbing was the Soviets’ blatant efforts, 
underway since the start of the year, to spread Communist influence across all four zones. 
In the Soviet zone, Stalin had directed the Kommunistische Partei (KPD) and the 
Sozialdemokratische Partei (SPD) to unite as the Sozialistische Einheitspartei (SED) in 
early 1946. In contrast to initiatives in the American zone, the Soviets showed no sign of 
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allowing the Germans the opportunity to pursue their own political choices.97 Rather, 
they were looking to strengthen SED influence, and by extension Communist influence, 
across Germany. Clay believed that uniting the occupied zones would create a greater 
economic potential, thereby curbing the SED’s political reach. 98  Molotov dismissed 
Clay’s suggestion and condemned the Americans for going back on the zonal-reparations 
initiative. He implied that Americans in fact plotted a return to the Morgenthau Plan 
leading to the annihilation of Germany as a state and insisted that the Soviet Union’s 
treatment of its zone had been honorable and fair.99 
 In this tense atmosphere James Byrnes traveled to Germany to deliver perhaps the 
most significant speech by a U.S. official on European soil. At the Stuttgart Opera House 
in early September, the Secretary of State outlined directly to the German people the core 
of American policies. Ideologically, the speech reflected American policy since the war’s 
end: stabilization, democratization, de-militarization, and de-Nazification. But Byrnes 
went further. In a dramatic gesture, he made unification of the occupation zones 
American policy as well, and, in a thinly veiled critique of Soviet and French zonal 
ambitions, he promised the German people sovereignty and eventual independence under 
international supervision. He guaranteed that despite the war and the occupation, “we do 
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not want Germany to become the satellite of any power.”100 As the crowd rose to its feet 
in applause and the band played the Star Spangled Banner, Senator Vandenberg, on stage 
with Byrnes, turned to the Secretary and insisted that the tune had “never before given me 
such a chill.” It was not surprising. Even for the former isolationist Senator, Byrnes’ 
declaration of American commitment to those threatened by totalitarianism struck a 
powerful chord. It also sent a strong message to Moscow, London, and Paris, that the 
U.S. promise to the international order remained firm. The American press hailed the 
speech as a profound declaration of American international commitment and interpreted 
it as an offer to the other great powers of either “rivalry or cooperation.” Interestingly, 
and significantly, reporters interpreted the speech as an offer rather than a dare.101  
The performance was perhaps Byrnes’ finest as Secretary of State. But within 
days, events back home threatened to undermine him. In July, Truman had asked a 
number of cabinet members and close advisors to present to him their views on the future 
direction of American foreign policy. Among the respondents was his Secretary of 
Commerce, FDR’s former Vice President, Henry Wallace. Wallace was viewed by many 
as somewhat radical. For years, he had worked tirelessly for the promotion of social 
justice on a global scale. In 1942, he had powerfully proclaimed that with victory in the 
war would come “the century of the common man” and called on the U.S. to lead in the 
creation of such a new order. He was no less a believer in American Exceptionalism than 
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Truman and he also shared many of Henry Luce’s view of the role Americans could and 
should take to ensure that the needs of people were met regardless of nationality or race. 
Wallace’s at times supranational views which placed the plight of all peoples above 
national interest, however, also caused him to take a more generous view of the Soviet 
Union than most other officials in Washington. He was not a Communist, but he 
sympathized with the principles of social equality that Marx’s doctrines endorsed. He 
saw great power collaboration as the only responsible path to peace, equality, and the 
abolition of empires.102  
Five days after Byrnes’ Stuttgart performance, Wallace shared with Truman a 
speech he was himself preparing to deliver in New York City. Repeating the pattern from 
Churchill’s iron curtain speech six months earlier, Truman would later claim that he had 
given the speech only a hasty glance, but since it predictably mirrored the views Wallace 
had presented to Truman in his reply to the President’s July request, the contents should 
not have been unfamiliar to him. Wallace’s speech denounced the British Empire and 
warned that London’s policies would drag the United States into war. Atomic weapons, 
he insisted should be under the control of the United Nations if peace was to be 
guaranteed. Americans, Wallace insisted, needed to compromise with the Soviet Union 
over atomic weapons. He chastised those who took an aggressive stance against the 
Soviet Union as warmongers, calling instead for what later would be called “peaceful co-
existence” between the two powers. The speech was not an attack on Truman’s foreign 
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policy; it merely reflected the peculiar pacific nature of Wallace’s social and political 
thought that had been evident throughout the entirety of his long public service.103  
The speech did, however, reflect a milder position than the one Truman had taken 
on Turkey. It was also much softer than the one Secretary of State Byrnes had presented 
in Stuttgart, leaving Byrnes deeply disappointed. He cabled Truman from Europe 
explaining that “the world is today in doubt not only as to American foreign policy, but 
as to your policy.” Essentially, he was telling the President that across the Atlantic people 
now questioned Washington’s commitment to a democratic Europe. Already planning to 
resign at the end of the year due to ill health, Byrnes now informed Truman that he could 
not continue one more day if “the administration is itself divided.” Baruch publicly 
followed suit, threatening to walk away from his U.N. position if Truman took no action 
against Wallace.104  
We know little of Truman’s initial personal reaction to the chaos, although he 
publicly expressed disbelief. On the day of the speech Truman had in fact told reporters 
that he had read and approved Wallace’s address, a point Wallace went on to make in the 
speech as well. Even so, the fallout appears to have stunned the President. Two days later 
he tried to cover himself by issuing a statement that he had misspoken when he told 
reporters of his approval.105 Regardless, the incident made the direction of U.S. global 
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policy unclear, a public consequence that Truman was left to sort out. He could have 
dismissed Wallace on the spot, thereby sending a clear message that he supported the 
policies presented by Byrnes and Baruch, but he did not. This decision raises major 
questions about the frequently proposed view that Truman pursued a solid “get tough” 
policy with the Soviet Union throughout 1946.  
On September 18, six days after Wallace’s speech, things took a turn for the 
worse for the President. The American media published in full the long confidential letter 
with policy recommendations that Wallace had presented to the President in July. 
Released without Truman’s approval, the letter tore into the Baruch Plan as unworkable, 
unreasonable, and likely to spark an atomic arms race. Americans, Wallace insisted, were 
in effect telling the Soviets that “if they are ‘good boys’ we may eventually turn our 
knowledge over to them…But there is no objective standard of what will qualify them as 
being ‘ good’ nor any specified time for sharing our knowledge.” In reverse 
circumstances, Wallace insisted, “we would react as the Russians” currently are in the 
U.N. Coming on the back of the speech, the letter set off an intense media debate.106 
Most reporters and several Congressmen, Republicans and Democrats strongly criticized 
Wallace. Roger Slaughter (D-MO) called Wallace’s position a “new low in cowardice so 
far as our foreign policy is concerned” and Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-LA) added that 
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he did “not think [Wallace] acted gracefully in the matter, considering his post.” In light 
of the upcoming elections, Republicans tried to tie Wallace to Truman with Robert Taft 
insisting that the President had “attempted to play both ends against the middle – to 
appeal to the left wing with Wallace’s favorable words about Russia while appealing to 
the more conservative sentiment by supporting Secretary Byrnes.” Several church groups, 
a few left leaning Congressmen, as well as Eleanor Roosevelt backed Wallace’s 
argument but this was clearly a minority position. As was so often the case, Walter 
Lippmann summed up the chaos the best, insisting that America and the Administration 
had simply “lost face” and that clarity in foreign affairs was now needed.107 
In that context, Truman asked for – and got – Wallace’s resignation on September 
20. 108  Faced with opposition from prominent members of his cabinet and from a 
Republican Party already looking very strong in the upcoming midterm elections, he 
must have felt a need to exorcise the problem. On September 17, and again a week later, 
Baruch submitted classified letters to the President clarifying the American policy 
position on the internationalization of atomic weapons and explaining at length what he 
deemed to be the erroneous nature of Wallace’s interpretations. The letters reflected his 
frequently stated view that Americans could not in good faith compromise its monopoly 
on nuclear weapons. At heart, Truman agreed with Baruch’s view. An avid reader of 
history, he believed that modern man needed to draw lessons from the past.  As a result, 
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he was determined that the internationalization of atomic weapons should not bear “a 
strong resemblance to the many abortive and ineffectual agreements of the past for 
disarmament or non-aggression.”109  
Even so, Truman struggled to balance his own belief that cooperation remained 
attainable with the ever-present signs that Washington’s relationship with Moscow was 
deteriorating. He still clung to the hope that the United States could find common ground 
with Stalin. This was why he had invited the Soviet leader to Washington. It was also 
likely why he had kept advisors like Wallace and Joseph Davies around well into 
1946.110 The President’s doubts were not lessened when four days after Wallace departed 
the cabinet, Clark Clifford handed Truman a report that he, at the President’s request, had 
worked on for almost two months alongside White House Naval aide George Elsey. 
Based on opinions from across the military branches, the Department of War, and the 
Department of State—including the expertise of George Kennan—the top secret report 
made for grim reading.111 Analyzing the future of U.S.-Soviet relations, the Clifford-
Elsey Report concluded that Moscow was preparing for a potential military confrontation 
with the U.S. and was not intent on improving relations. It warned that traditional 
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communist goals of world domination were the primary influence on Soviet foreign 
policy and that all members of the American Communist Party were in effect agents of 
the Soviet Union. The report recommended a toughening up of American foreign policy, 
insisting that “the language of military power is the only language disciples of power 
politics understand.” 112  Referencing the Churchillian logic from Fulton, previously 
dismissed by Truman, Clifford and Elsey concluded that if Americans were to find “it 
impossible to enlist Soviet cooperation in the solution of world problems, we should be 
prepared to join with the British and other Western countries in an attempt to build up a 
world of our own which will pursue its own objectives.”113  
Truman read the Clifford-Elsey report on the evening of September 24. At seven 
the next morning, he instructed Clifford to bring all copies of the report to the Oval 
Office. Here he cautioned Clifford that the report was not to be discussed or leaked. It 
never was while Truman remained in office. The President did not share its contents with 
the military or with his three most high-profile advisors on foreign affairs: Byrnes, 
Acheson, and Forrestal.  As he insisted to Clifford, if the report was “leaked it would 
blow the roof off the White House [and] the Kremlin.”114 If the Cold War was already 
underway, as many scholars assume, why then was Truman so concerned with the 
document’s secrecy? Following the suggestion made by Truman biographer Alonzo 
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Hamby, historian John Acacia recently argued that the President buried the report 
because he worried that Wallace would use its conclusions against him and accuse him of 
warmongering. This is an unconvincing argument, however, for which there is no 
documentary evidence. Not only does it fail to explain why the President would withhold 
the report from his trusted foreign policy team, it assigns Wallace more influence than he 
possessed. If anything, Truman’s firsthand congressional experience would have taught 
him that the public and Congress rallied around the President in times of international 
crisis; any accusations from Wallace would have fallen on deaf ears. If anything, 
domestic political support was sorely needed by Truman in the fall of 1946. The 
upcoming Congressional elections were largely considered a referendum on Truman’s 
performance and with his approval ratings hovering in the low thirties, publicizing the 
report’s findings would have likely provided the Party a welcome boost.115 Whatever his 
reasons for keeping it secret, Truman’s decision clearly demonstrates that he was not 
ready for conflict with the Soviet Union, whether hot or cold. 
***** 
Throughout 1946 Americans inside and outside the government worried increasingly 
about the global situation. William Bullitt, the former Ambassador to Moscow, criticized 
both Truman and FDR’s record of collaboration with Stalin. He claimed that as early as 
“the autumn of 1945” it had been clear, “except to those who did not wish to see, that the 
Soviet Union had replaced Germany as the embodiment of totalitarian imperialism.” 
Reinhold Niebuhr held a similarly grim view. Arguing for a stronger American 
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commitment to Western Europe, he emphasized, as he had so often done, that one world 
visions in general ignored the realities of power and “the tragic aspects of human 
existence.”116 
 Others simply worried about the United Nations’ ability to balance international 
affairs in light of the Security Council veto. As highlighted in chapter three, Americans 
had opposed the Soviet veto demands during the wartime negotiations. Early in the 
Truman Administration they had in fact considered an amendment to the Charter on this 
issue. During the first U.N. General Assembly in January, Byrnes explained to Truman, 
however, that while he favored a change to the veto rules, “it would be a mistake six 
months after the Charter was submitted to the Senate and even before the organization 
starts operating, to agree to a change.”117 However, thirteen Soviet vetoes over the course 
of 1946 – France was the only other power to use its veto even once – reinforced the 
concern over the permanent members’ veto prerogative.  
 Despite these concerns, few spoke as of yet of a coming universal struggle about 
ways of life. Regardless of Moscow’s ideology Americans remained committed to 
collaboration with the Soviet Union and they maintained a commitment, by scholars 
often underappreciated, to the United Nations and to a unified world. The American 
public in particular continued to believe in the United Nations as the most likely avenue 
to obtaining peaceful relations in the world. As late as August 1946, a New York Herald 
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Tribune poll found that forty-seven percent of Americans favored the proposal that all 
nations hand over to the U.N “all their military information and secrets, and allow 
continuous inspection.” Only thirty-seven percent opposed.118 On November 5, voters in 
Massachusetts were asked if they supported their Senator being “instructed to vote to 
request the President and the Congress of the United States to direct our delegates to the 
United Nations to propose or support Amendments to its charter which will strengthen 
the United Nations and make it a World Federal Government able to prevent war.” In the 
Bay State, this measure got the backing of almost ninety percent of the 700,000 votes 
cast.119 Even setting aside the loaded language and Massachusetts’ progressive traditions, 
the vote was a demonstrative show of support for the U.N and the internalization of law 
and cooperation. 
 A further sign of the strong significance Truman attached to the United Nations 
was his selection of the highly respected veteran, Senator Warren R. Austin (R-VT), to 
replace the retiring Edward Stettinius as U.N. Ambassador in the summer of 1946. A 
resolute internationalist, Austin had, through trial by fire, become a Senate powerhouse 
on foreign affairs. During World War II, the Republican Party ridiculed Austin for his 
support of FDR. Nevertheless, he won many admirers when, on the Senate Floor, he fired 
back at his own party leadership insisting that contrary to their views, “there are many 
worse things than war. A world enslaved by Hitler is much worse than war, it is worse 
than death. And a country whose boys will not go out and fight to save Christianity and 
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the principles of freedom from the ruthless destruction of a fiend – well, you won’t find 
such boys in America.” Walter Lippmann was delighted with Truman’s choice. He 
congratulated Austin, certain that he would become “a tower of strength in the Security 
Council,” and hoped that his appointment signaled that the Senate, under Truman, would 
become a powerful bastion in the conduct of foreign affairs. Similar praise followed from 
the soon to be re-elected Senator, Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., John Foster Dulles, Arthur 
Vandenberg, and many more. The media echoed this view, praising the decision to make 
Austin the nation’s chief U.N. diplomat. 120  Constitutionality prevented Austin from 
formally assuming the position until January, and as a result he served, in the interim in 
an advisor capacity to the career Foreign Service Officer Herschel Johnson.121  
Over the fall of 1946, Johnson publicly and in the Security Council highlighted 
the American commitment to the U.N. The organization was, he insisted in an address on 
CBS, a society of nations “through which the peoples of the world can, if they will, work 
toward the development of a world society...[It provides] a meeting place for all the 
world in which every political, economic, and social issue…can be debated and common 
measures worked out.” To Americans, he insisted, the U.N. represented the “best possible 
blue-print for the world that ought to be.” In an article published shortly after, he 
emphasized that the U.N.’s mission included not only “the positive development of 
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friendly relations between the nations of the world, [but also] the advance of economic, 
social and cultural standards of humanity and the encouragement and respect for human 
rights all over the world.” While recognizing that the Security Council did not function 
perfectly, Johnson saw progress in recent cases that gave him hope for the future of the 
organization.122 
 Following Truman’s lead, Johnson declared the “United Nations the corner stone 
of U.S. foreign policy.” In November, he highlighted America’s global responsibility and 
the need for the United States to take a leading role in the U.N. Calling for constant 
cooperation among the great powers, he underlined that “social and economic stability 
and a growing prosperity” create societies in which “extremism and fanaticism cannot 
thrive.” To him, it was America’s role “to take the leadership as the strongest member 
in…world recovery and the promotion of healthy economics everywhere.” On world 
trade, health, global food supplies, and disease prevention, he insisted that Americans 
take the lead. He argued that “freedom from fear cannot be won…by unilateral 
dictatorship; nor permanently by a balance of power.” American economic prosperity, 
then, must help the United Nations provide “the machinery for international collaboration 
in the creation of the conditions of health and strength of all communities. The Economic 
and Social Council…,the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Bank and Fund 
and the World Health Organization are now ready to serve this purpose. In these new 
organizations we will find our greatest hope for peace and security.” Johnson finished his 
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speech by insisting that “as long as the peoples of the world and the governments of the 
great powers are prepared to sacrifice for peace as they did for victory there is reason to 
believe in the United Nations. And let the role of the United States in the United Nations 
be to resolve firmly to yield second place to no nation in the contribution to organized 
peace which we are prepared to make.”123   
 This was hardly the message of a nation that had adopted a confrontational “get 
tough” policy with the Soviet Union. Despite the significant disagreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union during the first eighteen months after the Second 
World War ended, this was not a time of ultimatums or of sentiments of good versus evil. 
Truman’s decision to secure all copies of the Clifford-Elsey Report reflected – regardless 
of where American policy would stand six months hence – the absence of a clear 
antagonistic strategy. To insist, as some scholars do, that Americans already found 
themselves in a Cold War implies a far more consistent, far more logical, and a more 
confrontational American policy than the evidence supports. Any such interpretation 
underestimates Americans’ commitment to a functioning international order and the faith 
they still placed in the U.N. More significantly, it leads scholars to undervalue the 
dramatic transformational impact on American national self-perception when the Cold 
War broke out as a result of the Greek crisis the following year. Only with the declaration 
of the Truman Doctrine in March of 1947 did Americans cross their Rubicon. Only then, 
borne by their exceptionalist ideology, did their national socialization and their 
perception of enemies turn what ought to have been a traditional great power struggle for 
                                                 
123  Herschel V. Johnson, “The United States Role in the United Nations.” Address in Albany, NY, 
November 22, 1946.” HSTL, Herschel V. Johnson Papers, Box 14. 
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influence and resources into a Manichean struggle between ways of life. The manner and 
the ease with which Americans turned their disagreements with the Soviet Union into an 
existential conflict provides an avenue for understanding how Americans think of their 
role in the world. It is toward this Cold War world—a world created by American 
exceptionalist ideology—that we now turn.  
 206 
5. America in the World: The Coming of the Cold War, 1947-1948 
George Frost Kennan was the State Department’s most perceptive observer of the Soviet 
Union. Collectively, his official cables and memoranda, lectures, journal articles, and 
personal correspondence comprise a detailed and insightful analysis of Moscow’s 
political and ideological visions unmatched in official or academic circles at any point 
during the Cold War.1 Kennan viewed U.S.-Soviet relations as complex and challenging. 
The combination of Communism and Russian nationalism, he frequently warned, made a 
continuation of the U.S.-Soviet wartime alliance illusionary. Concerned about the spread 
of Communism, Kennan advocated a policy of both firmness and patience that was 
designed to confront the Soviets “with superior strength at every juncture where they 
might otherwise be inclined to encroach upon the vital interests of a stable and peaceful 
world.”  As he advised Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the summer of 1946, if 
Americans “keep cool, avoid hysteria…[and] keep a steady hand,” the international 
situation would remain stable.2  
Kennan’s advice to avoid hyperbole and unnecessary confrontation was sound. At 
the same time, however, it also highlighted his Achilles heel as a U.S. foreign policy 
analyst: he knew the Russian mind, but he understood little of the American.  While his 
                                                 
1 Kennan departed Moscow in the spring of 1946 after having spent eighteen of the last twenty years 
abroad. In Washington, he began lecturing at the newly established National War College until he became 
head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in early 1947. His lectures provide an important 
contemporary view of the evolving American-Soviet relations. See his Measures Short of War: The George 
F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946-1947 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University Press, 1991). For an extensive coverage of Kennan’s time at the National War College see 
Gaddis, George F. Kennan, pp. 225-246. 
2 George F. Kennan Lecture, “Trust as a Factor in International Relations,” Yale University, New Haven, 
CT, October 1, 1946, quoted in Gaddis, George F. Kennan, p. 245. George Kennan to Dean Acheson, 
“Draft of Information Policy on Relations with Russia,” July 1946. HSTL, Dean Acheson Papers, Box 27.  
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realist foreign policy orientation – one he shared with Lippmann, Niebuhr, and the 
political scientist Hans Morgenthau – recognized the “short-term trends of public opinion 
and…the erratic and subjective nature of public reaction to foreign-policy questions,” 
Kennan overestimated the extent to which national fear, passion, and instinct could be 
controlled.3 Once it became established dogma that international Communism challenged 
the U.S.-made world order, the genus Americanus made it nearly impossible for 
Americans to be persuaded to view the Soviet Union as a mere political adversary. The 
cultural and historical consciousness that made up American ideology ran too deep for 
the nation to maintain the balanced approach to international relations that Kennan 
favored. In effect, he was asking Americans to be something they were not. Instead, 
Americans came to view the Soviet Union as an absolute nemesis with which there could 
be no permanent modus vivendi. It was a remarkable shift from the first eighteen months 
of the postwar era during which the U.S. sought cooperation with Moscow in establishing 
the post-war order. But it was the only position American ideology would allow for. To 
the vast majority of Americans, an adversary with universalist aspirations equal to their 
own could not be considered anything but a threat to the American way of life. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, improved access to the archives of the 
former Eastern bloc has strengthened the orthodox interpretation that predominant 
responsibility for the Cold War rests with Stalin. European historians, in particular, have 
powerfully shown that in the absence of an American commitment to the European 
democracies, the iron curtain would have moved westward. We now know that Stalin had 
                                                 
3 Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950,  pp. 91-103. 
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drafted a master plan for a future Germany united under Communist rule long before the 
Western powers created the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. We also know that he 
desired the permanent Sovietization of Western Europe, a reality only prevented by the 
British and American armies reaching Brussels, Paris, and Copenhagen before the Red 
Army. It is equally clear that these Communist goals remained intact after the war’s end.4  
Stalin’s need for influence and control in Europe, along with the influence of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology on his global views, compelled him to reject participation in 
the American-designed international economic order. Despite the obvious financial and 
humanitarian advantages cooperation with the liberal democracies under the Bretton 
System would have brought to the citizens of the war ravaged Soviet Union, Stalin 
rejected reforms and instead used much needed funds and resources to pursue the 
development of atomic weapons. He unquestionably understood that concessions to the 
western powers would have endangered his own stranglehold on power and the political 
ideology and party that ruled his nation. For reasons of security and ideology – two issues 
that were never quite separable in Moscow – this was a risk he was not willing to take. 
Instead, Stalin tightened his grip on power and sought to extend Soviet influence in 
Turkey and Iran, and via Balkan proxies support Communist insurgents in Greece. At the 
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same time, he covertly sought similar political changes via Western European 
Communists whose unwavering allegiance Moscow expected.5   
Yet even if responsibility for the destruction of the American idealized one-world 
order and ultimately the Cold War rests with Moscow, we must look to the United States 
to explain why the Cold War became the kind of ideological conflict it did after 1947. 
“Theoretically,” as Henry Kissinger has speculated, “it might have been possible to 
consolidate a united front among the democracies while conducting negotiations with the 
Soviet Union about an overall settlement” on global issues.6 After all, traditional great 
powers had, in the past, often sought grand bargains as they divided influence and carved 
up continents. A less ideological protagonist might have pursued such a course. But the 
United States was no ordinary power. Americans’ ideology led them to forcefully 
respond to Stalin’s challenge as a threat to their nation’s global mission. As President 
Truman put it, “the world today looks to us for leadership because we have so largely 
realized, within our borders, those benefits of democratic government for which most of 
the peoples of the world are yearning…[our] foreign  policy is the outward expression of 
the democratic faith we profess.”7 Historians are often tempted to dismiss such rhetoric 
as self-congratulatory hyperbole. The American foreign-policy record certainly is 
sufficiently tainted by its collaboration with less than honorable regimes to justify such a 
dismissal. Yet, if we too casually reject Americans’ principled language as a purely 
rhetorical means to an end, we are likely to lose sight of its deep cultural and historical 
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roots and, in the process, miss something fundamental about how Americans perceive 
themselves and how they in turn perceive others. 
Historian Frank Costigliola recently encouraged scholars to stress the human side 
of foreign policymaking, arguing that individual emotions heavily influenced Truman’s 
cabinet as its members wrestled with the global role inherited from FDR.8  This emphasis 
on personalities and individual beliefs is to be applauded as it can help bring another 
intellectual layer to diplomatic history that has too often been absent. Still, while such a 
method can yield dividends when attempting to explain political decision-making, there 
is a danger in assigning individuals excessive influence in the formation of foreign 
policy. It was not simply the absence of a Metternich or a Castleragh that caused the Cold 
War, after all. The individuals in Truman’s cabinet were heavily influenced by American 
historical and cultural consciousness. Their socialization inspired them– like generations 
before or since – to view the United States as the indispensable nation with universal 
democratic responsibilities. This American cultural self-perception heavily influenced 
individuals’ views of the Cold War, and helped make the Cold War a cold war. Truman’s 
ideologically infused language cited above, it is significant to note, did not serve as a 
manipulative device to seduce or persuade the American public. Americans willingly 
embraced it because they already inhabited it. It was part of their long national heritage 
described in chapter two. It had been brought to life long before Truman’s tenure and it 
would outlive his time in the Oval Office. It reflected American sentiments about the 
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nation’s role in the world and it dictated Americans’ perception of, and response to, 
external and internal threats. This language encapsulated both a particular sense of 
mission as well an underlying American cultural struggle with “the other.” The threat of 
Communism – real or imagined – inspired a language of conflict, of good and evil and of 
sin and redemption. It cemented the American moral mission for the world as permanent 
and absolute. In this Americanized global context, a threat to liberty anywhere became a 
threat to liberty everywhere.  
 In an echo of 1861, Americans – as Anders Stephanson has pointed out – 
interpreted Stalin’s eventual abandonment of the postwar international order almost as a 
contractual breach.9 Between 1947 and early 1949 this helped ensure that Americans 
began interpreting the Soviet Union as the incarnation of another threat comparable to 
Hitler’s Germany rather than simply another great power with which the United States 
had to contend. Eventually this would lead Americans to abandon normal channels of 
diplomacy. It initiated the return to American national discourse of a world divided 
between the enslavers and the free, between the righteous and the sinners. Americans 
may not have started the Cold War, but it was their ideology that shaped, and nourished 
it. American exceptionalist ideology made the Cold War about antagonistic ways of life.   
***** 
Coincidentally, Greece, the birthplace of democracy, became a principal catalyst for the 
Cold War in early 1947. The conclusion of the Second World War had given way to civil 
conflict in Greece, as nationalists and communists vied for power. Historical ties and 
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Allied geo-strategic considerations had originally assigned London the predominant task 
of maintaining stability in postwar Greece, but the combination of a weakening British 
economy and the intensifying revolt against the Athens’s government soon upset this 
arrangement. Aided by Communist governments in Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, 
the insurgency threatened the conservative Athens regime’s existence. Despite its 
influence within these countries, Moscow took no steps to contain the situation. Coming 
on the backdrop of the previous year’s Near East crises, the Greek situation by 1946 
raised instant red flags both in London and Washington.10  
 Over the fall, events here reignited the old American interwar fear that miserable 
conditions created fertile breeding ground for ideologues’ false promises. Conditions in 
Greece rivaled the worst in Europe. Heavy fighting and a ruthless occupation by the 
Germans had devastated both industry and infrastructure. Three thousand villages were 
destroyed, a quarter of the population was homeless, and more than eight percent of the 
population lay dead. 11  In October 1946, Loy Henderson, the Director of the State 
Department’s Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (NEA), predicted that without 
international aid the Communists would triumph. If Greece fell, he explained, a similar 
outcome was likely to follow in Turkey. Although concerned, Dean Acheson was 
                                                 
10 Yugoslavia had an interest in Greece that extended beyond Communist ideological goals. Unlike Albania 
and Bulgaria, the Yugoslavians, under Marshal Josis Broz Tito, had secured their own liberation from Nazi 
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spread of Communism.  
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unreceptive to the NEA’s recommendation of unilateral American support for Greece.12 
The Truman Administration still considered the U.N. to be the primary vehicle for setting 
up and executing its international policies, and, as a result, pressed for Security Council 
involvement. Under Article 34 of the Charter, the Americans argued that the increase in 
cross-border shootings in the Balkans was “likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace” and recommended an exploratory investigation of the situation. 
Although no member of the Council denied the accuracy of this conclusion, the Soviet 
representative vetoed the American proposal because it did not single out Greece as the 
aggressor against the other Balkan nations.13 The absence of evidence to support the 
Soviet accusations caused the interim U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Herschel Johnson, to 
publicly condemn Moscow’s stance as an irresponsible politicization of the United 
Nations. The lifeblood of the organization, he insisted, rested on the veto being “the rare 
exception to the rule.”14 
 American press reports throughout the fall highlighted violence by leftists against 
Greek civilians and government institutions as well as the equally violent measures taken 
by Greek forces. At the same time, Moscow stepped up what can only be described as a 
one-sided, public denunciation of Greece in the U.N. General Assembly and in the Soviet 
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press. The Soviets accused the regime in Athens of being “chauvinistic, imperialist and 
aggressive” and an obstacle to the true wishes of the Greek people.15 In early November, 
the U.S. Navy made symbolic good-will calls in Turkey and Greece, repeating a gesture 
executed during the Turkish crisis. That same week, The Saturday Evening Post ran a 
long story, complete with powerful images, exposing the Communists’ extensive misuse 
of UNRRA relief-aid in neighboring Yugoslavia, along with the deliberate attempts of 
the regime there to deceive the population regarding the aid’s country of origin. 16  
American faith in the international order appeared increasingly misplaced. 
 Sumner Welles, now a private citizen, writing in the Washington Post, echoed the 
American government’s frustration with the international community’s impotence. If the 
U.N. proved unwilling to act, FDR’s former confidante recommended unilateral 
American support for Greece. Chastising Moscow for blocking the U.N. investigation, 
Welles warned that the reality of the veto made it “improbable that the Security Council” 
under present conditions could “undertake any official or impartial investigation of the 
facts.” As one of the diplomats involved in the early negotiations that established the 
postwar order, he understood that the American compromise on the veto had been 
intended to afford the permanent Security Council members a measure with which to 
protect themselves. He viewed any attempt by the great powers to use the veto to block 
an investigation not to their liking as behavior inconsistent with the spirit of the 
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international organization. He concluded by reminding his readers that while the Soviet 
Union could veto any Security Council action, it could not block a Greek request for a 
hearing in front of the Council.17 
Despite this public American stance, the Greek situation was not entirely black 
and white. Although formally elected in 1946, the Konstantinos Tsaldari government was 
no model democracy. In addition, the British, in part as a result of the percentages 
agreement Churchill had struck with Stalin in 1944 and in part at the request of the local 
government, maintained a degree of involvement not wholly within the spirit of the new 
international order.18 Tsaldari remained, nevertheless, the official representative of the 
Greek people, and on December 13 he took Greece’s case to the U.N. In front of the 
Security Council, he formally charged the countries of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria 
with “lending their support” to Communist guerilla attacks against Greek territory. Citing 
over thirty instances of infiltration and interventions from neighboring territories against 
Greek soil, the Athens’s representative charged that the U.N. could not “permit a few 
dealers in ideology [to] receive assistance from foreign countries for imperialistic 
ends…For in that event responsibility would rest upon all the United Nations, and in 
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particular upon the Great Powers.”19 The Greek case represented a new challenge to the 
international community.  
 As the crisis progressed, Americans increasingly fretted over the development of 
a proper foreign policy strategy. The Alsop brothers despairingly reported in the 
Washington Post, shortly after the Greek hearing, that “[K]eeping your fingers crossed 
cannot be described as having a policy in the field of world relations…, however, crossed 
fingers seem to be the only visibly American response” to Soviet policies. Support for 
Greece, they concluded, was not enough; the Unites States needed a program to provide 
support “on a much larger scale, in all economic and political soft spots.”20 At that time, 
however, there was no sign that such a program was in the making.  Encouragement, in 
any case, followed on December 19 when, after a heated debate in the Security Council, 
the Soviet Union – now under mounting international pressure – chose not to veto an 
American-backed measure to send a limited observer mission to the Balkans to seek 
further information.21 Elated American reporters viewed this development as a sign of 
rediscovered “big power harmony.” The Washington Post concluded that Moscow was 
not “prepared to do anything that would cast doubt on her new policy of cooperation with 
the west.” Even Walter Lippmann was optimistic. He viewed it as a “stabilization of the 
balance of power” and a clarification of “the limits of the sphere of influence established 
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at the end of the war.”22 The State Department too greeted the move with relief, hoping it 
was a sign of improved relations with Moscow. In November, and again in late 
December, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the NEA and Lincoln 
MacVeagh, the U.S. Ambassador to Athens, that in order to avoid provoking the Soviet 
Union, Americans would not extend further unilateral aid to Greece. For now, the matter 
would be left for the international community to deal with.23 
 In January 1947, Secretary of State Byrnes appointed Mark Ethridge as the 
primary American delegate to the United Nations Balkan Committee investigating the 
Greek matter. He had formerly served the State Department in Romania and Bulgaria and 
had been part of the unsuccessful effort to obtain Moscow’s approval of democratic 
postwar elections in the Balkans. Despite this previous failure, Ethridge remained 
optimistic that the U.N. could solve the Greek crisis. As was the case for so many, 
however, frustration soon replaced optimism. He later recalled that the Soviets, in an 
attempt to place the sole blame on the Greek government, did everything they could to 
keep the observers in the capital. They resisted “very strongly our moving even to 
Salonika… they resisted our moving around…They resisted very strongly our going into 
Yugoslavia or into Bulgaria.”  The Soviets were certain, Ethridge reported to the State 
Department, “that Greece is ripe plum ready to fall into their hands in a few weeks.” 
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 218 
Awaiting the inevitable Communist takeover, the Soviet delegation, was simply stalling 
for time.24 
Under these circumstances, the disagreement between Washington and Moscow 
over Greece’s future was bound to cause conflict and dismay. That it helped bring about 
the Cold War, was a reflection of Americans’ growing realization that the United Nations 
was coming up short and that their vision of a united world was failing along with it. This 
conclusion accelerated a debate over what the Alsops considered the “greatest unresolved 
problem of American foreign policy: The relationship between political foreign policy 
and economic foreign policy.”25 Sorting this out fell to George C. Marshall, who, in 
January 1947, replaced the ailing James Byrnes as Secretary of State. Marshall was 
adamant that international organizations could not provide the support required to save 
Greece from Communism. 26 He believed, along with the Greek Director General of 
Housing and Reconstruction, Constantinos Doxiadis, that UNRRA was “a first aid 
program and nothing else.” UNRRA could “provide food and supplies, but it could not 
ensure Greece’s recovery from the triple blow of war, occupation, and civil strife. To 
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prevent the collapse of the regime, Greece needed funds for importation of goods, 
rebuilding of industry, direct military assistance, food, the provision of administrators, 
technicians, [and] economists.”27 Labeling Greece an “old-fashioned economy…[with] 
no special aptitude for either politics or rebuilding,” Life magazine made it clear that only 
the U.S. could rescue the last non-Communist holdout in the Balkans.28 
 By mid-February, the “fingers crossed” policy, nevertheless, remained intact. 
That all changed, however, when the British Embassy in Washington delivered two 
memos to the Secretary of State’s office explaining that London would, “be obliged to 
discontinue the financial, economic, and advisory assistance” they had been providing to 
Greece and Turkey and urging the United States to provide support in its place. Upon 
receipt of the memos, Acheson – acting in Marshall’s place while he delivered his first 
address as Secretary of State at Princeton University – instructed Henderson and his NEA 
staff to draft an American response as quickly as possible and with utmost secrecy.29 
 As his deputies prepared the new policy initiative, Marshall delivered a speech 
two hundred miles north of the nation’s capital. An astute student of history, Marshall 
recalled how no force had been able to step up and rescue the democratic Hellenic world 
order as Athens declined.  Given “the special position that the United States now 
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occupie[d] in the world,” he argued that it was the American people’s obligation to 
ensure that such a tragedy would not occur again. Commenting on the speech even 
Lippmann, otherwise no advocate for American grandiloquence, conceded that there was 
no “escape from that responsibility…It is impossible to evade the consequences of 
history, and there is no way in which the United States can stand safely aside and mind its 
own internal business…while all about it the world sinks into disorder and squalor, and 
the violence of a desperate struggle for mere existence.”30 
 The NEA’s recommendation in response to the British message paralleled 
Marshall’s thinking, arguing that American aid to Greece was the only way to prevent 
“the capitulation of Greece to Soviet domination [which] might eventually result in the 
loss of the whole Near and Middle East and northern Africa.” Such an outcome, 
Henderson argued, “would consolidate the position of Communist minorities in many 
other countries where their aggressive tactics [were] seriously hampering the 
development of middle-of-the-road governments.”31  
 On February 27, President Truman, Marshall, and Acheson called a meeting of 
high-ranking Congressmen from both parties to argue the necessity of taking up Britain’s 
mantle in the Near East. As he had made clear at Princeton, Marshall believed the world 
had “arrived at a point in history” unparalleled “since ancient times.”32 The Congress and 
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the public needed to understand that far more than Greece, Turkey, or the Middle East 
was a stake. According to the State Department’s Joseph Jones, Acheson and Marshall 
also impressed upon the group that while planning could take place in secrecy, the 
announcement of aid needed to be public. Similarly, Truman’s Press Secretary Eben 
Ayers confided in his diary that there was an urgent need for a well composed message 
that was well-received by the American public and the press. 33 Jones privately and 
earnestly suggested to Henderson that the forthcoming public announcement tone down 
the financial aid issue in the Mediterranean crisis and instead “bring in more “the 
necessity for bolstering democracy around the world.” The decision to take over Britain’s 
role was, as he explained it, not purely a financial contribution, nor was it an attempt to 
pull “British chestnuts out of the fire.” As such, the proposal needed to be presented in 
terms of the mortal danger the spread of communism posed to “democracies throughout 
the world.” In Acheson’s words, the “public presentation” should not target the Soviet 
Union specifically, instead it should emphasize “the concept of individual liberty…the 
protection of democracies everywhere.” It was not “a matter of vague do-goodism,” but 
rather “a matter of protecting our whole way of life and of protecting the nation itself.”34 
Jones’ recommendation, echoed by others, constituted the core of the early drafts that the 
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State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) and the White House prepared in 
the ensuing days.   
 A cynical interpretation of these proceedings might suggest that the Truman 
Administration simply exaggerated the democratic ideals behind the proposal in an effort 
to sell their message to the people. Certainly they were aware that the regime they were 
about to bail out had a tarnished record, but this is not enough to explain the intense 
ideological nature of the policy and its presentation to the public. As outlined in chapter 
two, there was an extensive precedent—set by many past administrations, congressmen, 
intellectuals, and reporters—of promoting  interventions on behalf of freedom and the 
protection of American values. The decision to define involvement in the Greek affair on 
behalf of freedom, therefore, reflected a pattern that had been present in American 
ideological thinking for almost two centuries; it was not a new message. What was new, 
however, was that Americans, for the first time, had the power to execute their 
ideological goals. 
 The official records, in any case, make it clear that none of Truman’s advisors in 
the cabinet or in the State Department seriously questioned whether aid to Greece was the 
right thing. Under Secretary of State Will Clayton, one of the most astute thinkers on 
U.S.-European affairs during this period, summed up the feeling when on March 5 he 
privately wrote to Marshal that the “United States must take up world leadership and 
quickly to avert world disaster.” Elaborating he argued that the people needed to know 
what was at stake. He was clear, however that, to “shock them, it is only necessary for the 
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President and the Secretary of State to tell the truth and the whole truth.” Freedom was 
under threat and the situation demanded American world leadership, he believed.35 
 Not everybody concurred with the ideological tone of the message being drafted 
by the SWNCC. George Kennan, soon to be head of Marshall’s new Policy Planning 
Staff, strongly opposed sending signals that might exacerbate the relationship with 
Moscow. Instead, he recommended a public announcement “confined largely to the needs 
of the Greek people.” 36 The Soviet leadership’s belief in the ideology of Marxism-
Leninism and the task of world revolution, did not, in Kennan’s view, necessitate that 
Americans up the ante. As he had explained in an address to the Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) in January, other Russian traits made it “perfectly possible for the 
U.S….to contain Russian power if it is…done courteously and in a non-provocative way, 
long enough so that there might come internal changes in Russia.”37 This view reflected 
his conviction that such matters ought to be left to diplomats rather than politicians. 
Regional experts, fluent in foreign languages and sensitive to various cultures, possessed 
a propensity for calm and negotiated solutions that often eluded elected men. 
Compromise was in the diplomat’s nature, he believed, but not in the elected 
politician’s.38  
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For all his brilliance, Kennan would likely have felt more at home in the 
eighteenth-and-nineteenth century European courts of diplomacy where foreign policy 
was conducted away from the public’s eye and from public opinion. He either never truly 
grasped the arrogance that accompanied American ideology and power or he was 
unwilling to grapple within that reality. The day before Kennan’s address to the CFR, 
Truman stressed in his State of the Union Address that global “stability can be destroyed 
when nations with great responsibilities neglect to maintain the means of discharging 
those responsibilities…We have a higher duty and a greater responsibility than the 
attainment of our own national security.” No matter what Kennan may have believed, 
Americans, including the President, found such a message far easier to embrace than one 
of calculated compromise. As Life magazine put it, the Soviet Union was “an idea as well 
as a country…we must win the billion-odd people in the grandstand to our side by a 
demonstration that ours is the better idea, the better system.”39   
This was in effect the message that Truman brought to Congress, to the American 
people, and to the world on March 12, 1947. He ignored the cautious approach favored 
by Kennan and delivered a grandiose speech that broadened the United States obligation 
from simply supporting Greece to protecting the entire world from tyranny. Although not 
a particularly gifted public speaker, Truman’s delivery was resolute. Asking Congress for 
four hundred million dollars in aid to Greece and Turkey to ensure the survival of those 
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countries as free nations, Truman insisted that among America’s primary objectives in 
the world was the “creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to 
work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with 
Germany and Japan. Our victory was won over countries which sought to impose their 
will, and their way of life, upon other nations.” Americans must remain committed “to 
help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against 
aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.” As Truman 
interpreted it,  
…nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is 
too often not a free one. One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and 
is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, 
guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from 
political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled 
press and radio; fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe 
that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are 
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.40 
 
Thus, Truman’s Doctrine made the protection of global liberty America’s mission to 
bear. The speech never mentioned the Soviet Union. The message was clear enough. At 
its core this speech was about the United States and its role in the world. It was a call for 
Americans to take up what Walt Whitman called “their task eternal.” Eventually this kind 
of language would be blamed for American interventions in Vietnam and elsewhere 
around the globe, though this was never something Truman foresaw. Truman did, 
however, consider his speech the major “turning point in American foreign policy.” The 
State Department’s Paul Nitze, the man who would later replace Kennan as head of the 
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Policy Planning Staff, recalled that the “whole atmosphere in Washington changed 
overnight.”41 Historians often present the effect of Truman’s speech in similar terms. 
Daniel Rodgers, for example, concludes that it defined America as the “free world” 
responsible for protecting the innocent from the totalitarian other.42 So it did. But if the 
idea of American free-world leadership became more pronounced after March 1947, the 
legacy upon which this declaration of American leadership rested went back all the way 
to the nation’s founding. If it represented a change in deed, it hardly represented one in 
thought. Presenting it as a revolution in U.S. foreign policy undervalues the extent to 
which the message reflected beliefs inherent in the American mind. Truman’s fusion of 
exceptionalism and duty allowed Americans to embrace the unlimited burden that he laid 
before them practically without hesitation. What is more, Americans, as shown below, 
rallied around the belief that the U.S., as one columnist summed it up, “is the key to the 
destiny of tomorrow; we alone may be able to avert the decline of Western civilization, 
and a reversion to nihilism and the dark ages.”43  
***** 
In his biography of Dean Acheson, Robert Beisner insists that Americans never had much 
faith in the United Nations, with Acheson possessing the least faith of all.44 John Fousek, 
in his cultural history of the early Cold War, argues instead that Americans thought of the 
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postwar world as needing either U.N. or American leadership. Both scholars are reading 
events after the fact.  Not only did Americans believe in the U.N. during its early years, 
they viewed it as an extension – not as an alternative – to U.S. values and policies. They 
sought for the United Nations to embody the globalization of the freedoms that Paine had 
dreamt of and that FDR had sought to create. This explains why the single greatest topic 
of debate in the aftermath of Truman’s speech was whether it was the place of the United 
States or of the United Nations to undertake the role the President had laid out. Apart 
from on the political fringes, few questioned whether the gauntlet thrown down to 
totalitarianism was just or necessary. In the end, the conclusion reached by most was, as 
Assistant Secretary of State Willard Thorp explained on NBC,  that only “in a world of 
free nations can the United Nations carry out the principles on which it was 
founded…Greece is a small country…In order to be free she needs help. We have 
proposed that the Congress of the United States authorize that help. An attack on freedom 
anywhere is an attack on free people everywhere.”45 
 The Truman administration was not giving up on the U.N.; the Greek case merely 
highlighted the organization’s immediate limitations. Testifying before the House 
Foreign Relations Committee on March 20, Acheson explained that the United States had 
taken on the role of provider in Greece, because even “if the project were not blocked by 
certain members” of the Security Council, the U.N. did not possess the funds, the force, 
nor the equipment to render emergency aid.46 One political cartoon depicted this view 
showing a powerful Uncle Sam holding up a newspaper with the headline “U.N. Lacks 
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Teeth.” The personification of America looks sternly at a little boy with a U.N. hat and 
only one small tooth. The cartoon’s caption reads, “It takes time to grow them.” On the 
same page, in a separate cartoon, a little boy flexes his small muscles and looks 
admiringly at the strong Uncle Sam as he carries the globe on his shoulders. Americans, 
as U.S. Ambassador Warren Austin explained to the Security Council on March 28 
regarded “it as an obligation under the Charter, as well as a matter of elementary self-
interest for every member of the United Nations to do its utmost to bring about a peaceful 
adjustment of any international situation before it become a threat to the peace.” The 
program he insisted was, of “an emergency and temporary character,” to serve only until 
the “United Nations and its related agencies” could assume responsibilities. Americans 
still believed in the fundamental ideals of the United Nations – a Gallup poll six month 
later confirmed that eighty three percent of Americans wanted an even stronger U.N. – 
but for now they did not have confidence in the organization’s immediate strength.47  
While most inside and outside of the government had come to accept this reality, 
many were still not convinced that the U.S. should step up in its place. In his diary, David 
Lilienthal recorded the “air is full of dispute and discussion over Truman’s bold proposal 
that we (not the United Nations but the United States on its own) move into Greece and 
in effect rebuild it and protect it from Soviet coercion.”48 In his evaluation of the situation 
at the end of the month, Joseph Jones agreed, concluding that the “largest basis of 
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criticism is the Administrations ‘failure’ to take the problem to the U.N.” This criticism 
was, he explained, “leveled not only by opponents, but by some supporters and by others 
who do not commit themselves on either side.”49 Among those who worried was Eleanor 
Roosevelt. Her stature in the country and the world had only risen in the aftermath of 
FDR’s death and she had, under Truman, become America’s most forceful advocate of 
the internationalization of human rights in the United Nations. She cherished the idea of 
an international order and she worried that Truman might not have given it adequate 
time. In a long personal letter, Truman explained to her that while he agreed with her 
assessment that the world needed “a democratic, constructive and affirmative program of 
wide scope,” he also believed that the U.S. had “helped to build” and had “made clear to 
all who [would] understand, the most comprehensive machinery for a constructive world 
peace based on free institutions and ways of life that has ever been proposed and adopted 
by a body of nations.” “I would urge,” he continued “that in evaluating the step we are 
about to take, we should keep clearly in mind all the effort this country has engaged in 
sincerity to make possible a peace economically, ideologically, and politically sound.”50 
The United States had created the United Nations to handle international disputes as an 
extension of American ideals and interests. If it could not, he believed it was America’s 
duty to go it alone. Truman had no regrets over his message to Congress.  
The debate over a U.S. versus a U.N. role was a topic of discussion in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee as well. While he backed the president’s request for aid to 
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Greece and Turkey, Committee Chairman Arthur Vandenberg professed uncertainty as to 
what it all meant. “If we falter in our leadership, what happens? It may endanger the 
peace of the world,” began the Michigan senator. The development left him pondering, 
however, for “if the peace of the world is not the jurisdiction of the United Nations 
fundamentally, and if our obligations to the United Nations do not cover the peace of 
world, I do not know what the hell they do cover, and I do not know why there should be 
a United Nations nor why we should be in it.” 51  The more committed Republican 
internationalist on the Committee, and Vandenberg’s close friend, Henry Cabot Lodge 
Jr., was less concerned about the U.N. role. In his view, the matter was simple. He had 
already publicly backed the President insisting that globally Americans were now 
“deeply involved from a material, spiritual, and an ideological standpoint.” In the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, he seconded Vandenberg’s support for Truman and rallied 
the others, exclaiming: “Now we have a choice…whether we are going to repudiate the 
president and throw the flag on the ground and stamp on it or whether we are not. It 
seems to me those are the horns on the dilemma we are on, and to me it is not a hard 
decision to make.”52 
Unsurprisingly, Ohio Senator Robert Taft shared few of these sentiments. 
Although he eventually voted for the aid package to Greece and Turkey, he did so with 
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much reluctance. He viewed the Truman Doctrine as a “complete departure from 
previous American policy” and reiterated that even if he did vote for aid, it would not 
mean carte blanche for the execution of similar policies elsewhere in the world.53 He 
worried that Truman might initiate an open-ended commitment to other nations as well. 
Walter Lippmann shared this concern, questioning whether this sentimental adaptation of 
moral principles might tempt Americans to “reinforce every theater, to fill every vacuum 
of power and restore at one and the same time the whole shattered economic life of 
Europe and Asia.”54 On this rare occasion, Henry Wallace shared Taft’s and Lippmann’s 
fears. Less than a month after his dismissal from the Truman administration in September 
1946, Wallace had taken over as editor of the New Republic. In early 1947, he presided 
over the formation of Progressive Citizens of America (PCA), an organization of left 
leaning liberals, trade unionists, laborers, as well as intellectuals and artists committed to 
challenging Truman’s foreign policies and improving conditions for the working class at 
home. In the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine he warned that following Truman’s 
speech “every reactionary government and every strutting dictator will be able to hoist 
the skull and bones and demand that the American people rush to his aid.”55 Time would 
prove Taft, Lippmann, and Wallace right.  
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Despite the prominence of all three men, opposition to Truman’s Doctrine never 
truly gathered steam. Though Wallace would shake up the presidential race in 1948, he 
was increasingly isolating himself on the left. A similar development was occurring on 
the right for Robert Taft and the posse of Republicans opposed to a growing global 
American role. Ever since the “march of the elephants,” as the GOP’s ballot box grab in 
November 1946 was sometimes called, an internal revolution had been underway within 
the party. Though Taft remained the most powerful Republican figure in the Senate, his 
influence had begun to slip markedly. With regards to foreign affairs in particular, he 
represented an ever narrower constituency of the GOP. Within a few short years, the 
internationalists, led by Lodge, would challenge Taft’s leadership, excise the last 
remnants of isolationism, and bring the GOP into the far more liberal and progressive 
Eisenhower era.56   
Historians should not mistake this limited opposition, however, as a sign of 
popular enthusiasm over the international developments. Even though Gallup reported 
that the American public supported the Truman Doctrine by a two-to-one margin, many 
supporters remained cautious and concerned about what might follow. Nonetheless, the 
national mood gradually swung the President’s way. The reason for this is that although 
Truman clearly extended American commitments, he was not – despite Taft’s claims – 
charting a new course for America. There was a genealogy to the Truman Doctrine’s 
language that Americans were easily swept away by. His insistence that only Americans 
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could remake the world order and deflect totalitarianism was ingrained in the national 
consciousness. The President tapped into an ideological strain that ran so deep that hardly 
any Americans questioned or even realized its presence. Consequentially, the public and 
the media rallied behind the President’s call that circumstances required American 
leadership on behalf of freedom. In the aftermath of the speech, the White House 
examined 225 editorials from across the country. Of these, more than half were 
completely in favor of the President’s suggestions, while only thirteen opposed. Letters 
and telegrams from the public to the White House reflected a similar trend, with at least 
three to one in favor of the President’s actions. 57  Opinion polls show slightly less 
enthusiasm, although they do indicate that approval increased over the course of 1947 
and 1948 as the public became more educated on the matter.58 Generally, Americans 
came to accept NBC’s early assessment that Truman’s appeal was “a plea to save the 
American way in the world.”59  
This acceptance of the Truman Doctrine by the America people helps explain why 
there was little chance that Congress would not vote in favor of the bill to aid Greece and 
Turkey. Far more than the fate of Greece and Turkey was at stake. Failure to stand up for 
freedom meant, in the eyes of many, being on the wrong side of history. In a uniquely 
American tone, recalling the ideological visions of the nation’s responsibility, 
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Congressmen rallied behind Truman’s message,  As Charles Eaton (R-NJ) explained, 
America was “face to face with the necessity of choosing – and accepting the 
responsibilities that go with that choice – between slavery and freedom as the foundation 
of new world civilization.” Walter Andrews (R-NY) went even further, claiming that he 
had almost favored “the organization of the necessary number of long-range flying atom 
bomb squadrons so as to enforce our will for justice in torn parts of the world.”60  
The influential Republican foreign policy expert, John Foster Dulles concurred. 
He had, as Life magazine reported it “called out again and again for more intellectual and 
moral vigor in the world leadership which history has thrust upon the U.S.”61 Dulles 
defined the struggle ahead as a titanic one. Even before the Truman administration came 
around to hold similar views, Dulles prophetically announced that once “the full 
implications of the Soviet system come to be better understood by the American 
people…it will revive in them the spirit which led their forebears to pledge their lives, 
their fortunes, and their sacred honor to secure their personal freedoms.” To Dulles, the 
battle with the Soviet Union, like earlier American wars, was for a way of life.62 Acheson 
too viewed the conflict as essentially a fight for ideas. It pitted a world that believed in 
“the worth of the individual, the preservation of individual rights and individual 
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enterprise” against the Soviet “police state…[and its] rigid control and discipline over the 
individual.”63  
The United States was not alone in its concerns about the Soviet Union and its 
Communist agenda; Western Europeans worried about the Communist threat as well. If 
anything, they were the ones in the line of fire. But it is telling that in stark contrast to the 
Americans, the Europeans – Churchill aside – never saw the Cold War as a fight for 
mankind’s progress. But Americans, the public and the Congress alike, remained 
convinced that it was their duty to protect the world from the spread of Soviet ideals. On 
May 9, 1947, the Republican controlled House of Representatives voted 287-107 in favor 
of Truman’s aid package to Greece and Turkey. The Senate followed suit, voting 63-23.  
***** 
The Truman Doctrine destroyed what was left of America’s one-world vision. 
Throughout the entire Cold War, the United States would never again fully trust that the 
United Nations could become the sole promoter of American values. Instead, the national 
rhetoric shifted to emphasize a world divided, a world that could be saved through 
American leadership alone. In the public, political, and even religious spheres, Americans 
turned against their former ally, viewing the state of the world as “us” against “them.” 
This dramatic alteration causes some historians to claim that the Truman Administration 
eagerly exaggerated the Communist threat to gain public support for its international 
objectives. These scholars interpret his rhetoric as more dramatized, antagonistic, and 
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often naïve than circumstances called for.64 Even Wilson Miscamble, a scholar largely 
favorable toward Truman, insists that that the “grandly universalist terms portraying the 
issue as a conflict between totalitarian repression and democratic freedom” was 
“primarily to pry funds from a parsimonious Congress.”65  
The thesis that Truman oversold the Cold War attracted particular attention from 
scholars writing after the Cold War ended. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Moscow’s industrial, scientific, technological, economic, and ideological shortcomings 
were exposed. In hindsight, such facts made it seem improbable that the Soviet Union 
was capable of inspiring the emotions and fears its existence stirred in the American mind 
during the four decades of the Cold War. It is equally inviting to conclude that Truman 
and subsequent administrations created a behemoth and frightened the American public 
into the Cold War. That conflict creates political hyperbole is a well-established fact but 
the argument can easily be pressed too far. Even if the Soviet Union does not appear to 
have constituted an existential threat during the Cold War’s early years, Moscow’s 
abandonment of the American-designed world order and its perceived ambitions caused 
Americans to view the Communists in just such a way. The idea that ideologically 
minded foes were bent on eradicating the American way of life had a deep tradition in 
American thought. Emotionally, socially, and ideologically it influenced how Americans 
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inside and outside of government responded to these developments and how they 
perceived threats.    
American historical patterns may help explain why feelings of national anxiety so 
seamlessly found their way into American national discourse in a way they, for example, 
never did in any European country. Shortly after Truman’s speech, Secretary of Labor 
Lewis Schwellenbach stated his support for an outright ban on the American Communist 
Party. The move, which prompted the Communist Party to send thirty dimes to 
Schwellenbach as a symbol of betrayal of labor values, was echoed shortly after by 
Arthur Vandenberg, Harold Stassen and many others. 66  The questionable 
constitutionality of this particular measure complicated matters, but, as it has before and 
since, bypassing at least some established civil liberties, nevertheless, proved surprisingly 
easy. President Truman made use of his presidential prerogative and, on March 21st, 
issued Executive Order no. 9835 which established a loyalty program to identify and 
expel communists working in the U.S. government. The order sought to exclude from 
federal employment anyone with a history of supporting any “foreign or domestic, 
association, movement, group or combination of persons which the Attorney General” 
designates “as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of 
acts of violence to deny to others their rights (my italics) under the Constitution.”67 The 
government showed no concern for the civil rights the law violated and even went so far 
as to claim that the law was aimed at protecting civil rights, not taking them away. The 
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opposite of course was true. As Lilienthal correctly wrote in his diary, in practical effect, 
“the usual rule that men are presumed innocent until proven guilty is reversed.”68 
Though the loyalty act has been roundly criticized by historians, it was neither 
surprising nor unpopular at the time of its introduction. It reflected a trope in American 
national self-perception that the freedoms upon which the nation had been founded are 
always likely to be under threats from outside and from within. As Stephanson explains 
it, a central part of American national self-perception has always been “the imperative of 
vigilance for the sake of preserving freedom.”69 The loyalty law, then, was simply an 
extension of this perception just as the attacks on suspected loyalists during the 
Revolutionary War, President Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus, the Wilson 
Administration’s crackdown on suspected German sympathizers and pacifists, the First 
Red Scare of the 1920s, and Franklin Roosevelt’s decision to intern Japanese-Americans 
during the Second World War had also been.70 Americans justified the threat, whether 
real or perceived, of Federal employees loyal to the Communist Party and the Soviet 
Union on the highly ideological notion that their actions were conspiratorial in nature and 
un-American at heart. Communism was believed to threaten the true America.  
This “other’s” perceived challenge to the American core helps explains why 
opposition, despite the nation’s commitment to civil rights, proved unable to effectively 
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challenge the loyalty programs. The editorial board at The Washington Post, for example, 
considered the creation of loyalty boards to test employees’ commitment “a fair and 
systematic method of dealing with a problem that has long called for vigorous and 
decisive action.” The newspaper concluded that no “impairment of constitutional rights 
of free speech will result from the executive order.” 71  The Supreme Court agreed, 
refusing to review a case in which a Federal Employee had lost his job because of his 
membership in a “Communist Front” organization. Progressive and labor groups 
protested but to no avail. The protests of union members, in particular, were fueled by a 
fear that the previously acceptable political organizations and labor groups they had been 
a part of during the war would soon come under scrutiny. They worried – rightly so, as 
events in the coming years would prove – that the loyalty law would quickly stretch 
beyond the walls of government and that they would be its targets.72  
Three days after the announcement of E.O. 9835, a former U.S. Ambassador to 
the Soviet Union and to France, William Bullitt, testified before the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities (HUAC). Bullitt, by now one of the loudest critics of the 
previous years’ attempts to work with Moscow, explained that Americans were indeed in 
an apocalyptic struggle. He warned the Committee that Moscow’s leadership was 
preparing for a final, inevitable war with the United States. Americans, he argued, found 
                                                 
71 “Loyalty Tests,” The Washington Post, March 24, 1945. “Loyalty Test,” The New York Times, March 23, 
1947. “President’s Order on Loyalty Hailed,” The New York Times, March, 23, 1947. 
72 “Truman Plans to Ask Purge Funds Soon,” The Washington Post, March 30, 1947. Less than two weeks 
after the issuance of Executive Order 9835, Attorney General Tom C. Clark drew up the so-called Attorney 
General's List of Subversive Organizations (AGLOSO) which became the litmus test for the allowed 
existence of any group, organization, or club in the country until President Richard Nixon abolished it in 
1974. 
 240 
themselves in a position comparable to that of France in 1936. They were the stronger 
military power, but a failure to take action against their obvious adversary would lead to 
certain defeat. Commenting on the domestic situation, Bullitt argued that the Communist 
Party of the United States was “composed of potential traitors” conspiring “to commit 
murder” through the liquidation of opposition for the sake of “ultimate dictatorship.” 
Echoing Kennan’s assessment to Byrnes from 1946, Bullitt concluded that if Stalin “had 
the atom bomb, it would already have been dropped on the United States.”73 Even if 
formally at peace, Communists were participants in a covert war against American ideals. 
It made a normal relationship with Moscow and those who sympathized with its mission 
impossible. 
***** 
Though the Truman Doctrine was initially aimed at justifying increased aid for Greece 
and Turkey, it soon became evident that it stretched well beyond crisis management in 
the Balkans. This stern reality found its most thoughtful, if unintended, expression in an 
article printed in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs. The author was listed as “X,” but 
it soon became common knowledge that George Kennan’s sharp pen hid behind that 
pseudonym. Originally written in January and approved for publication just before 
Truman’s speech in March, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” as Kennan entitled his 
piece, explained in clear language the political threat the Soviet Union posed to the 
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United States. 74  Like Kennan’s Long Telegram, the X-article focused primarily on 
explaining the threat Americans faced, rather than providing concrete policy 
recommendations for how to respond to it. As such, the article reflected that Kennan, at 
heart, was an intellectual rather than a policymaker. He brought ideas and concepts to 
foreign policy but, was not a natural executor or operator.  
“The Sources of Soviet Conduct” explained both the historical background behind 
Moscow’s motivations as well as the impact of Communist ideology on the Soviet 
regime’s foreign policy. Not unlike his contemporary Hannah Arendt, he believed 
Moscow’s global quest was driven by a combination of totalitarian ambitions and 
Communist convictions. Kennan expected the Soviet Union – as he  described in one of 
his many colorful metaphors – to spread its influence like “a fluid stream which 
moves…until it has filled every nook and cranny,” unless met “with some unanswerable 
force.” Accordingly, he recommended that the United States apply “counter-force at a 
series of constantly shifting geographical and political points” to contain Communism’s 
spread. He did not advocate military involvement against the Soviet Union, nor did he 
call for military alliances, as he would later feel forced to explain.75 Kennan argued that 
“the issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test of the overall worth of the 
United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States need 
only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as a 
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great nation.” He concluded, in a manner reminiscent of so many arguing before and after 
him, with a call to American leadership:   
[S]urely there was never a fairer test of national quality than this. In the light of 
these circumstances, the thoughtful observer of Russian-American relations will find 
no cause for complaint in the Kremlin's challenge to American society. He will 
rather experience a certain gratitude to a Providence which, by providing the 
American people with this implacable challenge, has made their entire security as a 
nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and accepting the 
responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them 
to bear.76 
 
As one recent reviewer of John Lewis Gaddis’ Kennan biography writes, this “patently 
dishonest curtsy to American exceptionalism was violently at odds with what Kennan 
believed.”77 And so it was. The language struck a stark contrast to Kennan’s voiced 
opposition to the Truman Doctrine and appeared, in fact, to be far more in tune with 
views of a world divided between good and evil, far more in tune with the covenant John 
Winthrop insisted the Puritans enter into almost four centuries earlier. This language may 
not have reflected Kennan’s true opinion, but it was an ode to Americans’ belief that the 
Soviet Union represented a challenge to their freedoms that they had been summoned to 
defend.  
 Too much can be read into this odd contradiction between Kennan’s accepted 
views of American foreign policy and the X-article’s ideological tone. Perhaps the article 
simply needs to be understood in its proper context. Kennan had written “The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct” months before the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. On its own, 
published in a journal with a professional readership and a small circulation, it is unlikely 
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that its message would have been blown out of context. But its delayed publication – 
purely a reflection of the publishing world’s pace – made it appear to be an endorsement 
of Truman’s views, an endorsement Kennan had never intended to give. The article set 
off a debate between Kennan and Walter Lippmann who in “Today and Tomorrow” fired 
off a series of critical rebuttals of Kennan’s conclusions. In truth, the debate was rather 
one-sided, since Marshall soon made it clear to Kennan that “planners don’t talk.” As the 
head of the Policy Planning Staff, Kennan was thereby sidelined from engaging with 
Lippmann publicly.78  
Lippmann concurred with the need for containing the Soviet Union, but he 
chastised Kennan, as he had Truman, for committing the U.S. to unlimited interventions 
around the world. He worried that sooner or later, regardless of how “undesirable” it 
might be, Americans would have to either “disown” less than democratic client states or 
bail them out if they were to remain true to their word. Rather than accept open-ended 
commitments, Lippmann claimed that the United States ought to support the 
neutralization of Germany instead. Such a move, he argued, would limit the pressure on 
Moscow in Europe, lead to the withdrawal of the Red Army from Eastern Europe and the 
American military from the West and, by extension, resolve the European political crisis. 
The Soviet Union was, in Lippmann’s misguided interpretation, driven by traditional 
power politics much more so than by totalitarian desires for control or Marxist ideals. If 
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the U.S. simply pledged itself to containing Communism in Europe through political and 
economic support, he rather naively prophesized, Moscow and Washington would 
eventually reach an agreement on mutual disengagement.79  
 The publication of the X-article, an extended excerpt of which soon appeared in 
the widely read Life and Reader’s Digest, made Kennan feel “like one who has 
inadvertently loosed a large boulder from the top of a cliff and now helplessly witnesses 
its path of destruction in the valley below.” 80  He lamented that the Truman 
Administration along with many others – including Lippmann – had misunderstood his 
argument. The irony was that Kennan shared Lippmann’s view of Europe as the central 
Cold War battleground, just as he agreed that the conflict should not be viewed as a 
crusade to save an American way of life. This much is evident from PPS/1, the first 
formal recommendation prepared by the new Policy Planning Staff under Kennan’s 
guidance. Submitted to Marshall in May, PPS/1 suggested a more cautious policy than 
what appeared to be on display in the Foreign Affairs piece. The paper proposed 
substantial financial aid to Western Europe not as a supplement to the ideology of the 
Truman Doctrine, but as a means to supplant it. “Steps should be taken,” Kennan argued, 
“to clarify what the press has unfortunately come to identify as the ‘Truman Doctrine’, 
and to remove [its] damaging impressions which are current in large sections of 
American public opinion.” In particular, the paper contended, new aid proposals should 
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clarify that the Truman Doctrine was not “a blank check to give economic and military 
aid to any area in the world where the communists show signs of being successful.”81  
 A month later, at the National War College, Kennan argued that the World War II 
strategy of total war and its demands for “unconditional surrender” had left the victorious 
powers with “problems and responsibilities” previously unheard of in warfare. Limited 
“military action and limited post-hostilities commitments,” he believed, might well have 
been in the national interest. Perhaps, he pondered, “all our plans have been too 
ambitious. Perhaps we should never have tried to organize all the world into one 
association for peace, but should have been more modest…Perhaps the whole idea of 
world peace has been a premature, unworkable grandiose form of daydreaming.”  The 
goal of the war, he believed, should have been to restore a workable balance of power. 
According to Kennan, excessive moralism and legalism had no place in U.S. foreign 
policy.82 This argument revealed the gap that existed between Kennan’s intellectual view 
of international affairs and the reality of American ideology’s impact on U.S. policy both 
during and after the Second World War. Kennan’s caution, however wise, simply went 
against the grain of how Americans perceived their postwar role. If the Cold War had  
been solely about the containment of Communism, Kennan’s recommendations might 
have become established policy. To Americans, however, it was about something deeper. 
It was a war to spread ideas. It was a conflict for an Americanized world order, as much 
as it was a conflict against international Communism. 
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 In this context, it is unsurprising that the Truman Administration adopted 
Kennan’s proposed aid package to Western Europe while simultaneously ignoring his 
suggestion that they abandon the Truman Doctrine’s commitments. On June 5, at Harvard 
University, Marshall presented the outlines of what would become the European 
Recovery Program (ERP). Europe’s economic plight and the social crisis that 
accompanied it, he explained, demanded American aid to secure the “the revival of a 
working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social 
conditions in which free institutions can exist.” In a rebuttal of UNRRA, Marshall 
clarified that any “assistance that this Government may render in the future should 
provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in 
the task of recovery will find full co-operation…Any government which maneuvers to 
block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us.” 83  The message 
reflected the by now familiar American view that desolation provided breeding ground 
for totalitarianism and that the instability in Europe made it susceptible to Communism 
just as it had been susceptible to fascism in the previous decade. Economic recovery was 
America’s remedy. Neither the United Nations nor the IBRD were capable, at present, of 
providing the funding necessary to implement such a remedy. The feeling was, as Will 
Clayton expressed it, that “the United States must run this show.”84 
Despite the Truman Doctrine’s division of the world between free and totalitarian 
states, the American offer of aid included all of Europe. In reality, of course, the Truman 
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administration had no desire to fund anything east of the iron curtain. Marshall had at 
first hesitated to include the Communist nations of Eastern Europe in the offer, but both 
Kennan and Charles Bohlen, correctly as it turned out, assured him that Stalin would 
never accept the American aid. The United States made it clear that participation in what 
was soon referred to as the Marshall Plan would require inquiries into each recipient 
nation’s resources, industrial capabilities, gold reserves, and the establishment of 
stabilized and convertible national currencies.85  Moscow had already rejected the similar 
conditions required by the IMF or the IBRD, and Kennan and Bohlen were convinced 
they would do so again. To preempt any accusations that the initiative was somehow a 
product of American imperialism, a second American requirement – also expected to 
ensure Soviet rejection of the aid program – demanded that the European nations unite to 
request aid, ensuring that any agreement would reflect extensive European cooperation 
toward joint recovery. Americans would enter into no bilateral agreements.  
As the Americans expected, these demands caused Stalin to refrain from 
participating in the aid program. On his order, all Eastern European nations followed suit 
despite their desperate need for aid. Stalin – even when presented with an olive branch of 
massive financial aid—did not want to reveal data that would have exposed the Soviet 
Union’s financial weaknesses and low production levels caused by the extensive war 
damages. In addition, he was unwilling to liberalize trade practices or monetary policies, 
as doing so would threaten his grasp on power in the Soviet Union and particularly in 
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Eastern Europe. The Soviets, in response, hyperbolically insisted that the ERP was a 
blatant American attempt to control Europe politically and economically. In this they 
were wrong, though the program unquestionably connected the U.S. to Western Europe 
in an unprecedented manner. But if Stalin believed that the ERP threatened to remove the 
cordon sanitaire they deemed necessary to ensure their security and their ideology, he 
was right.86 Western aid and the accompanying demands presented above, would likely 
have made Communism in Central and Eastern Europe unsustainable. 
Cold War historians now unanimously accept that the Marshall Plan was designed 
to be rejected by Moscow. The revisionist argument that the ERP primarily served to 
support American capitalism, however, falls short. If so, why was it introduced only in 
1947 and not in 1945? Furthermore, if Washington had wanted to control Europe 
economically and politically, the United States would have insisted on bilateral 
agreements rather than on a universal agreement with the whole of Europe. Bilateral 
negotiations would have given the U.S. far greater leverage over individual countries. 
Instead, the Americans pressed for the establishment of what became the Committee for 
European Economic Cooperation, which later became the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC).87 The predictable outcome was the creation of a strong 
European political and economic bloc capable of challenging American economic 
hegemony in the long run. The United States pressed in hopes that the European bloc 
would thrive as democracies able to combat Communism on their own and because a 
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democratic, liberal Europe fit a model Americans had always deemed to be in their 
interest. The non-Communists European powers did not disappoint; despite the absence 
of the Soviet Union, they dove into intense collaboration on how best to use American 
aid to rebuild Europe. In September, the sixteen remaining states outside of the Soviet 
bloc jointly submitted their request for aid. Over the next half decade, aid worth a total of 
thirteen billion dollars flowed into Europe from Washington.88  
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan laid the ground for what was perhaps 
the greatest ideological American postwar success: the transformation of the European 
democracies into an American led and organized system. The united, capitalist, 
democratic Europe of the modern day is often taken for granted to such an extent that 
scholars overlook the tremendous American achievement that it was to guide these 
nations through their political and economic transformation. Apart from the highly tense 
conditions created by Europe’s nineteenth century balance-of-power system, the 
continent had known no serious collaboration since the creation of the nation state. But, 
laced with exceptionalist visions for what Americans perceived the world should be, the 
U.S. commitment to Western Europe revolutionized the continent to such an extent that it 
was unrecognizable from any other time in history. The real “revolution of the Cold War” 
was, as Westad correctly argues, “that the United States over a fifty-year period 
transformed its main capitalist competitors according to its own image.”89  
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In his account of the late 1940s, only published posthumously in 1993, later 
Director of the CIA, Allen Dulles explained that the Marshall Plan was not an exercise in 
philanthropy. It was pursued first and foremost because it was believed to be “the only 
peaceful course now open to us which may answer the communist challenge to our way 
of life.” 90  Such views demonstrated that both Kennan and Lippmann’s rationale for 
limited American commitment was not only out of touch with the needs of Western 
Europe, it was out of touch with the manner in which Americans embraced their global 
role. Across journals, newspapers, the halls of Congress, and the White House, people 
spoke of bringing American ideas to the continent of Europe. In an extensive Saturday 
Evening Post article, one columnist expertly explained both the world’s need for 
American commitment as well as the American responsibility to fulfill it:  
“[T]he problem is that the Communists are offering the Europeans an answer to their 
misery. It may be the wrong answer but many people think it is better than no 
answer at all...Ideas will have to be fought with ideas. It is hard to convey to 
Americans that the people of Europe are more starved for ideas than for bread, but it 
is nevertheless true...[the people of Europe]…are eagerly and desperately waiting for 
the word from Uncle Sam. Before they go along with the policy of the United States, 
they want see it implemented with ideas.91  
 
On this issue, few political figures were more outspoken than Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge. Even while the Truman Administration tried to publicly emphasize the economic 
benefits of the ERP in an effort to increase Congressional support, Lodge viewed the 
policy largely in ideological terms. He took the Senate floor more than three hundred 
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times throughout the spring of 1948 in defense of the ERP. Defying his own Party 
leadership, Lodge argued that Americans needed to make democracy an article of export 
and was convinced that the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the vehicles to 
do so. A World War II veteran, Lodge served in Europe through the end of 1945. The 
months he spent there impressed upon him the danger of Communist ideas. He saw the 
Marshall Plan as the remedy for the ills of Communism, but also understood that 
financial aid was of little value without a strong American ideological commitment to 
democracy’s defense.  
In speeches, articles, town-hall meetings, and on the Senate floor, he worked 
tirelessly to promote the President’s plan. He recognized that an initiative of this nature 
would need to be explained to the American people, but he remained confident that the 
measure would sell itself if the public was properly educated on the impetus behind it. 
The American people needed to understand the conditions in Europe and the dangers 
associated with the rise of Communist influence in the region.92 At a town hall meeting in 
December, Lodge explained to the crowd that anything less than a complete American 
dedication to Europe could result in a “Marshall Plan in reverse…with the Americans the 
money-spenders and the Communists the vote-getters.” Europe would unite, he declared 
a month later, if America took the lead: “We should use our influence to achieve a 
voluntary integration and unity in Europe in which tariff barriers are removed, financial 
                                                 
92 Interview with Harold Stein, August 7, 1952. HSTL, Harry B. Price Papers, Box 1. 
 252 
stability and a solid currency are assured…This is the best hope for avoiding the 
recurrence of a future European war.”93 
Similar messages were advanced by a number of private groups with close 
connections to the American political establishment. The Citizens’ Committee for the 
Marshall Plan had the backing of men like former Secretaries of War Henry Stimson and 
Robert Patterson as well as the prominent intellectual, Clark Eichelberger. Another 
significant contributor was Arthur W. Page, a member of the Council on Foreign 
Relations and an influential public relations specialist. He believed that the American 
mission was “to get the Russian out of Western Europe” – which presumably meant 
Germany, Austria, and perhaps Czechoslovakia and – and ensure that “our ideas will 
control the world.”94  
*****  
The boulder that Kennan had loosed from the top of the cliff – in the form of the X-
Article – continued its unintended path into 1948 and early 1949 as these American 
commitments overseas intensified. Not coincidentally, this increased global immersion 
corresponded with Kennan’s declining influence. The growing gap between Kennan’s 
view and the nation’s view of America’s global role was made clear with PPS/13, a 
recommendation Kennan delivered to Marshal in early November. The paper presented a 
swift overview of American policies around the world and, as Kennan has done in the 
past, urged cautious maneuvering on America’s part. Accordingly, he recommended that 
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countering the Soviets should only be done in areas of America’s choosing and interest. 
PPS/13 was bereft of any of the ideological views that had come to characterize the many 
public and official expressions of American foreign policy. In short, it was entirely out of 
touch with America’s evolving role in the world.95 
 Events in Germany provide but one example of this. The American decision to 
include the Western zones of Germany under the ERP had exacerbated the international 
climate and drawn a furious response from the Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. 
Moscow’s criticism was valid in the sense that the major powers had not yet resolved 
Germany’s future, but the Americans had run out of patience in their wait for such an 
agreement. Ever since the rejection of the Morgenthau Plan, Americans had – in contrast 
to Moscow – come to view a healthy Germany as central to Europe’s recovery. The 
historian Carolyn Eisenberg argues that this realization meant that U.S. officials never did 
much to work out an agreement with Moscow over Germany’s future, but in truth there is 
little evidence that an accord with Stalin was ever possible.96 After all, it was Soviet 
hostility and delay that had inspired Clay’s pressure for greater zonal integration which, 
as highlighted in chapter four, Moscow had rejected as early as 1946. The Soviet Union 
wanted an agreement over Germany only if they could control the shape it took. In late 
1947, the Western powers took the initiative and, with the acknowledgement that the 
Cold War was now underway, abandoned the primary principle of Allied cooperation on 
Germany: the idea that the defeated power should be treated as a single unit. In a move 
                                                 
95 PPS/13, Resume of World Situation, November 6, 1947, FRUS, 1947, vol. I, pp. 770-777. 
96  Carolyn W. Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 314, 355, 485. 
 254 
that would draw the beginning of the demarcation lines between east and west, the U.S. 
and Great Britain also began preparing for the eventuality of a divided Germany and for 
the establishment of a West German democratic state. These preparations included 
currency reforms in the western zones that were intended to stabilize the economy, instill 
confidence in the currency, ignite production, and curtail black market trade.97 
Stalin viewed these developments with grave concern, fearing that the new 
western currency would flow into the Communist zone through Berlin and compromise 
his control of the east. In an attempt to force the Western powers to either reconsider their 
plans for a capitalist, independent Germany in the west or, at the very least, abandon 
control of their zones in Berlin, Stalin chose to assert his authority the one area where he 
had maximum leverage. In the summer of 1948 Stalin blockaded Berlin, leaving the 
citizens of West Berlin trapped and with no supplies. The move was a catastrophic 
miscalculation on Stalin’s part. The story of Truman’s eleven-month American airlift of 
goods to the isolated citizens of West Berlin does not need to be retold here.98 What is 
worth pointing out, however, is that the Berlin incident drew the Americans significantly 
closer to Western Europe and in the process established a commitment that Washington, 
regardless of the potential consequences, refused to abandon for the next forty years. In 
the same way Greece had the year before, Berlin came to symbolize Americans’ view of 
a world divided between the free and the enslavers. Winston Churchill felt the same. 
“There can be no doubt,” the former Prime Minister asserted, “that the Communist 
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government of Russia has made up its mind to drive us…and other allies out…and turn 
the Russian zone in Germany into one of the satellite states under the role of totalitarian 
terrorism.”99 He wanted the western powers to stand firm on Germany, and the Truman 
administration willingly obliged. 
 Kennan was of a different opinion. In November 1948, he submitted to Marshall a 
carefully attuned suggestion for a more conciliatory policy, advising the administration to 
seek a broad settlement on Germany. Based on what he deemed to be the national 
interest, Kennan’s policy proposal balanced risk and reward and carefully sought to avoid 
what his fellow realist, Hans Morgenthau, later scornfully referred to as the “the pitfalls” 
of “sentimental philosophy” that both men believed characterized much of the Truman 
administration’s policy.100 Like Lippmann had argued the previous year, Kennan viewed 
mutual withdrawal and the subsequent neutralization of Germany as a productive path 
forward. The proposal, which was entirely out of tune with the course of U.S. foreign 
policy and with the President’s view of America’s national interest, was dismissed 
outright by John D. Hickerson, the Director of the State Department’s Office of European 
Affairs, as well as by Clay and Charles Bohlen.101  
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 The widespread rejection of Kennan’s recommendations for Germany reflected 
Americans’ growing concern over Soviet actions in Europe. In February, almost five 
months before the Berlin blockade, Soviet-dominated Communists took political control 
of Czechoslovakia. Kennan had been expecting this development for months. He 
considered it a defensive “response to the success of the Marshall Plan.”  His realpolitik 
led him to consider it an acceptable defeat since it was not, in his mind, the beginning of 
a Soviet assault on Western Europe.102 Americans in general, it turned out, did not concur 
with that assessment. Soviet actions in Europe exposed democracy’s frailty, leading 
many to argue for a firmer American commitment. The Saturday Evening Post, for 
example, thundered that the Communist empire was on the move while America was 
hesitant. “The longer we are taking making up our minds, the more powerful the 
Communist appeal in Europe.” A month later, an editorial in the same magazine asserted 
that as “more lights go out in Europe, it is time Americans began asking themselves how 
much this country [the United States] has been softened up for a future communist coup.” 
Criticizing Henry Wallace – who was challenging Truman as the progressive candidate in 
the upcoming presidential election – the editors explained that “humanity is faced with 
the elemental issue: whether communist tyranny shall submerge the earth or men shall 
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win the desperate fight to remain free.” 103 Doing nothing was not an option. Doing 
nothing smacked of appeasement. 
The Prague coup only added to Washington’s ever increasing concern over the 
expanding Communist influence in France, Italy, Scandinavia, and elsewhere. The Italian 
situation appeared particularly precarious, because the Communists and socialists had 
emerged as joint electoral favorites. Somewhat hyperbolically, but well in tune with the 
American perception of what was at stake in Europe, Time magazine compared the 
significance of the Italian election to that of Paul Revere’s ride. In a manner that would 
become customary for many Americans during the Cold War, the magazine deluded itself 
into believing that everything hinged on  one particular event. “Failure,” in Rome, by 
which Time meant a victory for the leftist coalition, would bring Europe “to the brink of 
catastrophe.” The National Security Act’s recent authorization of government funds for 
covert operations unleashed the newly formed CIA, which in turn heavily funded the 
eventual conservative victors.104  
Events in Czechoslovakia also shook public and political confidence across 
Western Europe. No matter how foreseeable it may have appeared to George Kennan, the 
collapse of Czechoslovakian democracy and the subsequent murder or suicide of Foreign 
Minister Jan Masaryk pushed Europeans from mere unease to outright fright. On March 
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17, 1948, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries concluded the Brussels Pact to form 
the Western Union, which pledged each member to defend each other from external 
military action. Even united, the democracies’ depleted militaries still stood little chance 
of holding the line in a potential war against the several hundred Soviet divisions that 
were stretched across Eastern Europe. As early as December 1947, the British Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Bevin, had broached the idea of American military support during 
conversations with Hickerson in London. To the State Department official, Bevin 
presented an unfinished illustration of circles outlining a hypothetical military 
relationship. As Hickerson later recalled it, there “was one circle, a tight one. Then they 
wanted another circle taking in the [eventual] Brussels Pact countries and the U.S. and 
Canada, not quite as tightly drawn, but still a circle to bring us into a collective defense 
arrangement.”105 
 Although the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which emerged out of 
Bevin’s proposal, would formally be created within the principles of the United Nations, 
which authorized the establishment of regional defense pacts, it only further underlined 
that the United States had finally given up on the U.N. as the enforcer of security. This 
drew opposition from men like Taft who opposed increased commitments overseas. 
Kennan too was opposed, considering it disproportionate to the Soviet threat in Europe 
and an unnecessary escalation of tension. As on the issue of Germany, he believed the 
American policy was too inflexible. But he, along with Taft, was in the minority.  A 
military alliance was needed, John Hickerson asserted, regardless of “whether entangling 
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alliances have been considered worse than original sin since George Washington’s time.” 
Dean Acheson, who in January 1949 would replace George Marshall as Secretary of 
State, shared Hickerson’s view. The opinion of these two men reflected, as Beisner 
explains, the intensifying position within the United States that it was no longer enough 
for the west to be “strong enough to contain [italics in original] the Kremlin.” Americans 
wanted the west to win the Cold War.106 This position left Kennan increasingly out in the 
cold. He and contemporary realists never fully valued that the American response to the 
European cries for help – what Geir Lundestad has called “invitations” – was not merely 
an effort to save the Europeans. It was a series of “conscious and comprehensive attempts 
at changing Europe (and Japan [see chapter six]) in the direction of U.S. ideas and 
models.”107 
Under the ominous cloud of events in Berlin, Czechoslovakia, and Italy the 
already limited congressional opposition to the Marshall Plan dissipated by the time it 
finally came to a vote in the spring. Even Robert Taft reluctantly voted for the measure, 
though he dismissed any notion that the measure represented a U.S. commitment to the 
Western European states: “If I vote for the bill,” he insisted, “it will be with the 
understanding that there is no…obligation, that there is no contract with recipient 
countries, that they are not our partners.” Whether he truly believed this outcome was 
possible or simply wanted to avoid the reality of the situation is unclear. Regardless, the 
Economic Aid Act of 1948, as the Marshall Plan was formally called, passed with only 
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17 opposing votes in the Senate and a mere 74 in the House. Whatever men like Taft and 
Kennan – who otherwise had little in common – hoped for, American commitments were 
expanding not contracting.108  
***** 
No sooner had the ink dried on the ERP legislation than Senator Henry Cabot Lodge 
launched a similar campaign on behalf of NATO legislation. In his mind it was all 
connected: ideological commitments, financial aid, and military commitment. Europeans 
needed to believe in the U.S. commitment. He asserted that the “the Christian concept of 
the dignity of man is the strongest revolutionary force in the world. But because we lack 
imagination and understanding, we have allowed the materialistic and brutal verbiage of 
Communism to gain a greater export currency than our own belief which springs from 
eternal sources.” He concluded that the “fight is fundamentally one for men’s minds. The 
effort must, therefore, be made by ideas which appeal to the aspirations of men’s 
souls.”109  
Lodge was one of many who now brought religion into the fight. In August of the 
previous year, in correspondence with Pope Pius XII, President Truman had gone so far 
as to enlist the Holy See in freedom’s fight. He believed the relationship between the 
American Government, the American people, and the Pope had the potential to contribute 
“profoundly” to the creation of a “moral world order,” and he was certain “that those who 
do not recognize their responsibility to Almighty God cannot meet their full duty toward 
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fellow men.”110 Harry Truman was a Baptist, but he did not consider the Cold War to be 
a conflict between Christianity and Communism. Neither, indications are, did most 
Americans, although many regarded it as a deeply spiritual affair. Truman did, however, 
view Christianity as the foundation of the American way of life. It supported free 
enterprise, free will, republican government, and individual rights. “Religious morality 
stood at the center of his world view…for without faith morals could not exist, and 
without morality there could be no peace,” Andrew Preston accurately asserts. As 
Truman wrote to the influential religious leader Jesse Bader, the “alternative” to the 
“annihilation of civilization” was religion. “Religion alone has the answer to humanity’s 
twentieth century cry of despair.”111 This invocation of faith served, at times, as a Cold 
War tactic, but as Stephen Whitfield and David Foglesong have shown, it would be 
misleading to imply that faith did not influence the American Cold War mindset. In his 
work on the American mission to bring liberty to Russia, Foglesong emphasizes that 
during the beginning of the Cold War “the invocation of religious themes reflected 
deeply felt convictions [among people] raised during the ‘Third Great Awakening’ of 
1890-1920, when Americans had set out to evangelize the world.”112   
 As 1948 drew to a close, fear, emotions, instinct, determination, and faith merged 
with Americans’ longstanding ideological beliefs of an exceptional nation. In November, 
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Truman won a tight election against the former Republican Governor of New York, 
Thomas Dewey. The election was fought largely on domestic issues, as neither Dewey 
nor Strom Thurmond, who represented the States’ Rights Party, presented much criticism 
of the President’s Cold War foreign policies.113 The only serious challenge to Truman’s 
foreign policy came from Henry Wallace’s Progressive Party. Wallace had gained 
popularity in 1947, but his campaign lost momentum amidst his support for greater 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, his criticism of the Truman Doctrine, and the formal 
endorsement granted to his campaign by the American Communist Party. The American 
people believed the time for partnership with Moscow was over. The National Security 
Council did as well. In late November, the NSC informed Truman that Soviet ideological 
“behavior clearly demonstrates that the ultimate objective of the USSR is the domination 
of the world.” Therefore, the primary U.S. objective, according to the NSC, was now “to 
reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat 
to the peace, national independence and stability to the world family of nations.”114 
 Harry Truman concurred with the NSC’s call for mission. On January 20, 1949 he 
addressed the American people for the first time as President in his own right. On 
Acheson’s recommendation, Clark Clifford had excised the most divisive ideological 
language from the speech, but it was still plenty powerful in its final form.115 Truman left 
no doubt as to what was at stake in the world or how the United States interpreted the 
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struggle ahead. It is telling that his inaugural address was entirely about foreign policy. 
“The American people,” he explained, “stand firm in the faith which has inspired this 
Nation from the beginning…We believe that all men have a right to freedom of thought 
and expression…that all men are equal because they are created in the image of God.” 
Declaring it an American purpose to make their dream of freedom the world’s dream, 
Truman warned that free nations found “themselves directly opposed by a regime with 
contrary aims and a totally different concept of life...[and] a false philosophy…That 
philosophy is communism.” In the two preceding years, the Soviet Union had challenged 
the American designed world order. But Truman did not despair. He claimed that the 
Soviet challenge had only made Americans stronger in its test of their 
“courage…devotion to duty, and [their] concept of liberty.” The American commitment 
to its role as the leader of the free world, he declared, was now absolute.116 The extent of 
that commitment was soon to be tested, as the Cold War expanded from Europe to the 
globe. 
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6. America in the World: From Point Four to the Korean War  
Harry S Truman began 1949 in a buoyant mood. Collectively, the Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, and the impending establishment of NATO appeared to have stabilized the 
European situation. Even the Western European Communist parties that had seemed to be 
credible ballot- box contenders during the early postwar years now largely appeared to be 
on the defensive. Domestically, Truman felt confident as well. He treated his surprising 
victory over Thomas Dewey as a mandate to fulfill what Franklin Roosevelt’s programs 
had begun at home and abroad. On January 5, reporting on the state of the Union, the 
President presented an ambitious agenda to the American people. In casting their vote for 
him, the voters had confirmed his belief that 
poverty is just as wasteful and just as unnecessary as preventable disease. We have 
pledged our common resources to help one another in the hazards and struggles of 
individual life. We believe that no unfair prejudice or artificial distinction should bar 
any citizen of the United States of America from an education, or from good health, 
or from a job that he is capable of performing…We must spare no effort to raise the 
general level of health in this country. In a nation as rich as ours, it is a shocking fact 
that tens of millions lack adequate medical care. We are short of doctors, hospitals, 
nurses. We must remedy these shortages.  
 
Historians often think of the Fair Deal, as Truman’s economic reform program became 
known, exclusively in terms of domestic policy. The policy’s underlying belief, however, 
mirrored ideas that extended well beyond America’s borders. Echoing his faith in 
Roosevelt’s New Deal for the world, Truman insisted that “the driving force behind our 
progress is our faith in our democratic institutions. That faith is embodied in the promise 
of equal rights and equal opportunities which the founders of our Republic proclaimed to 
their countrymen and to the whole world.” He was “confident that the Divine Power 
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which has guided us to this time of fateful responsibility and glorious opportunity will not 
desert us now.”1  
 It was exactly this kind of language and commitment that worried George 
Kennan.  “[T]he shadows which fall on all of us, these days, are so huge and dark, and so 
unmistakable in portent, that they clearly dwarf all that happens among us individually,” 
he wrote in a long letter to Dean Acheson on the state of American foreign policy shortly 
before Truman’s speech. Contemplating his own future, Kennan explained to the 
incoming Secretary of State that if he was to continue in government service, he needed 
assurances that Americans were not “just bravely paddling the antiquated raft of U.S. 
foreign policy upstream, at a speed of three miles an hour, against a current which is 
making four.” Though melancholy was not an unusual state of mind for George Kennan, 
America’s role in the world worried the Director of the Policy Planning Staff.  In the 
second Truman Administration, Kennan wanted “a new modesty, a new humility, in the 
conduct of foreign policy, - a modesty which eschews both the arrogance of trying to ‘go 
it alone’ and the neurotic satisfaction of striking idealistic attitudes.” There was no room, 
he insisted, “for self-delusion and for lofty pronouncements about peace and 
democracy.”2  
Kennan continued to define Moscow as just another great power that should be 
assessed and dealt with based solely on its political, economic, and military policies; 
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concerns of morality ought not to guide or define Washington’s approach to the Soviet 
Union. Though he certainly must have recognized that the currents were against him, 
Kennan’s hope of American humility in world affairs illustrated just how much he 
continued to underestimate the depth of the motivations that had inspired the Truman 
Doctrine and the emotions its visions had stirred among Americans. Far more than a mere 
policy, the President’s declaration had reflected an American state of mind. This was 
never reversible in the manner Kennan now suggested. Contrary to his hopes, the United 
States continued to form new commitments around the world and began to strengthen 
those that had already been established. The fear that Communism threatened the 
American way of life at home and abroad – along  with Americans’ strong sense of 
mission – created a perception of the country’s role in the world that left little space, 
geographical or psychological, for the balance of power approach to the Cold War that 
Kennan and other Cold War realists favored.  
Historical and cultural consciousness led Americans to think of international 
affairs in terms of moral universals and global commitments. In a manner that was never 
replicated by the United States’ democratic allies in Europe, Americans adopted the 
mentality that democracy’s survival in the world was their responsibility. The most 
powerful demonstration of this belief came in the National Security Council’s assessment 
of the international situation following the loss of America’s atomic monopoly and the 
Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. A normal power would likely have reacted 
to these shifts in the international balance of power with some degree of 
acknowledgement and accommodation. Ideological propensities, however, did not allow 
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for such a balanced recalibration of U.S. global views. In a language that encapsulated 
not only America’s Cold War, but many of the nation’s former and future conflicts as 
well, the top secret NSC-68 report saw two faiths at war for the future of mankind. It 
described a Soviet “design” on the world against an American “purpose.” The document 
epitomized American exceptionalist ideology. It spoke of a historical mission to save 
mankind from the slavery of tyrants who threatened to destroy the American mission. By 
June 1950, global events seemed to prove all of these prophecies correct as the Cold War 
turned hot in the Far East. 
.***** 
Although the Soviet Union’s acquisition of the atomic bomb, the declaration of the 
People’s Republic of China, and the outbreak of the Korean War had not yet come to 
pass when Truman was sworn in as President for the second time on January 20, 1949, 
his inaugural address nevertheless emphasized the tension of the Cold War. In a speech 
devoted entirely to foreign policy, Truman denounced the “the false philosophy” of 
Communism. Its global threat, he insisted, made the United States’ democratic mission 
more necessary than ever. He was adamant, however, that the strength of America rested 
not solely in its democratic roots or in its military power but also in its humanitarianism, 
philanthropic traditions, and support for human rights. According to Truman, the Cold 
War could still be won without firing a shot.  
As if to underline that he was the true heir of Franklin Roosevelt, Truman outlined 
a decisive American global mission. “The old imperialism-exploitation for foreign 
profit,” the President explained, “has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a 
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program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair-dealing…Democracy 
alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant 
action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their ancient enemies- 
hunger, misery, and despair.” Truman held that it was the United States’ responsibility to 
reverse a global situation where more than half the people of the world were victims of 
disease, lived with inadequate food supplies, and were faced with “primitive and 
stagnant” economies. “For the first time in history,” he insisted,  
humanity possess the knowledge and skills to relieve the suffering of these people. 
The United States is pre-eminent among nations in the development of industrial and 
scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use for 
assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical 
knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. I believe that we should 
make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical 
knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life. And, in 
cooperation with other nations, we should foster capital investment in areas needing 
development. Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their 
own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and 
more mechanical power to lighten their burdens.3 
 
In effect, Truman advocated attaching a modernization program to the Doctrine that bore 
his name. Calling for the United Nations to participate in the Point Four program, as it 
soon became known, the President insisted that this “must be a worldwide effort for the 
achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.” The leadership Truman assumed for the 
United States in this program reflected Luce’s vision of the “American Century.” It was a 
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“Fair Deal for the World.” 4  As had Luce, the President declared it America’s 
responsibility to be more than the arsenal of democracy; Americans needed to be the 
good Samaritans of the world.5  Influenced by both FDR and former First Lady Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who only the previous month had been the driving force behind the 
establishment of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Truman set 
in motion a program to help lift up those who had not yet reached the same stage of 
societal, technological, and educational development as Americans.6   
Prior to 1949, American involvement in international relief work and 
philanthropy had been limited to temporary aid initiatives, such as the American supply 
of foodstuffs and other aid during the Russian famine of the early nineteen-twenties and 
in the aftermath of the Japanese earth quakes during the same decade.7 Just as Roosevelt 
had come to believe by the end of the war, Truman insisted that international 
circumstances and American missionary responsibilities demanded increased 
humanitarian efforts on a broader scale; palliative measures were not enough. The 
original hope had been that the Bretton Woods institutions would take the leading role in 
such efforts, but, as the Marshall Plan had highlighted, they proved to be incapable of 
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rising to the challenge. The State Department and the White House had understood the 
limitations of the Bretton Woods institutions for some time. In fact, by 1949, ideas for the 
establishment of more permanent American-sponsored aid programs had been circulated 
for several years in unfinished form but it was only in the aftermath of the European 
Recovery Program’s political success, that these ideas were expressed in any formal 
manner. The most original suggestions came from Walter S. Salant at the Council of 
Economic Advisers to the Executive Office, and from the State Department’s Benjamin 
Hardy. Salant was an esteemed economist who had studied under Keynes at Cambridge 
and had been one of the principal economists involved in assessing U.S. resources, funds, 
and productive capacity prior to the execution of the Marshall Plan. Hardy was less of an 
academic, but had gained plenty of hands-on experience while working for Nelson 
Rockefeller’s Latin America emergency assistance operation during the war.8 Drawing 
on his experiences, Hardy advised the Administration that American foreign policy 
needed to actively promote and export American values of ingenuity, industry, and 
support; otherwise, he claimed, America would be too easily labeled as nothing more 
than a negative, anti-communist state.9   
In late 1948, at the request of the White House’s David Lloyd, Salant and Hardy 
each submitted memoranda to Lloyd, George Elsey, and Clark Clifford proposing the 
creation of an American global assistance program. They suggested that, given the 
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“almost universal yearning for better conditions of life throughout the world,” the United 
States should “convert the instrument of America’s immense technological resources…to 
the rest of the world.” Americans needed to demonstrate how “the application of 
techniques and procedures that have proved themselves in this country can directly 
benefit [underdeveloped nations], through increased production of…clothing, housing 
and other consumer goods, better public health, social conditions, etc.” Their core 
argument was the need for a new initiative to pick up where the Marshall Plan left off. 
“ERP is an emergency operation that provides a shot-in-the-arm of immediate 
consumption of goods and means boosting production in a short time. The new program, 
expected to operate effectively on less than fifty million dollars annually, would enable 
the peoples we aid to use their own efforts to continue these short-term benefits 
indefinitely.” Emphasizing science and technology, they called for making “full and 
affirmative use of one of the resources in which the U.S. is the richest and the Soviet 
Union the poorest. Our overwhelming superiority in a field of constructive effort would 
be apparent to even the most backward and illiterate people.”10   
Hardy and Salant advocated using the bully pulpit of the inaugural address to 
present this program to the American people and to the world. “This is the way to make 
the greatest psychological impact and to ride and direct the universal groundswell of 
desire for a better world…the details of planning and financing can be developed after the 
policy is set – a not insuperable task for a nation that leads the world in know-how by an 
almost incalculable margin.” The proposal expressed the familiar exceptionalist 
                                                 
10 State Department Memorandum, “Use of U.S. Technological Resources as a Weapon in the Struggle 
Against Communism, December 15, 1948.” HSTL, Walter S. Salant Papers, Box 2. 
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assumption that others craved the American way of life.11 In his diary entry the day after 
Truman’s speech, David Lilienthal cheered the project. As a former director of the TVA, 
Lilienthal was one of the most experienced thinkers on aid policy and the practical 
execution of aid programs. He concurred with the President’s assessment that there was 
an urgent need to pursue “great development undertakings throughout the world, based 
upon a sharing of our technical skills and resources.” Lilienthal considered it “an effective 
(italics in original) alternative to Communism.12 
As in the case of the ERP, Point Four’s purpose was not mere benevolence. The 
use of “financial assistance,” Lloyd later explained, was “closely linked to the 
achievement of…political and security objectives.” Foreign assistance was vital to the 
creation of new consumers of American goods. At the same time, he believed, economic 
aid programs could serve to contain Communism because they could make the 
reestablishment of “normal economic trading relationships between” America’s current 
and potential allies and “areas under Soviet domination” unnecessary. In the absence of 
increased aid, Lloyd believed, that “the Soviet bloc” would be able to “bring concerted 
economic pressure upon, [and] their trading position with the Soviet bloc would become 
dangerously weak unless they could look to some alternative source of supply and 
financing.”13  
                                                 
11Memorandum for the President, December 20, 1948. HSTL, Walter S. Salant Papers, Box 2; Walter S. 
Salant [to David Lloyd], January 11, 1949. HSTL, Walter S. Salant Papers, Box 2. See Oral Interview 
Walter S. Salant.  HSTL, Oral History Collection.  
12 Lilienthal, Journals  vol. II, pp. 448-449. 
13 Memorandum: The Problem of the Future Balance of Payments of the United States, February 16, 1950, 
FRUS, 1950, vol. I, pp. 838-841. 
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The national reception of the Point Four program was overwhelmingly positive. 
There was a surge of excitement among American reporters who felt that the United 
States was fulfilling its mission. The New York Post, in an article pretentiously entitled 
“Our World,” wrote that just “as the 19th century was Britain’s greatest, so the 20th 
century is to be America’s greatest…the world will be shaped by the outflow from 
us…from the now unexplored jungles of Africa to the now unchartered parts of the Far 
East, from…South America to the vastly productive areas of the Middle East. Europe 
will become secondary.” Truman’s programs, the columnist concluded were designed “to 
build, not simply to ‘contain.’” The Watertown Daily Times declared that Truman had 
charted “the new world role of the United States,” asking American capital “to invade 
new areas…[to] raise the living standards of millions and provide rich markets for 
American products.” Clearly the program was viewed as a mutually beneficial endeavor. 
“Our President has given his pledge to a troubled world,” the article continued. Only the 
U.S. could, the paper dramatically concluded, “light a beacon to pierce the darkness…we 
continue our crusade for peace.”14 Nothing summed up the national feeling better than 
the Washington Post’s excitement at the project. In a long and carefully argued front page 
article, the paper highlighted just how “Roosevelt’s dream” had now finally become a 
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formal “U.S. objective.” Truman, the columnist insisted, “has given the whole concept a 
push such as it never had before. He has dramatized it to the hundreds of millions, abroad 
and at home, who read or heard his inaugural address. He has thrown the whole weight of 
the Presidency into getting the problem of backward areas out of the realm of talk and 
into the realm of action.”15  
In a manner similar to that which Lodge and others had called for the year before, 
Point Four sought to make ideas the core of America’s message overseas. It aspired to 
secure goodwill abroad while simultaneously transmitting American visions of freedom 
and free enterprise, alongside skills and support, to the poorest nations on the planet. At 
the same time, it reflected a belief still prevalent in early 1949 that Americans could 
contain Communism at a relatively low cost and without undue risk. Point Four reflected, 
as Scott Lucas argues in a different context, that the Cold War was “a clash of cultures 
and ideologies,” not simply a contest of national security or economics.16  
Point Four built on the American experiences gained from running aid programs 
in Latin America as well as the Tennessee Valley Authority at home. The TVA’s iconic 
status made it a central example of American exceptionalism and a model for the export 
of American ingenuity and ideals. It was no surprise that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in the 
same year as Truman’s speech, called for Americans to enlist these achievements in the 
fight against the Soviet Union. As he grandiloquently insisted, “no other people in the 
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world approach the American mastery of the new magic of science and technology. Our 
engineers can transform arid plains, poor poverty-stricken river valleys into wonderlands 
of vegetation and power.” The TVA, he insisted “is a weapon which, if properly 
employed” could overcome “all the social ruthlessness of the Communists for the support 
of the peoples of Asia.” It highlighted what Americans considered a vital difference 
between U.S. and Soviet development strategies. Unlike the Soviet model, which was 
always followed by authoritarian control, the U.S. model allowed for the modernization 
of societies along with the development of popular government. As such, the TVA ideal 
would strengthen the relationship between the United States and the less industrialized 
countries, rather than create a relationship between an imperial power and a dependent 
country. That, at least, was how the White House and many reporters imaged it.17  
Congress allocated thirty-five million dollars to support Point Four in 1949 – 
slightly shy of Salant’s projections for the program – and although this would increase 
over time, the program never quite lived up to its supporters’ hopes. Unlike the ERP, 
Point Four never had extensive Congressional support. Seething from November’s 
unexpected loss, and already critical of Truman’s extensive domestic aid program, the 
GOP leadership balked at further increases in government spending.18 Perhaps a more 
fundamental reason for the failure of the program was the State Department’s lack of a 
bureaucracy capable of implementing such a large initiative. Unlike today, the Foreign 
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Service of the 1940s was neither trained in the execution of programs on this scale nor 
did it include an agency tasked specifically with international development in the way 
USAID would be after its creation in 1961. This shifted too much of the burden of 
planning and organization to the underdeveloped nations. Unlike the European response 
to Marshall’s proposal in June 1947, these nations possessed neither the basic 
organizational structures nor the unity to shape an initial response to the program that 
might have inspired a more determined American effort.  
Because of its shortcomings, diplomatic historians have tended to neglect Point 
Four or treat it with scorn; it is at best a footnote in most scholarship on the early Cold 
War. This dismissal is unfortunate. The very fact that this fourth point in Truman’s 
inaugural address followed the United Nations, the Marshall Plan, and NATO as the first 
three points implies that this was not a slight idea conceived without purpose. When 
considered on the long axis, Point Four reflected a growing belief that modernization 
ought to be an active component of American foreign policy strategy. It was, as Ekbladh 
shows, an extension of the less organized aid programs of the thirties in Asia and Latin 
America. Point Four’s real significance is not that it never managed to create a fully 
sustainable recovery program for the underdeveloped world, but that it represented an 
attempt to encourage world development that for a short period showed great promise 
and inspired great ideas.19  
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***** 
The intensification of the Cold War diminished Point Four’s prospects.  At no point did a 
vacuum of calm develop that would allow for the complex planning and fine-tuning of 
the program. The Cold War was too powerful. In part, American ideology was to blame. 
Having created the Soviet Union as an existential threat to the American way of life, 
Americans were too easily distracted by other events, no more so than at home.  
Two months after Truman’s inauguration, visitors from across the world gathered 
in New York City for the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace. Sponsored 
by the National Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions operating under the 
Moscow run front-organization known as the World Peace Council (WPC), it was an 
exhibition in propaganda. Communists, socialists, and fellow travelers from the U.S., 
Europe, and the Soviet Union – at least those who were not denied entry visas – used the 
stage to present their views on a variety of issues. Under the protection that freedom of 
speech provided, men like Alexander Fadayev, one of the primary Soviet propagandists 
and writers of his generation, denounced the Western world as an “antidemocratic, 
reactionary, imperialist camp led by the ruling circles of the United States of America.” 
He and others, including many American speakers, criticized Truman’s policies as 
militaristic, claiming that the soon to be formalized North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
and U.S. atomic energy policy were nothing more than warmongering.20 
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 The general American reaction to the event was anger and frustration. In its 
editorial pages, Life scorned not just the Communists who came from overseas but also 
those operating within the United States. In a powerful picture spread, the magazine 
exposed fifty prominent Americans for the “glamour, prestige” and “respectability” they 
had provided the meetings through their support. While acknowledging that Norman 
Mailer, Arthur Miller, Corliss Lamont, and the Congressmen and church leaders in 
attendance were not necessarily covert operatives for the Kremlin, the magazine left no 
doubt that they were “dupes” aiding the enemy. 21  The House Committee on Un-
American Activities (HUAC) issued a scathing report condemning the meeting. In over 
sixty pages, it singled out each participant and denounced the entire proceeding as “a 
supermobilization of the inveterate wheelhorses and supporters of the Communist Party 
and its auxiliary organizations. It was in a sense a glorified pyramid club, pyramiding into 
one inflated front the names which had time and again been used by the Communist 
decoys for the entrapment of innocents.”22 It was an interesting choice of words for a 
Committee not known for its concern with entrapment, but it captured the national mood 
well. 
 The recently established Commentary magazine dismissed the event as nothing 
more than a “propaganda spectacle” with no attempt to instigate “a genuine intellectual 
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debate.” The intellectual William Barrett demanded an American alternative. In this 
“mortal struggle” against international Communism, he called on the writers and 
intellectuals in the United States to suit up.23 Intellectuals needed to work harder to reach 
the public and to explain what was at stake. He viewed the slogan “No Slavery!” as the 
most suitable counter phrase to the challenge to Communism. It was an apt statement for 
a nation that historically and culturally tended to define the absence of freedom as 
bondage. Barrett, alongside intellectuals like the philosopher Sidney Hook and Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., joined the chorus of public figures emphasizing the advancement of 
“ideas” as a winning Cold War strategy. Explaining what set the free world apart, they 
argued, was a necessary weapon in the fight against a foe that ruthlessly exposed citizens 
around the world to propaganda. The New Republic, Time, and the Saturday Evening Post 
seconded these assessments. The former called for an American alternative to the 
“Communist International” and declared that the “world’s battle” in which Americans 
found themselves was ultimately a clash “between two universal faiths.” In this crusade, 
“commitment” to the cause would determine the winner.24 
 To many of the reporters covering the WPC Conference, it was the number of 
American participants that caused the greatest surprise, though it hardly should have. By 
the spring of 1949, the government had effectively exposed a number of Americans 
inside and outside of government who still maintained, or had maintained in the past, 
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relationships with the Communist Party or with Moscow-backed front organizations. 
Although reports indicated that members of the Communist Party in the United States 
had dropped from 80,000 in 1944 to just 23,000 in 1949, the threat appeared more real 
than ever.25 Eventually, the search and exposure of Soviet collaborators and sympathizers 
would take on the name McCarthyism, but such efforts began long before McCarthy rose 
to prominence and continued well after the Senate censured him in 1954. By 1949, 
conformity with American global ideals or alienation from American society were 
becoming the only two options.  Either one was with the Americans or one was with the 
Communists. The Conference in New York only confirmed the widely suspected view 
that Truman’s loyalty programs begun in 1947 were indeed justified. Less than a year 
before, Elizabeth Bentley, yet another former Soviet informant to come forward, had 
accused a number of government officials of espionage, including Harry Dexter White. 
Another, though not singled out by Bentley, Alger Hiss, went on trial for perjury (the 
statute of limitation for espionage had expired) just weeks after the Conference ended in 
New York. The Hiss case was among the biggest court spectacles of the Cold War. Hiss’ 
presence at Yalta alongside Roosevelt and his prominent list of friends, which included 
Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Eleanor Roosevelt, provided fodder for 
conservatives who publicly insisted that the State Department was deliberately aiding and 
abetting the Communists.26   
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 In this kind of atmosphere, many intellectuals heeded William Barrett’s call and 
joined the crusade for an American world order. By the end of the year, Conyers Read, 
President of the American Historical Association, used the AHA’s annual dinner to insist 
that in this age of transition Americans would “either be ruled by a dictatorship or by a 
government democratically controlled.” He went on to insist that   
The antidote to bad doctrine is better doctrine, not neutralized' intelligence. We must 
assert our own objectives, define our own ideals, establish our own standards and 
organize all the forces of our society in support of them. Discipline is the essential 
prerequisite of every effective army whether it march under the Stars and Stripes or 
under the Hammer and Sickle. We have to fight an enemy whose value system is 
deliberately simplified in order to achieve quick decisions. And atomic bombs make 
quick decisions imperative. The liberal neutral attitude, the approach to social 
evolution in terms of dispassionate behaviorism will no longer suffice. Dusty 
answers will not satisfy our demands for positive assurances. Total war, whether it 
be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume his part. The 
historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist.27  
 
HUAC hearings, arrests, and suspicions fed the convictions of people like Conyers Read 
and William Barrett that the threats from domestic Communists were not merely 
academic. 
***** 
The growing fear of Communism at home appeared all the more pertinent in light of the 
events occurring far from American shores during the last four months of 1949. On 
September 3, a U.S. military reconnaissance plane detected an elevated radioactive count 
over the northern Pacific. In the coming days, other planes recorded similar levels of 
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radiation. The conclusion was inescapable: the American atomic monopoly had been 
broken.28  
The Truman Administration’s initial reaction was incredulity. For four years, a 
debate had raged within the Administration over whether the Soviet Union would get the 
bomb in the near future. At a Cabinet Meeting in late September 1945, Truman had asked 
his primary advisors to respond to a memorandum from Henry Stimson which advocated 
greater international cooperation on atomic weapons.29 Eventually, that memorandum 
would lead to Byrnes’ meetings with Stalin in December on U.N. collaboration on 
nuclear weapons and the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Yet, at the time, some Cabinet 
members strongly opposed such steps, because, according to Costigliola’s recent account, 
they thought the creation of the atomic bomb a uniquely American achievement. 
According to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, the Russians were “oriental in their 
thinking” and, as such, incapable of replicating the American feat.30 While Americans 
may have funded the bomb project, Forrestal’s view ignored the contributions by a long 
list of European scientists to the Manhattan Project. Nevertheless, other Cabinet 
members, including Attorney General Tom Clark and Secretary of the Treasury Fred 
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Vinson, the latter a man Truman had great respect for, joined Forrestal in opposing 
Stimson’s suggestions. Not long after, General Leslie Groves, the former Director of the 
American bomb project, aligned himself with this view as well.  “Never before has 
anyone mastered such complexities in so short a time and under such pressure,” he 
insisted. “Maybe I will be accused of overrating American ability but in answer I point 
to” the atomic bomb “as my justification.” Like Forrestal, Groves was of the view that no 
one “but the men who built [the bomb] know its complexity and the almost impossible 
close tolerances required.” No other nation could replicate the achievement.31  
 In fairness, most members of Truman’s cabinet disagreed with this ode to 
American exceptionalism. They accepted the view advocated by scientists that there was 
no permanent American advantage. Nevertheless, no one had expected the Soviet Union 
to break the monopoly so soon. Only a year prior to “First Lightning,” the codename the 
Soviets gave their first atomic explosion, the Director of Central Intelligence, Rear 
Admiral Hillenkoeter, explained to Truman that since the intelligence community’s 
report on the “Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program” had been delivered to the 
Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee in 1947, nothing had given the CIA 
reason to alter its assessment of Soviet capabilities. By implication, the DCI, significantly 
enough, made clear that Soviet atomic espionage had either been unsuccessful or was of 
minor concern. Hillenkoetter explained that while it continued to be impossible to 
determine the exact status of the Soviet atomic program, “or to determine the date 
scheduled by the Soviets for the completion of their first atomic bomb,” intelligence 
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indicated that “the highest Soviet authority was seriously disturbed by the lack of 
progress.” Based on this intelligence, the CIA concluded “that the earliest date by which 
it is remotely possible that the USSR may have completed its first atomic bomb is mid-
1950.” The most “probable date,” the CIA believed, was “mid-1953.”32   
 In this context, “First Lightning” shocked the American political and intelligence 
communities. More significantly, it shocked the American public and the media. 
“Hiroshima has shaken the whole world,” Stalin had insisted four years earlier. The 
“balance,” he believed, had “been destroyed.” Now it had been shattered once again. 
Lilienthal learned the news of the Soviet test while on vacation. “The feeling in the 
abdomen,” he recalled in his dairy, “here it is [What we’d feared ever] since January 
1946…we are here.33 Following the advice of Lilienthal, Truman informed the public on 
September 23 that the White House had evidence “that within recent weeks an atomic 
explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.”34  
 In Congress, a melancholy Arthur Vandenberg professed that this “is now a 
different world.”35 Americans instantaneously worried about Soviet delivery methods via 
long range bombers modeled on the American B-29, via rockets delivered from 
submarines, or via cargo ships docking in American harbors. In truth, the Soviets 
possessed no real delivery capabilities, but J. Robert Oppenheimer, the nation’s primary 
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scientist on atomic energy and a consultant to the Truman Administration, calmed few 
nerves when he explained that the best way to detect a Soviet bomb arriving on a cargo 
ship was “by screw driver.” Prior to detonation, it was next to impossible to identify an 
atomic weapon.36 In a panicky letter to Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Senator 
Alexander Wiley (R-WI) insisted that now no place was safe. He called on the 
Department of Defense to abandon the Pentagon and decentralize and insisted that other 
major government offices follow suit. Fearing a sneak attack, Wiley insisted that the U.S. 
“would be a sucker for a solar plexus blow which could knock our country out of an 
atomic war a few minutes after such a war started.”37  
While most members of the House, Senate, and the Truman Administration urged 
calm, the sense of national panic proved hard to contain.38 An alarmist editorial in Life 
magazine believed that the Soviet Union, deeply troubled by Truman’s foreign-policy 
successes in 1948 and committed to “permanent expansion,” refused to accept a “steady 
contraction of power…To accept it would have been to accept at some point collapse of 
their regime and death for themselves. They did not accept it. They already had a 
timetable calling for war…This timetable they now drastically altered: they advanced the 
calculated date of war.” Life’s description of Soviet ambitions spoke volumes about 
American views of the Cold War; it was a battle of faith and ideas in which there could 
be only one victor. To accept the other’s victory would, in the end, mean the destruction 
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of one’s own global mission and one’s own faith. “Now the U.S. and the Soviet Union 
face each other, Bomb to Bomb.” Peace “acceptable to the democratic world must spell 
defeat and extinction to the men who rule Russia,” the magazine’s editorial board 
continued.39 The Alsop brothers defined the American reception of the news of the Soviet 
atomic explosion as “trancelike.”  They considered Americans “totally unprepared for the 
new situation” politically, strategically, and militarily. A “great many people may console 
themselves,” they concluded, “that perhaps the Kremlin cherishes no aggressive 
intentions. But really moonstruck powers of self-delusion are needed to believe that if the 
Soviet Union achieves superior military power this power will not be used for all it is 
worth. And in this cruel world, the moonstruck rarely survive.”40  
Four days after the President’s announcement, HUAC reopened investigations 
into atomic espionage and leaks. Before long, critics of the Truman Administration came 
to view these events as an opportunity to challenge the President and Acheson. Harold 
Velde (R-IL), later the chairman of HUAC, insisted that the Soviet acquisition of the 
bomb was “solely because the American Government…had had the official attitude…of 
being highly tolerant of, and at times even sympathetic to, the views of Communists and 
fellow travelers.” He had little time for the consistent message from atomic scientists that 
the creation of an atomic bomb was fundamentally a technological challenge; the bomb’s 
workings were not a secret that existed on paper and could simply be stolen and 
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implemented.41 But in Velde’s opinion – one that became increasingly popular after the 
later arrests of Klaus Fuchs and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg – espionage had to have been 
the principal reason for the loss of the American atomic monopoly.42  
First Lighting increased Americans’ sense that Moscow threatened their role in 
the world and, by extension, their very existence. “The grim side of the picture,” the 
Saturday Evening Post argued, “is that the Russian communist dictators are fanatically 
determined to rule or ruin. They are indifferent to human life, including the lives of their 
own people, and look upon war as a necessary incident in the achievement of policy.”43 
In this environment, there was less space for Truman’s Point Four program. As the Daily 
Boston Globe reported, “fear is a dubious counselor in the shaping of a nation’s foreign 
policy.” “[H]ysterical expediency,” bred contempt for every “constructive effort” in the 
aftermath of the Soviet atomic test. Although Point Four was intended to exhibit how 
humanitarianism and liberal ideas could top Communism, Congress, the editors dourly 
reported, now met the program “frostily” and with “unconcealed disfavor.”44  
***** 
If the Soviet atomic test represented the first serious chink in Truman foreign policy 
armor, a second soon followed. On October 1 Mao Tse-Tung declared the establishment 
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of the People’s Republic of China. With this announcement, the most populous country 
in the world had formally joined the world’s largest in the Communist camp. The Soviet 
press hailed Mao’s new regime. Isvestia declared the victorious Chinese Communist 
Revolution one of the year’s two most “stupendous events,” the other being “the world 
failure of United States calculations upon atomic monopoly.”45  
 The outcome in China was expected. For years, the Truman Administration had 
attempted to broker a truce between the Chinese Communist Party and Chiang Kai-
Shek’s Kuomintang regime in hopes of avoiding a Communist takeover. Frustrated by 
how cronyism, nepotism, and incompetence enfeebled Chiang’s government and his 
military, the Americans chose to cut their losses by 1949.46 That summer, the White 
House commissioned a State Department White Paper on the situation in China. As 
Truman explained to John Melby, one of the paper’s principal authors, the purpose was to 
write “the record and write it straight, no matter who is hurt; tell the truth. That's the best 
way to set the American public straight on this thing.”47 With Mao triumphant, Chiang 
and his nationalists evacuated to the island of Formosa (Taiwan). Here they received 
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some economic and political support from Washington but as the State Department White 
Paper revealed it, Taiwan was a lost cause. In case of war with Mao’s forces, Chiang 
would receive no aid. As Assistant Secretary of State W.W. Butterworth explained to the 
British Ambassador, Washington did not deem the nationalist regime “significant enough 
to make it desirable for the U.S. Government to employ force to prevent the Island from 
falling under the control of the Communists.”48   
 In general, the Truman Administration’s postwar approach to the Far East lacked 
the overall coordination that characterized its policy elsewhere. Since the end of the war, 
only Japan had received a level of attention comparable to that of Europe. As in 
Germany, the American mission in Japan sought to transform the former enemy into a 
responsible power at home and eventually abroad. The key components of the occupation 
policy, from which the Americans deliberately excluded the other Allied powers, were 
modernization and democratization. Under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, 
and with administrative support provided by the State Department, the Americans sought 
to end feudalism, militarism, and discrimination.49 Enemies that had posed a threat to the 
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American role in the world were uprooted, their ideology crushed, and their society 
recast. As George Atcheson, Jr., a political advisor to MacArthur, explained in a long 
classified letter to Truman less than six months after the Emperor’s surrender, “the 
democratization of Japan” was under way and included “mandates for freedom of speech, 
press, and assembly, abolition of thought control, universal suffrage,” financial, 
industrial, and agrarian reforms, and “the demilitarization of education.”50 Americans 
deemed economic aid and wide-ranging democratic reforms vital, because “if they were 
not exposed to the American form of progress,” despondent peoples might be “hijacked 
by false forms of modernity.” In George Atcheson’s view, the Japanese were “groping 
for a new ideology to replace the shattered one.” He was insistent, however, that with 
“American efforts, democratic ideas will grow among the people [as] underprivileged 
people seek to gain for themselves some measure of the individual freedom and dignity 
which Americans have struggled for and have achieved.”51 No one seemed to question 
whether the American development model was transferable to the Far East.  
The conditions that secured American control over Japan’s reconstruction were 
not present in Korea. There, at the end of the war, Americans had to contend with joint 
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Communist occupation of the old Hermit Kingdom. While Soviet officials selected and 
trained Korean Communists to control the country north of the thirty-eighth parallel, 
American forces took charge of the country’s southern half. This demarcation was to be 
temporary; it was a practical measure designed to lead Korea toward independence and 
unification. The Cold War’s influence after 1947, however, precluded such an outcome. 
When in November of that year a U.N. resolution called for nation-wide elections to 
ensure unification, the North refused to partake. Americans moved forward alone, and in 
the summer of 1948, the United Nations oversaw and approved the election of an 
assembly and, subsequently, of Syngman Rhee as President of the Republic of Korea.52 
According to the NSC, the goal of American policy was “a united, self-governing, and 
sovereign Korea…independent of foreign control and eligible for membership in the 
U.N….[and] fully representative of the expressed will of the Korean people.” As in 
Japan, the purpose was “to assist the Korean people in establishing a sound economy and 
educational system as essential bases of an independent and democratic state.” So as to 
prevent any charges of American imperialism, the Council specifically called for the 
withdrawal of all “remaining U.S. occupation forces…as early as practicable” given these 
objectives for Korea’s future. Despite the fact that Korea was teetering on the brink of 
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civil war, this withdrawal continued during 1949 and early 1950 as the U.S. continued to 
demobilize in South Korea while the Red Army also evacuated the North. Americans 
understood that Syngman Rhee often exercised strongly antidemocratic policies. But to 
those who criticized the often harsh regime, U.S. Ambassador to Seoul John Muccio 
explained that since the capital was less than thirty miles “from where its soldiers and 
police are frequently engaged in armed conflict [and] the Pyongyang radio fills the air 
with demands for the liquidation of every member of the Government…it has been 
difficult for me privately to advise the Korean President against certain extreme 
measures.”53  Americans worried about Korea’s ability to proceed as a divided nation and 
had grave concerns about the ability of Korea to democratize without extensive Western 
supervision. Nonetheless, the hope in Washington was that the U.S. had done its duty in 
helping to shape the beginning of a democratic nation.54  
In comparison to Korea and Japan, the U.S. role in South East Asia was limited. 
Except for a small contingent of OSS officers, Americans played no part in overseeing 
the Japanese surrender. When the war ended, France returned to its colonies in Laos, 
Cambodia, and Vietnam. As Edgar Snow rightly saw it in 1946, there would be no “four 
freedoms in Indochina.”  In light of Ho Chi Minh’s attempt to establish an independent 
Vietnamese state in September 1945 and the United States’ later involvement in Vietnam, 
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it is tempting to criticize the Truman Administration for having abandoned the principles 
of anti-imperialism and national self-determination. But the American unwillingness to 
prevent the French return to Indochina should not be interpreted as approval. Americans 
did not put the same kind of pressure on France as they did, for example, on the Dutch in 
Indonesia, because they were convinced of Ho’s Communist leanings and because they 
did not want to undermine France’s status in Europe. As Washington Post reporter Ernest 
Lindley explained it, however, Americans expected that Indochina would be returned to 
France with “specific conditions…looking toward independence.”55  
Like Roosevelt, Truman despised European imperialism. At the same time, he 
shared his predecessor’s belief that the underdeveloped world required tutelage before 
independence.  It had consistently been American policy that the “sudden withdrawal of 
imperial authority…would lead either to chaos or to the setting up of local 
dictatorships.” 56  As in  their own previous efforts in the Philippines, American 
policymakers therefore considered tutors necessary to guide the underdeveloped peoples 
of Indochina. As explained in chapter three, the United Nations Trustee program that the 
Roosevelt Administration had pressed so hard for had been designed to ensure that this 
could be executed without the European powers regaining the kind of control they once 
possessed and that “less civilized” nations would be led toward independence. Since the 
trustee program had stalled in the U.N., the French appeared to be the only option. Ho 
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had originally asked for U.S. recognition in September 1945,  before the French returned 
to Vietnam but the Truman Administration had proven uninterested. In accordance with 
the long established view, the Vietnamese were not considered capable of ruling 
responsibly without Western guidance.  
Partly because they knew little of Indochina, and partly because the region in the 
context of the global postwar chaos was of little importance, Truman and Acheson never 
appreciated just how irreconcilable the French goals and the Indochinese nationalists’ 
demands actually were. Americans did pressure Paris to find a solution that would limit 
French influence and secure nationalist political influence, but otherwise they issued few 
demands. In May 1947, less than two months after the announcement of the Truman 
Doctrine, Marshall told Jefferson Caffery, the American Ambassador to Paris, that 
Washington was increasingly “concerned about the slow progress toward a settlement” 
on the independence issue. At the same time, the Secretary of State remained 
apprehensive that following the relaxation of European control, “internal racial, religious, 
and national differences could plunge new nations into violent discord [and that as a 
result,] Communists could capture control.” Marshall explained to Caffery that the 
Administration considered the “best safeguard” against this to be “continued close 
association between newly-autonomous peoples and powers which have long been 
responsible for their welfare.” Americans did continue to lean on France even after Paris 
established the quasi-independent State of Vietnam under the leadership of former 
Emperor Bảo Đại in March 1949. Relaying their experience from Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
China, the U.S. Ambassador in June explained to the French Foreign Minister, Robert 
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Schuman, that France would not be able to provide for the “legitimate aspirations” of the 
Vietnamese people if “they failed to obtain the support of truly nationalist elements” in 
Vietnam. Washington wanted independence for Vietnam, but not at the cost of 
Communism.57  
 As is evident from this brief overview, U.S. policy in the Far East was 
unorganized for most of the early postwar period. Although Americans ideologically 
engaged the Cold War as a universal struggle, the absence of a serious Communist threat 
in the region resulted in a muddled approach. Only Mao’s rise to power caused a 
recalibration of U.S. policy in the Far East. Three weeks after the declaration of the 
People’s Republic of China, the NSC concluded that, for the foreseeable future, “it is the 
USSR which threatens to dominate Asia through the complementary instruments of 
Communist conspiracy and diplomatic pressure supported by military strength.” 
American policy “must be to reduce the power and influence of the USSR in Asia to such 
a degree that the Soviet Union will no longer be capable of threatening…the peace, 
national independence or stability of the Asiatic nations.”58 To counter Moscow, the NSC 
insisted that the U.S. objective for Asia must be “the development of friendly, stable, and 
self-sustaining states in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter.” Because of their individual weakness and their inability to defend 
themselves in the last war, the NSC believed that the Asian countries would follow the 
European example and “draw together” to form a united front.  It should be U.S. policy to 
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“participate in and guide such an association [of Asian nations] toward harmony with the 
free world.” Participation, the Council warned, “should be based upon equality and 
partnership,” not on American overlordship.59 
 A well-developed aid program might have gone a long way to assist in the 
creation of such collaboration between the Americans and the nations of the Far East. In a 
January 1950 address to members of the Americans for Democratic Action in 
Washington, D.C, Walter Salant called for the “vigorous prosecution of the Point Four 
Program” in Asia.  This, he believed, would allow Americans to pursue a policy in which 
they sought to align themselves with democratic forces across the underdeveloped world. 
“Point Four…is an attempt to supplement the necessary but essentially negative policy of 
mere military containment with a constructive program for remedying the conditions of 
want and hunger…upon which anti-democratic forces thrive.60  
Salant’s speech elucidated how the Truman Administration hoped to navigate a 
course between positive reforms through Point Four aid and increased security measures 
through military aid.61 Overall, however, the State Department had a poor sense of how 
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to establish an effective counterweight to Communism. They never truly understood that 
there was little likelihood of a natural partnership among Asian nations and no natural 
inclination toward democracy. To foster that would have required a far greater meliorist 
effort. As early as 1946, George Atcheson warned Truman that here, “[L]iberalism is 
vague and difficult to define.” Communism, in contrast, “is positive and concrete.” 
Americans hoped that elections in Korea and increased pressure on the French in 
Indochina would help bring about liberal economic and political reform. They likely 
should have heeded Walter Lippmann’s warning that the “masses of Asia have known 
little or nothing of freedom, or of the gospel of the equality of human persons.” He saw 
little hope that this would change in the immediate future. This left Asia vulnerable to an 
extent that the Truman Administration appreciated only once war was upon them. 
***** 
At “the half mark of the century,” the influential New York Times columnist Arthur 
Krock insisted, “every government policy, act and thought of Washington is based on” 
international Communism. He considered it “the most sinister [threat]…of the first half 
of the twentieth century.” 62 George Kennan’s prophecy that containing Communism 
would, in time, ensure the ideology’s collapse had by now lost much of its credibility. 
The dam had been breached, and Communism now challenged Americans not only in 
Europe but around the world as well. Americans perceived the dual danger now 
emanating from Moscow and Beijing as a direct threat to the American way of life. 
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Washington suffered another setback in mid-February 1950 when Stalin and Mao, side 
by side, announced the establishment of a formal alliance between the Soviet Union and 
the People’s Republic of China. With this announcement, Communism appeared 
monolithic and on the march; it was not suffering from the internal disorder Kennan had 
predicted. To Americans, this Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual 
Assistance was just “as disturbing as the German-Italian-Japanese” Tripartite Pact of 
1940 had been.63 Its goal, Washington believed, was nothing less than world domination.  
In early 1950, Truman requested from his national security team an extensive 
review of U.S. foreign policy.64 This task fell principally to the State Department’s Paul 
Nitze, who had replaced Kennan as Director of the Policy Planning Staff in January. 
Kennan and Nitze had originally collaborated closely on the PPS, but their different 
interpretations of the Cold War had steadily driven a wedge between them throughout 
1948 and 1949. Kennan did not believe that Stalin would engage in reckless military 
action, and, as a result, was adamant that the United States’ primary Cold War weapon 
should be its economic potential. “Military commitments,” he explained in a 1948 NSC 
memorandum, should “only” be in cases of “immediate” need. 65  In contrast, Nitze 
viewed Moscow as a force driven by a messianic quest for control of the world. He had 
“studied, almost memorized, Spengler’s Decline of the West,” and he believed that fate 
literally awaited the American designed world order if the Truman Administration failed 
to act resolutely. It is an exaggeration to label Nitze a hawk and Kennan a dove, as one 
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journalist recently did in an account of the two men, but there is little doubt that Dean 
Acheson’s selection of Nitze to head the PPS signaled that Kennan’s approach to the 
Cold War had run its course.66   
The reassessment of policy that Truman had requested reached his desk in April. 
Formally known as National Security Memorandum 68 (NSC-68), it called for a dramatic 
reversal of postwar defense policy in order to bring America’s military capabilities in line 
with its commitments around the world. Less than two years earlier, the NSC had 
confidently concluded that “if Western Europe is to enjoy any feeling of security at the 
present time, without which there can be no European economic recovery and little hope 
for a future peaceful and stable world, it is in large degree because the atomic bomb, 
under American trusteeship, offers the present major counterbalance to the ever-present 
threat of Soviet military power.” At that point, all military options remained on the table. 
General Omar Bradley confirmed this in July 1949, when he told the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee that “the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the 
atomic bomb.” 67  Although the Soviets for now lacked a delivery system, the 
psychological impact annulled the American atomic trump. In response, NSC-68 
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recommended a “rapid buildup” of both conventional and nuclear forces, increased 
psychological warfare and covert operations against the Soviet Union and her satellites, 
and accelerated research and development of the hydrogen bomb.68 In short, NSC-68 
sought to ensure superior overall power for the United States. If this objective failed, the 
authors warned, the Soviet Union could, by 1954 – the year they referred to as the “year 
of maximum danger” – at least reach parity with the U.S. atomic capabilities. At that 
point, they argued, Moscow would be tempted to launch an unprovoked strike against the 
United States and its allies. 
 Far more than a mere call for rearmament, NSC-68 was the principal document of 
American Cold War ideology. It was a policy recommendation, but it read like a sermon. 
In precise, yet hyperbolic, language, the top secret document demonized the Soviet 
Union’s “design” on the world order. It portrayed the Kremlin as animated “by a fanatical 
faith, antithetical” to Americans’ vision of global democracy. The Communists were 
“implacable” in their desire to “destroy” Americans’ “purpose” in the world. NSC-68’s 
central message was that the United States must “lead in building a successfully 
functioning…free world. It is only by practical affirmation abroad as well as at home, of 
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our essential values, that we can preserve our own integrity in which lies the real 
frustration of the Kremlin design.” Americans, the authors concluded, “must fight if 
necessary to defend our way of life,” and must seek to create global conditions “under 
which our free and democratic system can survive and prosper.”69  
 Given the nominal peace that still existed in early 1950, a normal power might 
have been satisfied with simply frustrating the potential antagonist’s future moves. NSC-
68’s emphasis on American “purpose” and Communist “design,” however, indicated that 
mere containment was no longer enough. The mutually exclusive nature of the two 
ideologies and the conspiratorial nature of Communism dictated that the Truman 
Administration pursue the destruction of the enemy. Kennan had implied similarly in his 
Long Telegram and in his X-article, but never with the sense of urgency Nitze showed. 
History had taught Americans, the writers of NSC-68 believed, that ideologues and 
aggressors never negotiated in good faith and only abused “peace” as a tactical 
opportunity to wage war by other means. To counter this, they insisted that the objective 
of U.S. policy be the annihilation of the Soviet Union’s “power and influence” in the 
world and the eventual “decay” of Communism everywhere. Since “’preventive’ war – in  
the sense of a military attack not provoked by a military attack upon us or our allies –  
was “unacceptable to Americans,” Nitze and his associates called for Americans to 
“project” their “moral and material strength [and bring about]…a fundamental change in 
                                                 
69 NSC 68, FRUS, 1950 vol. I, pp. 235-292.  
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the nature of the Soviet Union system.” There could be no negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. Total Cold War was to be U.S. policy.70  
 The State Department’s principal experts on the Soviet Union, George Kennan 
and Charles Bohlen, played no significant part in the NSC-68 process. Of the two, 
Bohlen was more sympathetic to Nitze’s work, but neither man approved of the 
document’s tone or message. In their opinion, Moscow was neither fanatical nor 
inherently militaristic or expansionist. Capabilities, they insisted, did not equal 
intentions.71 As Bohlen later complained, Nitze’s team appeared to have made no serious 
effort to analyze “Soviet thought in regard to war between states or the even more 
elementary fact that any war [would also carry] major risks to the Soviet system in 
Russia.”  The charge was not unfair but Nitze had little time for what John Lewis Gaddis 
has aptly called Kennan’s “preference for prophecy.” Nitze believed in numbers and data. 
He would not allow Soviet capabilities to outpace Americans’ on the hunch that Stalin 
did not intend to go to war.72  
 In the view of many diplomatic historians, NSC-68’s aggressive language 
primarily reflected Acheson’s and Nitze’s determination to convince the budget 
conscious President to accept increased military spending. As evidence of this, most 
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present Acheson’s comment that the proposal was intended first “to bludgeon the mass 
mind of ‘top government,’” and then the public, into accepting the necessity of 
strengthening the U.S. military.73 Truman certainly was, as Arnold Offner expertly shows 
in his biography of the President, in many respects a simple man. He often brought a one-
dimensional approach to government affairs. In order to explain the quadrupling of 
defense spending that Nitze estimated necessary to implement NSC-68, “bludgeoning” 
the President may indeed have been a useful tactic.74 
 Some scholars simply view this rearmament as central to the establishment of an 
American empire overseas and to the protection of American capitalist interests abroad. 
More recently, in what can best be described as a spin-off of early Cold War revisionism, 
Curt Cardwell insisted that NSC-68 and U.S. Cold War policy in general were 
exclusively intended to protect U.S. economic interests. National security concerns, he 
argues, were mirages created by U.S. officials to scare the Congress and the American 
people into supporting policies of economic expansion. NSC-68’s hyperbolic language 
reflected American concerns over their prospective allies’ balance-of-payment problems 
rather than the threat of the Soviet Union as an ideological power. While few scholars 
subscribe to Cardwell’s radical thesis that the Truman Administration did not fear the 
expansion of Communism in the world or his view that their policies were exclusively 
designed to protect the U.S. economy by bridging the “dollar gap” in Europe after the 
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Marshall Plan expired, the revisionist insistence that NSC-68 was part of a project to 
extend American influence in Europe, Asia, and the Western Hemisphere and to secure 
for the United States large degrees of control over international trade and finance has 
merit.75 The American ideological vision for the world had always held, after all, that 
these geographical areas would be better off under heavy U.S. influence. In that sense, 
rearmament and a strengthened economy were central to NSC-68’s recommendations and 
its ultimate goal of a strengthened American position in the world.  
 Diplomatic historians should be careful, however, not simply to interpret the 
document’s language as a mere means to an end. NSC-68 was more than a sales pitch to 
convince the economizers. The document’s rhetorical heritage reflected a reality that 
went well beyond matters of national economic interests and security; it reflected a 
reality closely tied to American culture, beliefs, traditions, language, and heritage. NSC-
68’s insistence that the United States must “fight if necessary to defend our way of life” 
and “foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish” 
was strikingly similar to the logic of previous generations during the Revolutionary War, 
the Civil War, and the two World Wars. It defined the United States as the representative 
and protector of an ideal society and contrasted it with the Communist “other.” This 
emphasis on good and evil, on freedom and enslavement, and on purpose and design 
reflected how Americans had interpreted their global mission over time. Its Manichean 
logic reflected the kind of open-ended universal responsibility that is part of America’s 
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identity. Similarly, NSC-68’s themes of rehabilitation and conversion of the “other” have 
a substantial lineage. Etymologically, they appear in Winthrop’s Model of Christian 
Charity, in Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address, in Woodrow Wilson’s many 
denunciations of Imperial Germany, in Henry Stimson’s WW II dismissal of a world 
divided between freedom and slavery, in FDR’s speeches and fireside chats, and even in 
Kennan’s X-article. They are traceable through the modern era as well, most evidently in 
the language employed by the Kennedy and Reagan Administrations but also in the more 
recent global war on terror. Given this genealogy, NSC-68’s language cannot easily be 
dismissed as mere oratory. The central theme was not the defense of democracy at home, 
but the continuation of America’s crusade for freedom everywhere. Nitze summed up the 
mission well when, reminiscing about his time in government service, he explained that 
his happiest and most productive years were “when I was working closely with Dean 
creating a modern world (my italics).”76   
 Acheson understood that creating this modern world required both the President’s 
and the public’s support. Truman was budget conscious and, given his ambitious 
domestic program – already facing opposition from Republicans in Congress – he 
opposed excessive deficit spending. 77  The public too required guidance, Acheson 
believed. It is significant, however, that the campaign Acheson began in  the spring of 
1950 was not intended to manipulate the American public. As in the case of the Truman 
Doctrine, private and classified memoranda make clear that U.S. officials believed in the 
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message they took to the American people. They acknowledged, as one NSC-68 advisor 
put it, that the people needed to be informed “with no sugarcoating.”78 Democracy made 
blunt honesty necessary, as NSC-68 implied, but it also made exaggeration inevitable. 
Charles Beard was right, after all, when he claimed that the American system demands 
hyperbole. Nevertheless, even if the chosen language in speeches and other public 
pronouncements served propagandistically, this does not rule out that this language also 
served as a component in the actual determination of policy and public beliefs.  
As Acheson explained it to Congressman Christian Herter (R-MA), the nature of 
American democracy gave the people “a false sense of security.” The public 
underestimated, the Secretary believed, that the Cold War was “a real war and that…the 
Soviets are intent on world domination.” It was necessary to make the people understand 
that the United States was “the only real force in opposition to their movement.”79 His 
main concern was that this false sense of security might lead Americans to underestimate 
the urgency of the situation. The policy elite worried that the popular mood was prone to 
unpredictable oscillations, something that its shifting positions in both world wars 
seemed to prove. 80 What was needed, Acheson explained, was an “education in the 
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obvious.”81 That education meant bringing the ideology of NSC-68 to the American 
public in order to remind them of what was at stake.  
An excellent example of this came at the University of California, Berkeley, 
where Acheson was scheduled to deliver a major policy address in March. Chatting with 
reporters in advance of the speech, the Secretary of State defined the Cold War as an 
“irreconcilable moral conflict.” The United States was not searching for war, but 
Moscow, in Acheson’s view, was attempting to “deny us the physical environment in 
which to develop our way of life.”82 The speech Acheson delivered the next day reflected 
this view, along with the arrogant attitude that Kennan had warned Acheson of in his 
January letter cited above. More so, it reflected the barometer of righteousness that 
Americans used to distinguish Washington’s purpose from the Kremlin’s designs. 
Addressing the student crowd, Acheson explained that there could be “no moral 
compromise with the contrary theses of international communism.” He affirmed that the 
Cold War could come to an end, but only if the Soviets would support the unification and 
democratization of Germany and Korea, end their excessive veto use in the United 
Nations Security Council, collaborate on nuclear arms control, suspend their hostile anti-
Western propaganda, and withdraw their troops from their European satellites. In effect, 
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Acheson’s message to Moscow was simple:  the United States would be happy to 
negotiate with the Soviets, as soon as they ceased being Communists.83  
Acheson’s public campaign – referred to by him as an effort in “total diplomacy,” 
may, in part, have been intended to serve as a counterweight to Senator Joseph 
McCarthy’s increasingly aggressive charges against the State Department begun a month 
before. The Secretary’s message was consistent enough in the years before and since, 
however, that McCarthyism hardly suffices as an explanation.84 The American people, in 
any case, firmly endorsed the Administration’s position. To the Washington Post, the 
speech summed up the public’s view of the Cold War. “[T]heir unanimity [of support] 
furnishes a strength to this Nation’s diplomacy such as no other Foreign Minister in the 
world possesses.”85 National opinion polls going back well over a year revealed that the 
public did indeed share the Truman Administration’s concerns. In July of 1949, two 
months before the Soviet atomic bomb test, Gallup polls showed that seventy-three 
percent of Americans disapproved of Communists teaching in U.S. schools and colleges. 
The overwhelming majority of both Republicans and Democrats believed that the 
American Communist Party should be outlawed. The American people showed a similar 
apprehension regarding Soviet foreign policy. When asked in November 1949 to evaluate 
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recent Soviet foreign policy initiatives, seventy percent of Americans said they believed 
that Moscow’s goal was to “rule the world.” That number climbed to seventy-three 
percent among the college educated. In light of this, it is no surprise that the public 
supported NSC-68’s initiatives, even if they would not actually read the classified 
document for another twenty-five years. Seventy-three percent of surveyed Americans 
supported the hydrogen bomb program, and while forty-eight percent of Americans 
preferred an international agreement with Moscow on nuclear weaponry, seventy percent 
of those who supported the hydrogen bomb program believed no accommodation with 
the Soviet Union was possible. Almost seven out of every ten Americans believed the 
Soviets would use the bomb against the U.S. if it was in their possession.86  
Citizens’ concerns about  Communism only strengthened over the course of 1950. 
While Truman initially adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward NSC-68’s budget 
increases, the American people endorsed that principle.87 In late March, Gallup reported 
that sixty-three percent of Americans thought the government should increase spending 
on national defense. 88  A year after the formation of NATO, the American people 
supported that organization seven to one, while a majority of those polled in May 
endorsed the “total mobilization of all [able] United States citizens” to be ready for 
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another war. Americans may not have read NSC-68, but they unsurprisingly believed in 
its message. This is unsurprising for it reflected archetypes that ran deep within 
Americans’ historical and cultural consciousness.  
***** 
In light of the sizable amount of resources allocated to the military and the arms race 
between 1945 and 1991, it is easy to overlook that when NSC-68 landed on Truman’s 
desk in April of 1950, the Cold War was still largely a political conflict.  Between 1945 
and 1950, the U.S. armed forces demobilized and American troops came home from 
Europe and the Far East in large numbers. Until the summer of 1950, the Cold War 
remained exactly what George Kennan had expected it to be: a psychological struggle 
waged primarily by political and economic means. That mirage shattered in June 1950 in 
the valleys and mountains of Korea.  
 The U.S. response to the North Korean attack on the Republic of South Korea on 
June 25, 1950 was shaped by Americans’ sense of missionary responsibility and their 
perception of enemies constituting a threat to the American way of life. Although the 
Korean peninsula was of only marginal strategic importance, the psychological 
significance of the war proved immeasurable. Only six months earlier, Secretary of State 
Dean Acheson had publicly explained that while Japan and the Philippines fell within the 
American “defensive perimeter” in the Far East, Syngman Rhee’s South Korea, Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s Taiwan, and mainland Asia in general, would have to “rely upon the 
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations” for 
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their security.89 This was a very Kennanesque interpretation of the Asian situation that 
the author of the containment doctrine unsurprisingly favored. Once they learned of the 
Communist attack, however, Kennan and Acheson abandoned their realist position 
without hesitation. Both concurred that military action to defend Korea was necessary 
and that support of Chiang Kai-Shek and the Chinese nationalists was vital. Throughout 
the Administration, the consensus was that losing territory in Asia to the Communists 
would deliver a tremendous psychological and ideological defeat to America’s role in the 
world. NSC-68’s perspective that a victory for Communism anywhere was a loss for the 
free world everywhere proved dominant.90   
Within hours after the U.S. Embassy in Seoul confirmed the attack on South 
Korea, State Department officials informed U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie of the 
event and requested an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council.91 The 
Council met that same day in what was only its second emergency session since its 
founding. Although Stalin and Mao did not initiate the attack on South Korea, they had 
known of and sanctioned North Korean leader Kim Il Sung’s war plans. But all three 
leaders underestimated both Americans’ refusal to let South Korea fall and the United 
Nations’ ability to act.92 In protest of the U.N.’s refusal to recognize Mao’s government 
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as the representative of China, the Soviet Union had been boycotting the Security Council 
for six months when the war began. Consequently, the Soviet Ambassador was unable to 
veto the American effort, and on June 26, the Security Council adopted a U.S. sponsored 
resolution calling for North Korea to “cease hostilities” and withdraw to the thirty-eighth 
parallel. The American representative, Ernest Gross – Ambassador Austin was in 
Vermont at the time the Council convened – powerfully highlighted the U.N.’s mission 
and the significance of international law, insisting that the organization could not 
abandon “a nation brought into being by the United Nations” only two years earlier.93 
When Pyongyang ignored the resolution, the U.N. called on its members to “furnish such 
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to 
restore international peace.”94 Within days, U.S. armed forces that were on occupation 
duty in Japan, under the auspices of the U.N., engaged the Communists on the Korean 
peninsula.      
 The American decision to seek action through the United Nations rather than the 
U.S. Congress symbolized the importance that the creators of the postwar order attached 
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to the organization. As John D. Hickerson later recalled it, “the first thing, the UN, was 
just automatic. I mean it was aggression, and that we knew we were going to do.” The 
U.N. considered the Republic of Korea, which contained the vast majority of the 
population and a democratically elected government, “the only… government in Korea.” 
Truman was in Missouri at the time of the attack, but none of his advisors doubted that 
action through the U.N. was the President’s preferred choice. They were right. Truman, 
according to the State Department’s Phillips Jessup, was determined that the U.S. did not 
“let the U.N. down.” “I did this [italics in original] for the United Nations,” Truman told 
Hickerson shortly after the decision to intervene. “I believed in the League of Nations. It 
failed…we [the U.S.] started the United Nations. It was our idea.”95 Truman did not 
doubt that protecting the Republic of Korea was America’s responsibility as well. 
 More was at stake, of course, than the United Nations’ status and accountability.  
Inside and outside of government, Americans viewed the North Korean attack through 
the prism of the Communist threat to global freedom. Only a week prior to the attack, the 
CIA had described North Korea as “a firmly controlled Soviet satellite” and dismissed 
the chance of a military assault.96 This assessment was significant not only because it was 
wrong, but also because it explains why Washington, from the beginning, treated the war 
in Korea as a Cold War battle ground rather than a civil conflict. The consensus was that 
Moscow sought world domination. Korea, it appeared, was merely the first step in that 
direction. John Foster Dulles, traveling in Asia along with the State Department’s 
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Director of North East Asian Affairs, John M. Allison, at the time of the attack, relayed to 
Acheson that “to sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start 
disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.” The Secretary of State 
concurred. In Acheson’s view, the fight was with “the second team, whereas the real 
enemy is the Soviet Union.”97 Truman agreed as well. In a conversation with George 
Elsey on the day after the war began, the President “walked over to the globe standing in 
front of the fireplace and said that he was more worried about other parts of the world.” 
Looking at the Middle East, he said, here “is where they will start trouble if we aren’t 
careful.” “Korea,” the President explained to Elsey, “is the Greece of the Far East. If we 
are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they 
won’t take any next steps.”98  
At home, the media and the public’s immediate response mirrored the President’s. 
No one doubted that Moscow was behind the war. Whenever mentioned in the reports of 
the war, Kim Il Sung’s regime was portrayed as a mere Soviet puppet. The Washington 
Post instantly concluded that “the Russians have put themselves in the wrong.” As a 
result, Asian nations would not hesitate to support “a firm American policy of 
antiagression.” The columnist believed that Moscow had “engaged in a test of the 
American intention” for the world. “There can be no hesitation when so much is at stake. 
In this crisis the Government must act…so boldly as to leave nobody in suspense, let 
                                                 
97 John Foster Dulles and John M. Allison to Acheson and Rusk, June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, vol. VII, p. 
140;  Acheson, quoted in Walter LaFeber, “NATO and the Korean War: A Context,” Diplomatic History 
vol. 13, no. 4 (Fall, 1989), pp. 461-477. 
98 Memorandum: President Truman’s Conversation with George M. Elsey, June 26, 1950. HSTL, George 
M. Elsey Papers, Box 71. 
 315 
alone Russia.” Echoing this sentiment, the New York Times hoped “that the Soviet 
Government will…arrive at an answer which will put an end to the present slaughter and 
save the peace of the world.” Life too detected international Communism’s global design 
behind the operation. A two-page map sketched how Communist aggression could be 
expected to develop across Asia. It presented Korea as only one front in a Communist 
offensive already being waged by Ho Chi Minh in South East Asia that would soon 
include Malaya and Burma and then threaten India. The significance of the U.S. and U.N. 
action was “to dampen a small explosion before it became a big one– before Communist 
aggression moved elsewhere in Asia and blew up most of the Orient.”99 Truman, in a 
principled echo of Theodore Roosevelt’s visions for international order, termed the U.N. 
operation in Korea a “police action” against Communist “bandits.”100 
On July 6, the National Security Council explained to the President that the war 
“unmasked the great and growing combined military strength of Soviet Russia” and “its 
willing and ambitious satellites.” While the U.N. forces could stop aggression in Korea, it 
warned that the free world was incapable of adequately responding “if the Russians 
reimpose[d] the Berlin blockade” or moved against democracies elsewhere. As it  had 
done in NSC-68, the Council reiterated that when “they believe they are ready, the Soviet 
Union plans to attack the United States, because it is their often reiterated intention to 
rule the world.” In the interim, “the Soviet Union can be expected to harass the United 
States through such satellites as North Korea, communist China, and eastern 
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Germany.”101 The Central Intelligence Agency similarly estimated that “the basic Soviet 
objectives in launching the North Korean attack” were to “test the strength of U.S. 
commitments” and to prepare “for the further expansion of Communism in Asia and 
Europe by undermining the confidence of non-Communist states in the value of U.S. 
support.”102 There was “little doubt,” Acheson concluded to British Foreign Secretary 
Ernest Bevin in early July – long  before China entered the war, – that “Communism with 
China as the spearhead, has now embarked upon an assault against Asia, with immediate 
objectives in Korea, Indo-China, Burma, the Philippines and Malaya and with medium-
range objectives in Hong Kong, Indonesia, Siam, India, and Japan.” 103  President 
Eisenhower may have been the first to define the Domino Theory but its logic was 
prevalent during the Truman era as well.  
On July 19, in a special message to Congress – and in a subsequent radio address 
to the American people, – Truman defined the war as a Communist attack against the 
legitimate government of Korea. “The free nations face a world-wide threat. It must be 
met with a world-wide defense.” Communist leaders, by “their actions in Korea…have 
demonstrated their contempt for the basic moral principles on which the United Nations 
is founded. This is a direct challenge to the efforts of the free nations to build the kind of 
world in which men can live in peace and freedom.” Korea was “a warning that there 
may be similar acts of aggression in other parts of the world. The free nations must be on 
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their guard, more than ever before, against this kind of sneak attack.” 104  Although 
unaware of the NSC’s deliberations, Senator Lodge concurred with its evaluations. 
Korea, he believed, was simply the beginning; perhaps, it was even a diversion. He 
applauded Truman’s resolve, but he warned that the “situation with regards to Europe is 
potentially a thousand times more portentous and dangerous than the situation in Korea. 
The point of the Soviet arrow is not aimed at Korea or at Formosa or at Indo-China or at 
Iran: It is aimed at West-Germany.”105   
 Many intellectuals shared these views. Sidney Hook, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
James Burnham and many others from  the United States and Western Europe were 
attending a conference in West Berlin just as the war began. The conference was 
designed to serve as a liberal democratic counterstrike against the WPC conferences, and, 
according to Hook, the news of the war only “gave a fillip to the spirit of the delegates.” 
In exposed West Berlin, the attendees half expected to be arrested by the MVD. The 
consensus at the conference was that in the current struggle, mankind faced an “either or” 
choice in the world. Freedom or totalitarianism. Nothing less than the entire free way of 
life was at stake. In light of the Kremlin’s “crusade for world power,” the political 
theorist James Burnham dismissed any notion of neutrality. He explained that he was not 
opposed “under any and all circumstances to the use of atomic bombs.” “I am against 
those bombs now stored or to be stored in Siberia which are designed for the destruction 
of Paris, London, Rome, New York, and of Western civilization generally. I am...for 
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those bombs made in Los Alamos, Hanford, and Oak Ridge…[which] have been the sole 
defense of – the liberties of Western Europe.” In “World War III: The Ideological 
Conflict,” William Barrett praised the Administration’s response to the Communists. “At 
last,” he insisted, the authorities seem to be waking up to realize how badly the U.S. has 
been beaten in the battle of ideas.”106 
According to the Washington Post, Truman’s public announcements “put 
aggressive communism on notice that it must reckon with American might no less than 
American principle.” The newspaper insisted that there “is neither belligerence nor 
imperialism [in the U.S. attitude]. But while the United States wants no additional 
territory, it will not stand by and see one free country after another overrun by puppets of 
the Kremlin.” Life, a magazine that had been critical of Truman’s Asia policy in the past, 
took a similar stand. Luce’s magazine summed up “the reaction of the plain man” with a 
simple exclamation:  “[A]t last!” According to its editorial board, both “the president and 
the plain man are to be congratulated: the President for the courage of the decision and 
the plain man for…good judgment on a very complicated matter.”107 The reference to the 
plain man’s “good judgment,” in Life’s view, was not misplaced. Americans interpreted 
the war in Korea as part of a global war. According to Gallup, three out of four 
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Americans supported military intervention in Korea. Sixty-eight percent thought it more 
important to stop Communist expansion in Europe and Asia than to keep out of war. By 
eight to one Americans supported a U.S. declaration of war against the Soviet Union if 
the Red Army attempted to take control of West Berlin. NATO’s approval rating jumped 
above eighty percent with the start of the war. The U.N.’s popularity increased as well 
with over eighty percent of Americans – ninety-four  percent of the college educated – 
believing that the United Nations should create a military force ready to be deployed 
anywhere in the world.108 
Korea confirmed the American citizens’ fear that the Soviet Union threatened the 
American way of life in the world. Sixty-six percent believed Russia would use atomic 
bombs against American cities if capable of doing so, and over eighty percent believed 
that the Soviet Union aimed to become the world’s ruling power. Fifty-seven percent 
thought they were now in World War III, and only twenty-eight percent believed the war 
would not escalate into a full scale global conflict. By the time the Chinese Communists 
entered the war on North Korea’s side in November 1950, eighty-one percent of 
Americans believed that Mao was acting on Stalin’s orders. In light of these fears, 
Americans were willing to make sacrifices. Although Congress had opposed a push by 
the Truman Administration to introduce Universal Military Training in 1948 and 1949, 
seventy-eight percent of Americans in early July approved of this measure. Over seventy 
percent of Americans, according to Gallup, favored higher taxes for a military buildup. 
By the end of the year, fifty percent favored the Truman Administration’s decision to 
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double the size of the armed forces to approximately three million men. Thirty-three 
percent did not think that number sufficient.109  
When combined with the media’s coverage of the war and the Administration’s 
stance, these extensive poll numbers show a tremendous degree of clarity in American 
ideological thinking by 1950. The American public embraced a mission, and the 
protection of that mission, that went far beyond Korea. As Acheson relayed it privately to 
Bevin, the U.S. believed “that the whole future of the free world is at stake.” Reflecting 
this sense of duty, Life’s editors enthusiastically defined the Korean moment as an 
inspiration and a challenge. The United States’ responsibility was not only to protect the 
weaker nations “against all outside Communist aggression,” but to also “work with them 
to help them build up their political economies against the dangers of chaos and 
overthrow from within. It is a mighty job – a mighty tough one, a mighty interesting one. 
In the doing of this job, we shall gain as a nation more than we give. We shall gain in the 
broadening of our participation in the whole human adventure.”110  
***** 
Despite the initial enthusiasm, Korea eventually became the forgotten war. In American 
memory, it appeared as nothing more than a footnote between the Second World War and 
Vietnam. It produced neither the victory culture of the former nor the humiliation of the 
latter. As the war dragged on into 1951 and 1952, any hopes for victory faded. 
Meanwhile, at home, McCarthy’s attacks on the Democrats and the State Department 
intensified and Truman’s popularity plummeted. In March 1952, Truman announced that 
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he would not seek another term as President. But if Harry Truman was a casualty of the 
Korean War it was his handling of it, not the ideology behind it, that Americans turned 
against. Four years after the Korean War truce, John Foster Dulles, now Secretary of 
State, echoed Nitze’s views to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. International 
Communism, Dulles explained, “is a conspiracy.” Its leaders “have gotten control of one 
government after another. They first got control of Russia after the First World War. 
They have gone on getting control of one country and another…International 
communism is still a group which is seeking to control the world.”111      
The ideals that inspired NSC-68 and Point Four continued to dominate U.S. 
foreign policy in the years and decades ahead. Beginning with the war in Korea, 
Americans placed South Korea and Taiwan within their defense perimeter, began 
rearming West Germany, brought non-Atlantic nations like Turkey and Greece into 
NATO, deployed troops to Western Europe under NATO command, and eventually 
extended their influence in the Middle East, and expanded their nuclear arsenal. They 
finalized a peace treaty with Japan – without Moscow’s acquiescence – and brought 
Indochina into the Western defense system under the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization. 112 Accompanying these national security measures was an increasingly 
extensive mission of global meliorism aimed. Point Four soon ran up a 155 million dollar 
annual tab, with Truman’s immediate successors – Dwight Eisenhower, John F. 
Kennedy, and every President since – extending this aid, albeit in different forms, with a 
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dogged meliorist view. The creation of the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
the Peace Corps, and the Alliance for Progress soon followed, along with Walt Rostow’s 
full-fledged plans to modernize backwards countries.113 Communism’s rise undoubtedly 
gave these policies renewed impetus and helped institutionalize them; however, 
meliorism in American thought went back much further than the establishment of the 
international Communist movement and has long outlived it. Though Americans have 
proven  relatively incapable and often impatient nation-builders, they have continued 
their missionary efforts nevertheless. The assumption that progress is always possible and 
that it in some form is an American responsibility has never strayed far from their view of 
global developments.  
 When NSC-68 was finally declassified in 1975 – less than six weeks before the 
final Americans hastily abandoned Saigon – scholars from virtually every Cold War 
school of thought joined Kennan and Bohlen in lamenting its ideological tone and its 
overestimation of Soviet intentions and capabilities. Samuel Wells, Jr. called it an 
“amazingly incomplete and amateurish study” that overdrew the “evil nature of the 
Communist bloc” and overlooked that “many nations in the ‘free world’” had “no 
democratic or responsible government.” John Lewis Gaddis concurred. So did Andrew 
Bacevich and many others. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s relatively quiet 
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collapse, many have assumed that ulterior motives must have been behind the 
presentation of the Soviet Union in this exaggerated light.114 
At least part of the reason for this can be located in diplomatic historians’ 
aversion to the influence of ideas and their lack of appreciation for historical and cultural 
consciousness.  Too great an emphasis on rearmament, national security, and economics 
– while important – misses the point that despite all of NSC-68’s blustering rhetoric 
about Stalin’s build-up, the heart of the document reflected the heart of America. NSC-
68, read in conjunction with the national response inside and outside of government to 
the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, appears to be more of an exposé of the American 
mind than an analysis of the Soviet Union’s policies. Its ideological tone reflected the 
mutual exclusiveness of the two universal faiths. The Soviet Union was not only an 
existential threat but an obstacle to America’s global role as well. For one to prosper the 
other had to perish.  This was why containment was not enough. NSC-68’s message 
tapped an ideological vein that ran along the long axis of America’s past. The Second 
World War had confirmed the American synthesis of righteousness and responsibility. As 
Truman expressed it in 1948, “the danger that threatens us in the world is utterly and 
totally opposed to [Christian values]. The international Communist movement is based on 
a fierce and terrible fanaticism. It denies the existence of God and where it can it stamps 
out the worship of God.” Truman did not doubt that God had created Americans or that 
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he had “brought us to our present position of power and strength for some great 
purpose.”115 This is exceptionalism personified. 
 Critics may argue that the East Coast Groton- and Ivy League-educated 
policymaking elite that had long dominated U.S. foreign policy  believed that the average 
citizen would never understand the complexities of the global order and, as a result, must 
be fed simplified arguments designed for national consumption. Certainly, Acheson and 
Dulles and the vast majority of members of Truman’s Administration (though not the 
President or Clark Clifford) were cut from cloth of East Coast elitism much the same that 
Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt’s cabinets had been before them. We should be cautious, 
however, to dismiss their rhetoric as mere tools designed to deceive. It is worth 
remembering, as Bruce Kuklick points out, that those very East Coast “institutions – 
Harvard, Yale, and Princeton, chief among them – were founded to…carry sacred views 
into the profane world.”116 In any case, as the polls presented above indicate, the gap 
between citizens and policymakers on America’s global role was insubstantial.  American 
ideology, ideology carried forward from the nation’s founding, ensured that the American 
people did not need much convincing, let alone an Ivy League education, to believe that 
theirs was a special mission and that their economic and political principles were 
universally valid. They overwhelmingly, and with little resistance, embraced the Cold 
War logic because it confirmed their own identity. The Cold War of NSC-68 and Korea 
may have made Americans fearful, but it also inspired a purpose Americans longed for. It 
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epitomized the way Americans thought of their own role in the world. In that sense, it did 
not change Americans, it allowed Americans to be themselves.  
 326 
Conclusion 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s The Irony of American History may well be most eloquent exposé of 
American exceptionalist ideals. Rolling off the presses in the midst of the Korean War, 
the book bared the roots and inherent dangers of the mythology of greatness that the 
American people so wholeheartedly embraced.1 Niebuhr did not describe Americans’ 
liberal, optimistic world-view that reached maturity in the early Cold War years as an 
ideology per se, but his work exposes the  nature of America’s national self-perception in 
a manner similar to that of the preceding chapters. His philosophical framework is one to 
which scholars interested in both the overlap between diplomatic and intellectual history 
and the influences of Americans’ ideas on the exercise of power can turn if they seek an 
explanation for the undercurrents of the United States’ role in the world. Almost two 
decades earlier, Niebuhr had argued that “man” will only discover “a progressively 
higher justice and more stable peace…[if he] does not attempt the impossible.”2 By the 
time he completed The Irony of American History, he saw little hope that Americans – 
now at the pinnacle of global power – would show such prudence. He chastised 
Americans’ sense of chosenness, their naïve conviction that they possessed the power and 
the foresight to impose human will on history, and their outright refusal to recognize their 
own limitations.3  
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In precision and prescience, Niebuhr’s work is rivaled perhaps only by Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn’s works on the Soviet Union. Indeed, the two men’s despondent 
interpretations of the two Cold War rivals appear in many ways strikingly similar. 
Solzhenitsyn criticized the Soviet system for believing in Communism’s ability to create 
and navigate the human order of things and warned of the consequences that follow when 
ideologues dismiss the need for “repentance” or refuse to impose “self-limitation.” Given 
his disdain for the Soviet ideology, the Russian dissident – an inmate of the Soviet Gulag 
system when The Irony of American History went to print – would have understood 
exactly what the American theologian meant when he criticized the “deep layer of 
Messianic consciousness in the mind of America” and prophetically warned that the 
extension of power, especially in the name of good, always carried the potential for evil. 
Graham Greene, in his 1955 novel The Quiet American, captured this exact portrait of the 
United States in the shape of a young American named Alden Pyle. Attempting to bring 
democracy to South East Asia, Pyle’s idealism, naiveté, and righteousness merge to 
produce a protagonist capable of doing evil in the name of good.4    
Niebuhr’s call for humility and modesty in American foreign affairs was 
admirable but self-effacement has never been an American virtue. Niebuhr, in effect, was 
asking Americans to be something that they were not. As this dissertation shows, 
Americans’ perception of international Communism as a universal threat to freedom 
along with their intense sense of missionary responsibility overpowered realism and often 
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prudence. One example of this came in October 1951 when the editors’ of Collier’s 
magazine dedicated an entire issue to the imagined scenario of “Russia’s Defeat and 
Occupation, 1952-1960.” The contributors, which included influential writers such as 
Edward Murrow, Hal Boyle, Arthur Koestler, and Robert Sherwood, envisioned a Third 
World War in response to Soviet aggression in Europe. The imagined outcome was an 
American victory followed by the military occupation of the Soviet Union by armed 
forces of the United Nations. As had been done in Germany after 1945, the authors 
prophesized that the result of the war would be an American-inspired democratic 
reconstruction of the Soviet Union and that freedom of religion and press would 
inevitably follow as Communism collapsed. Moscow, Washington, Chicago, and other 
major cities would fall victim to atomic bombs in the process, but by 1960, as Robert 
Sherwood foresaw it in his essay, “the light” of freedom “would be shining in Russia, and 
in all other darkened places of the earth.”5  
This principle of global meliorism as a Cold War strategy and as a foreign policy 
justification, found support from Massachusetts Institute of Technology professor Walt 
W. Rostow, whose works sought to provide a roadmap for providing American-style 
modernization to all peoples. Rostow considered modernization to be part of Americans’ 
historical and cultural consciousness and believed it could be an exportable product that 
would improve the world, cement American preeminence, and contain Communism. 
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Together with his MIT colleague Max Millikan, Rostow co-authored A Proposal: A Key 
to an Effective Foreign Policy in 1957. In a language reminiscent of Truman’s Point Four 
program, their book called for Americans to aid the less developed world through the 
spread of U.S. ingenuity. The ability to do so, the authors insisted, “lies in the fact that we 
have developed more successfully than any other nation the social, political, and 
economic techniques for realizing widespread popular desires for change without…social 
disorganization.” They called on the United States “to give fresh meaning and vitality to 
the historic American sense of mission – a mission to see the principles of national 
independence and human liberty extended on the world scene.”6 This idea, which Rostow 
brought to the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations in the sixties, signaled that that the 
Cold War in American thought never revolved exclusively around the containment of 
Communism, access and markets for American trade, or, despite the unprecedented 
vulnerability exposed by the conflict, around national security. Though the Cold War was 
about all of this these things, in the hearts and minds of Americans, it was also a mission 
for the world. 
***** 
This American missionary impulse proved especially powerful through the period of 
postwar planning and into the early Cold War that followed. This period, analyzed 
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thoroughly in this study, was the first – to use a term that became popular after the end of 
the Cold War – “uni-polar moment” during which the United States envisioned the rest of 
the world, including the Soviets and the former European powers, to be moving toward 
more equitable and progressive models.7 It was this sense of exceptionalism that led 
Americans to view their victory in the Second World War as evidence of their nation’s 
greatness and global responsibility. This belief found its most vivid expressions in the 
design of, and the expectations placed on, the new international order and the institutions 
– most notable the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions – created to 
oversee it. This one-world order was always intended to align closely with American 
ideals; it was meant to be driven by the American principles of liberty, freedom, 
economic growth, free trade and provide access to markets and securing human rights.  
This postwar design cannot, of course, be reduced to a simple philanthropic 
mission. Americans sought international collaboration on U.S. terms and never 
overlooked the benefits such collaboration would provide them.  But as shown in these 
chapters, Americans truly believed that their efforts could improve the world. They 
expected progress to come not only in mammon – though Americans have always linked 
wealth to progress – but in the confirmation of their nation’s exceptionalism as well. The 
apostles for progress never doubted that the world would be better off if others embraced 
American ideals.  Few Americans questioned that only the United States possessed the 
authority, altruism, wealth, and virtue to reform the regions, nations, and continents of the 
world. That is why this study describes United States’ foreign policy as principally 
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ideological in nature. Over time, American foreign policy has been laced with a faith and 
a mission similar to that of the other major ideological forces of the twentieth century: a 
determination that theirs’ is the responsibility to alter the course of human history and 
provide for mankind an end-destination.  
In his 1955 work, The Liberal Tradition in America, the eminent historian Louis 
Hartz questioned just this kind of arrogance. Though Americans may choose to herald 
themselves as pragmatists rather than ideologues, he argued that this national self-
perception was “deceptive because, glacierlike” it “rested on miles of submerged 
conviction” that American virtues are superior. “When one’s ultimate values are accepted 
everywhere one looks, the absolute language of self-evidence comes easily enough,” 
Hartz presciently explained. Like Niebuhr, Hartz firmly supported democracy, but he 
considered Americans’ veneration of liberal ideals rather naïve. He insisted that “even a 
good idea can be a little frightening when it is the only idea a [nation] has ever had.” 
Hartz worried that that the “liberal idea” had “utter dominion over the American mind” 
and had, as a result, caused Americans’ overwhelming faith in the superiority of their 
values to become hubristic.8  
In recent years, it has become popular to characterize the United States as an 
empire. The universality of the American mission presented here, however, should cause 
scholars to consider if this label, with all its connotations, is actually appropriate. The 
point is not that the United States and the Soviet Union did not, at times, act in a manner 
comparable to the European empires – they did – but that something is lost when we 
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assign such a narrow portrayal to these powers. In contrast to the British and the French 
empires, which acquired their sense of mission and social consciousness largely as an 
addendum to an operation already underway, the United States and the Soviet Union, for 
better or for worse, embraced a mission for influence and world improvement that was 
always a part of their ideological consciousness.9 This undoubtedly must have seemed 
like a distinction without a difference to those nations that faced the brunt of American 
military and economic might. Recognizing this, however, is essential if we hope to 
understand what drives, and has driven, Americans’ role in the world. The empire thesis 
may explain why the United States entered the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth 
century, but not why it spent the next forty years modernizing the country. Likewise, U.S. 
Cold War policy cannot accurately be characterized as solely imperial or as a mere 
exercise on behalf of American businesses. Neither the United Nations nor the Bretton 
Woods institutions provided the United States the sort of exclusive control that the 
European imperialists had acquired previously. Instead, these organizations heavily 
favored the less developed nations, at least in comparison to the position these nations 
had held prior to the outbreak of the Second World War.  
Ideology provides, in my view, a more convincing explanation for America’s 
perception of its own place in the world. Americans viewed Moscow as a global threat to 
their mission, because Communism possessed a universal undertaking similar to their 
own. This was why there could be no modus vivendi with the Soviet Union. Once Stalin 
abandoned the liberal international economic order, constrained the United Nations’ 
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functional ability, rejected international oversight of atomic energy and weapons, and 
appeared – from Washington’s vantage point at least – set on pursuing traditional 
Communist expansion, the United States quickly turned the Cold War into an ideological 
conflict in which every nation and every territory assumed a tremendous psychological 
significance. The Truman Doctrine, Point Four, NSC-68, and the American response to 
the war in Korean were just the beginning. In the years that followed, the determination 
that Americans were in a battle for their very way of life caused Washington to guarantee 
Taiwan and West Berlin’s safety, intervene in Vietnam, and determine that insignificant 
nations like Guatemala, Chile, and Nicaragua could not be allowed to toe the Communist 
line. To Americans, the Cold War was a struggle between good and evil that was 
incomparable to anything the European imperial powers had been involved in, at least 
since the great wars of religion.  
Hartz hoped that Americans would eventually become a more liberal-minded 
society— one more tolerable and less fearful of others’ ideas, one that did not equate “the 
alien with the unintelligible,” and one that did not turn “eccentricity into sin.” At stake in 
the postwar order, he concluded, was “nothing less than a new level of consciousness, a 
transcending of irrational” ideals “in which an understanding of self and an understanding 
of others go hand in hand.”10 The end of the Cold War has left little reason to suspect that 
Americans will turn in such a  tolerant direction. By 1991, as the Soviet Union collapsed, 
it was clear that the humiliation of Vietnam was just a temporary blip in Americans’ 
memories, comparable perhaps to the distaste many had felt during the Mexican-
                                                 
10 Hartz, The Liberal Tradition, pp. 11-12, 308-309. 
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American War, the war in the Philippines, or the interwar opposition to Wilson’s Great 
War. Even if many Americans acknowledged the sins of Vietnam, victory in the Cold 
War seemed to only confirm their own righteousness. Francis Fukuyama spoke of the end 
of the Cold Was as a total victory for liberalism; the neo-conservative William Kristol 
called for the establishment of “benevolent hegemony” over the world; Madeleine 
Albright defined America as the indispensable nation, asserting that the United States’ 
“stand tall and…see further than other countries into the future;” Anthony Lake, Bill 
Clinton’s National Security Advisor, called for “enlargement” to expand democracies and 
liberal economies; and, soon after, the George W. Bush’s Administration, along with 
many intellectuals, called for an expansion of American values and the democratization 
of the Middle East.11 The era between the end of the Cold War and the outbreak of the 
War on Terror only confirmed exceptionalism’s permanency in American thought and 
the  influence it has on American foreign policy. Hartz and Niebuhr, it would appear, had 
indeed asked Americans to be something they are not.   
 
 
                                                 
11 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History; William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite 
Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs vol. 75, no. 4 (July-August, 1996), pp. 18-32; Madeleine Albright, Today 
Show, NBC, February 19, 1998; “From Containment to Enlargement,” Remarks of Anthony Lake, 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 
September 21, 1993; Charles Krauthammer, Democratic Realism (American Enterprise Institute, 2004); 
George W. Bush, PPP George W. Bush, 2005, pp. 66-69. 
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